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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse comprend trois articles visant à éclairer l' impact des inscriptions croisées et 
des activités des analystes sur l'environnement informationnel des entreprises à travers le 
monde. 
Dans le premier article, nous étudions l'influence des inscriptions croisées sur la relation 
entre le cours boursier et le bénéfice tant actuel que futur de l'entreprise. Notre apport réside 
surtout dans une mesure intuitive d ' informativité des prix et dans l'examen de l'association 
qui peut exister entre cette mesure et la décision de s'inscrire à la cote américaine. 
L'informativité des prix est approximée par la quantité d'informations sur les bénéfices futurs 
que contiennent les prix actuels des actions (des prix plus informatifs doivent refléter plus 
d ' informations sur les bénéfices futurs de 1 'entreprise). Nos résultats suggèrent que 
l'inscription croisée à une bourse américaine ne contribue pas à intégrer plus d'informations 
sur les bénéfices futurs dans les prix de marché actuels. En général, il apparaît que le 
mécanisme des inscriptions croisées n'a aucun impact sur l' environnement informationnel 
des firmes non américaines. 
Le second article vise à clarifier l'impact des activités des analystes financiers sur 
l'informativité des prix. En particulier, nous examinons si ces activités améliorent le 
processus d' incorporation de l' information privée au niveau des prix de marché. L'habileté 
des analystes à prévoir ou influencer les prix des actifs financiers a fait l' objet de plusieurs 
études dans la littérature financière et comptable. Toutefois, il existe très peu de recherches 
qui associent de telles activités au processus de formation des prix (processus par lequel 
1 'information est incorporée au prix de marché des actions). Nous espérons que cette étude va 
contribuer à une meilleure compréhension de l'impact des analystes sur le processus de 
formation des prix. Dans notre analyse, nous utilisons la même mesure d'informativité des 
prix qui est proposée dans le premier papier. Par conséquent, on considère qu'une plus 
grande informativité des prix est reliée à l' incorporation de plus d'informations sur les 
bénéfices futurs dans les prix de marché actuels. Nos résultats indiquent que le suivi des 
analystes, au niveau des marchés développés, permet aux prix des actions d'incorporer plus 
d ' information au sujet des bénéfices futurs de la firme. Dans le cas des marchés émergents, 
nos résultats suggèrent que les analystes financiers agissent en tant que simples 
intermédiaires financiers au lieu d ' agents capables de réduire les asymétries d ' information au 
niveau des marchés financiers. 
Le troisième article se focalise sur la relation entre l'inscription croisée et les contraintes 
financières des firmes . L 'objectif de ce papier est d'examiner si l' inscription croisée à la cote 
américaine permet de réduire les contraintes financières des entreprises. Pour tester cette 
hypothèse, nous utilisons la relation entre l' investissement et les cash-flows comme une 
mesure d 'approximation de la présence et de l' importance des contraintes de financement. Un 
important courant de recherche interprète une plus grande sensibilité de l' investissement aux 
cash-flows comme une preuve que les firmes ont des contraintes de financement élevées. 
Xl 
Dans notre étude, nous différencions les entreprises non US qui sont inscrites à la cote 
américaine des entreprises non inscrites, et comparons la sensibilité des dépenses 
d'investissement aux cash-flows entre les deux sous-échantillons. Nos résultats indiquent une 
réduction significative des contraintes de financement pour les sociétés non américaines qui 
ont coté leurs actions sur l' une des bourses US. De plus, les bénéfices financiers associés aux 
inscriptions à des bourses US (NASDAQ et NYSE) sont plus importants par rapport à ceux 
générés par les programmes privés (Rule 144A). D ' un autre côté, les programmes qui se 
négocient sur le marché hors cote (Over-the-Counter) n'offrent pas de bénéfices financiers 
simi laires à ceux des programmes boursiers et privés. Nos résultats indiquent aussi que la 
réduction des contraintes de financement est plus prononcée pour les entreprises originaires 
de marchés émergents. 
Mots clés : Inscript ions croisées, Théorie du bonding, asymétrie d ' information, activités des 
analystes , informativité des prix, prévisions des bénéfices, dépenses d'investissement, 
contraintes de financement 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three papers addressing the impact of US cross-listings and 
analysts' coverage on the information environment of corporations around the world. 
In the first paper, we investigate how US cross-listings affect the relation between current 
stock priees, contemporaneous earnings and future earnings. Our main contribution is to 
propose an intuitive measure of stock priee informativeness that relies on fundamental data, 
namely earnings, and examine its relation with the cross-listing decision. Our summary 
measure defines how much information current stocks priees contain about future earnings 
(more informative stocks priees contain more information about future earnings). We find 
that US exchange cross-listings do not contribute to impound more earnings information into 
stock priees, in accord with the view that US exchange cross-listings have a neutra! effect on 
the firm's information environment. This result is robust to many aspects of our methodology. 
On the other hand, consistent with their minimal incrementai disclosure requirements, non 
exchange cross-listings also experience an insignificant change in their priee informativeness. 
The second paper aims at clarifying the impact of analyst coverage on stock priee 
informativeness. ln particular, we examine whether analysts' activities improve the flow of 
private information into stock priees. The ability of analysts to predict or influence stock 
priees has been the subject of extensive analysis in accounting and finance. However, there 
has been little evidence showing that analyst coverage is related to priee discovery (the 
process by which information is incorporated into stock priees) . We expect this research to 
contribute to a better understanding of how analysts impact the priee information process. ln 
our analysis, we rely on the same measure of priee informativeness we first used in paper 1. 
Therefore, we consider that higher stock priee informativeness is associated with more 
information about future earnings being impounded in current priees. Our results indicate that 
analyst coverage, in developed markets, improves the flow of private information into stock 
priees. In emerging countries, our findings suggest that financial analysts act primary as 
intermediaries rather than private information providers. 
The third paper focuses on the relation between US cross-listing and firm's financing 
constraints. The pU!·pose of this paper is to investigate whether relaxation of financial 
constraints is an important outcome of the US cross-listing decision. To test such vital 
economie role, we use the re lation between investment and cash flow as a proxy for the 
presence and importance of fi rm 's fi nancing constraints. Considerable research interprets 
greater investment-cash flow sensitivity as ev idence that firms are fi nancially constrained. In 
our study, we differentiate between cross-listed and non cross-listed firm s and compare the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity between the two subsamples. Consistent with the bonding 
hypothesis, we find that US exchange cross-listing significantly alleviates firm ' s financing 
constraints. Further, the financial benefits associated with exchange cross-listings are larger 
in comparison to private placements listings (Rule 144A). On the other hand, over-the­
Counter (OTC) programs do not offer comparable financial benefits as exchange or private 
Xlll 
placements listings . Our results also indicate that the fin ancial impact of US cross-listings is 
more pronounced for emerging markets firm s. 
Keywords: US cross-listings, bonding hypothesis, asymmetric information, analyst coverage, 
stock priee informativeness, firm -specific information, earnings forecasts , investment 
spending, financing constraints 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 
Un environnement informationnel enrichi en quantité, pertinence et précision, permet 
censément aux investisseurs de mieux appréhender la réalité économique de la firme . En 
effet, plus d ' information pertinente et précise devrait réduire l'asymétrie d'information et 
rendre l' investisseur plus apte à évaluer l' avenir de la firme. Dans cette thèse, nous étudions 
l'impact de l'inscription croisée (surtout aux États-Unis) et du suivi des analystes financiers 
sur l'environnement informationnel des firmes. En particulier, deux articles de la présente 
thèse concernent les effets de l' inscription croisée sur le processus de formation des prix et 
sur les décisions d ' investissements des firmes. Notre troisième article examine la manière 
dont les analystes financiers influent sur l' informativité des prix au niveau des marchés 
financiers . En gros, nous visons à vérifier si la cotation croisée au niveau du marché 
américain et un plus grand suivi de la part des analystes financiers sont associés à une 
meilleure accessibilité informationnelle. 
Nous privilégions divers facteurs informationnels vu que ces derniers devraient 
augmenter la visibilité de la firme et le degré d'efficience des marchés. En effet, tant les 
asymétries d'information que les carences en matière de contrôle managérial et de protection 
des actionnaires minoritaires influent sur le financement et l'évaluation des entreprises. Le 
risque que les dirigeants de l'entreprise exploitent des informations privilégiées au détriment 
des actionnaires minoritaires engendre des coûts d'agence . En 1976, Jensen et Meckling ont 
mis en relief l'impotiance de la relation principal-agent puisque chaque groupe cherche à 
maximiser sa propre utilité au détriment de l'autre. Par conséquent, les conflits d'intérêts 
actionnaires-gestionnaires peuvent freiner la bonne marche de l'entreprise (difficultés de 
fi nancement. .. ). 
Ce chapitre introductif est organisé de la manière suivante. En première partie, on aborde 
ce qui motive et résulte de l' inscription croisée. La seconde patiie donne un aperçu sur le rôle 
des analystes financiers comme producteurs d ' information. Dans ces deux parties, nous nous 
attacherons à situer notre travail de recherche par rapport à la littérature existante. 
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1. Motivations et conséquences de l'inscription croisée 
Les études abondent sur les effets de l'inscription croisée à la cote américaine. Avant l'an 
2000, la recherche, dans le domaine, est plutôt quantitative mesurant divers impacts de 
l'inscription croisée sur la valeur de la firme, sur son coût de capital et sur la liquidité de ses 
titres. Depuis 2000, le courant de recherche s'oriente vers les aspects qualitatifs, notamment 
la gouvernance d'entreprise et l'environnement informationnel des firmes. Avant de faire le 
point sur ces acquis quantitatifs et qualitatifs, nous présentons, dans un premier lieu, les 
différentes formes de la multicotation aux USA. 
2. Les mécanismes de l'inscription croisée 
Pour répondre aux besoins d'une vaste gamme d' entreprises, la place boursière 
américaine a crée plusieurs catégories d'inscription, chacune avec ses exigences et avantages 
potentiels pour l' investisseur. Ainsi , les entreprises non américaines peuvent choisir la 
cotation ordinaire, aussi prestigieuse qu'exigeante, ou encore, l' inscription via des émissions 
de certificats américains d'actions étrangères (dits «American Depositary Receipts» ou 
ADRs). Signalons que l'inscription croisée à la cote américaine se fait surtout via des ADRs. 
Ces derniers représentent des certificats négociables qui sont émis par une banque américaine 
et adossés à diverses quantités d'actions étrangères détenues en fiducie à l'étranger. 
Il existe quatre programmes d' accès (ADRs) aux marchés financiers américains qu'on 
étiquette soit par les niveaux 1, II et III ou par la régie 144A. Les trois premiers sont ouverts 
au grand public. Par contre, l'accès via la règle 144A est réservé aux investisseurs 
institutionnels (Qualified Institutional Buyers ou QIBs) . 
./ Les ADR de niveau I, également appelés «feuilles roses», se négocient sur le marché 
hors cote (OTC) et sont peu liquides. Les exigences d'information imposées à leur 
émetteur par la SEC sont minimales et les états financiers n'ont pas à être dressés selon 
les principes comptables généralement reconnus des États-Unis (US GAAP). Les ADR de 
niveau I ne permettent pas de lever des capitaux. 
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../ Les ADR de niveau Il sont choisis par les sociétés étrangères qui désirent coter leurs 
actions sur l' une des bourses américaines (NYSE et NASDAQ). Pour ce type de 
programme, la SEC exige des documents et des standards précis relatifs à la publication 
des informations financières et comptables ainsi que le respect des normes US GAAP. 
Les certificats de niveau II ne permettent pas la levée des capitaux . 
../ Les ADR de niveau III s ' adressent aux entreprises étrangères qui souhaitent, à la fois , 
lever des capitaux et être cotées à une bourse américaine (NYSE et NASDAQ). En 
contrepartie, ces entreprises doivent convertir leur comptabilité aux standards américains 
et offrir le même niveau d'information que les entreprises américaines. Il s'agit de la 
procédure la plus élaborée mais aussi celle qui est la plus susceptible d'améliorer la 
liquidité des actions et les conditions de financement des entreprises étrangères . 
../ Les ADR de type 144A ne sont pas cotés en bourse mais permettent aux entreprises 
étrangères de lever des capitaux avec des contraintes limitées (prospectus aux normes 
US), à condition de ne vendre qu'à des investisseurs spécifiques (les QIBs). 
3. Les aspects quantitatifs de l'inscription croisée 
Les écrits d 'avant 2000 sur l' inscription croisée abondent. Ils s'attachent surtout à ses 
effets sur: 
a) la valeur des actions; 
b) le coût du capital et l'exposition au risque; et, 
c) la liquidité des actions. 
En principe, l' inscription croisée aux USA n'a pas d'effet si les marchés concernés sont 
parfaitement intégrés. Comme ce n'est pas le cas, divers modèles avec barrières à 
l' investissement international sont apparus (Black, 1974; Stapleton et Subramanyam, 1977; 
Stultz, 1981 ; Errunza et Losq, 1985; etc). De tels modèles suggèrent que l'inscription croisée 
- --- ------ -- --------- -- ---- - --------- -------------------- - --------------
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sur deux marchés non intégrés a un effet positif sur le cours d'un titre et négatif sur sa prime 
de risque. 
Plusieurs travaux indiquent que les actions intercotées croissent en valeur avant 
l' inscription aux USA et peu après. Toutefois, la hausse se dissiperait dans l'année qui suit. 
Dans la littérature, la baisse qu'accuse le cours de l'action est souvent attribuée non pas à 
l'intercotation en soi, mais à des facteurs propres à l'entreprise. Ainsi, on observe une 
dissipation de valeur plus prononcée pour les petites firmes. 
En 1999, Miller étudie 181 entreprises qui annoncent pour la première fois une émission 
d' ADRs entre 1985 et 1995 . Dans son analyse, Miller recours à l'approche événementielle 
classique. Il trouve une performance moyenne anormale significative de 1.15% dans les 3 
jours ouvrables centrés sur l'annonce (-1, t=O, + 1). De plus, en accumulant les rendements 
anormaux jusqu'à t=125; Miller voit disparaitre l'anormalité dans les rendements des titres. 
Quant à Foerster et Karolyi (1999), ils ont examiné 153 firmes émettrices d'ADRs de type II 
et III sur une fenêtre de 2 ans autour du jour de l'annonce. Leurs résultats suggèrent que les 
actions intercotées connaissent cumulativement un rendement anormal positif sur 53 
semaines(- 1 an à+ 1 semaine après le jour de l'annonce) et une baisse significative dans les 
51 semaines subséquentes. Pour leur part, Errunza et Miller (2000) ont analysé l' impact de la 
multicotation sur le coût de capital de 126 firmes émettrices d'ADRs entre 1985 et 1994. 
Leurs résultats indiquent que la cotation élargie aux USA a réduit leur le coût de capital. 
Pareillement, Hail et Leuz (2009) observent aussi une baisse de ce coût suite à une cotation 
étendue aux USA. 
Pour ce qui est de la liquidité et des frais de transactions, les résultats de plusieurs travaux 
empiriques (Foerster et Karolyi , 1998 ; Domowitz et al. 1998; et Smith et Sofianos, 1997) 
suggèrent que l' écart entre le cours acheteur-vendeur diminue sur le marché domestique une 
fois le titre est inscrit à la cote américaine. On a aussi noté, sans surprise, une hausse du 
volume total négocié. Par ailleurs, une liquidité accrue suite à une inscription croisée se 
répercute en frais de transactions amoindris (Foerster et Karolyi , 1998). 
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Jusqu 'en 2000, l' hypothèse dominante voulait que l' inscription croisée profite plus aux 
firmes issues d'un marché non intégré avec ceux des USA. Depuis lors, plusieurs auteurs 
remettent en question cette hypothèse vu que : 
a) même si la multicotation peut réduire le coût de capital, 9 firmes non américaines sur 10 
n'y recourent pas (Doidge et al, 2004). 
b) les firmes cotées sur des marchés non américains qui s ' avèrent intégrés aux marchés US 
(le cas du Canada) bénéficient de l' inscription croisée tout autant que les firmes issues de 
marchés non intégrés; et, 
c) malgré 1' intégration croissante des marchés financiers, 1' inscription croisée à la cote 
américaine demeure importante. 
Devant le manque de convergences dans les résultats antérieurs, Coffee ( 1999) et Stulz 
(1999) ont amorcé un nouveau courant de recherche ou l'on relie l' inscription croisée à la 
gouvernance d 'entreprise. 
4. Les aspects qualitatifs de l'inscription croisée 
L' inscription croisée aiderait la firme étrangère à contourner les sources de conflits 
d'intérêts entre les actionnaires et les gestionnaires. En effet, en élargissant son inscription 
boursière aux USA, la firme étrangère bénéficierait d ' une meilleure régie du fait qu 'elle se 
trouve liée par des normes de gouvernance très strictes. Coffee ( 1999) et Stulz (1999) ont été 
les premiers à suggérer cette motivation de l' inscription croisée (hypothèse de l' engagement 
dite «bonding hypothesis» ). Ces auteurs estiment que 1' inter-cotation oblige les dirigeants de 
l'entreprise à respecter des normes de gouvernance accrues et à renoncer à l' expropriation des 
actionnai res m inoritaires, en contrepartie des bénéfices liés à cette opération. 
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L'hypothèse de l'engagement veut que : 
a) L'information poussée, exigée de la firme étrangère par la SEC, atténue le risque que 
les dirigeants de l'entreprise exploitent des informations privilégiées. 
b) La publication des états financiers selon les principes comptables américains pousse 
les entreprises étrangères à produire des états financiers plus informatifs en 
comparaison à ceux découlant de la seule application des normes comptables 
nationales. 
c) L'inscription en bourse américaine enrichit l'environnement informationnel de la 
firme du fait d'une couverture accrue par les médias et les analystes financiers. 
Les tests de la «théorie de 1 'engagement» portent à croire que 1' inscription croisée en 
bourses américaines profite à l' investisseur (Resse et Weisbach, 2002; Doidge 2004; et 
Doidge et al, 2009). Nos articles 1 et 3 s' inscrivent dans ce courant de recherche qui 
s'intéresse aux liens entre la gouvernance d' entreprise et l'inscription croisée. Dans le 
premier, nous testons l'influence des inscriptions croisées sur le processus de formation des 
prix. En particulier, nous voyons si en s' inscrivant à la cote américaine, l'entreprise étrangère 
permet à ces prix d' intégrer plus d' informations au sujet des bénéfices futurs de la firme. 
Notre principale contribution consiste à proposer une mesure intuitive d' informativité des 
prix qui est utilisée pour la première fois au niveau de la littérature qui traite des effets de 
l' inscription croisée. Dans le 3éme article, nous testons s'il y a ce lien plausible entre la 
multicotation d' une firme et son financement à meilleur coût. En effet, si plus de 
transparence et moins d'asymétrie d'information résultent de la multicotation, l'investisseur 
potentiel devenu plus renseigné va en exiger un rendement plus bas. 
5. Les analystes financiers et l'informativité des prix 
Le rôle des analystes au sein des marchés financiers a fait l' objet de plusieurs études dans 
la littérature financière et comptable. Généralement, les analystes sont considérés comme des 
experts dont le rôle principal consiste à émettre des prévisions sur les résultats futurs de 
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l'entreprise et à analyser les entreprises qu'ils recommandent par la suite à l'achat ou à la 
vente. Ces agents financiers ont été étudiés, principalement, en rapport avec 1 ' hypothèse 
d' efficience des marchés. Ils ont aussi fait l'objet de recherches qui confrontent l' hypothèse 
de la rationalité à celle des biais cognitifs (1 ittérature behavioriste ). Par ailleurs, certains 
auteurs se sont aussi intéressés aux motivations économiques des analystes financiers et de 
leurs employeurs (banques d'affaires et sociétés de courtage). À travers notre deuxième 
article, nous espérons apporter une contribution au niveau de l'impact des activités des 
analystes sur 1' informativité des prix. Pour cela, nous utilisons la même mesure 
d' informativité des prix qui est proposée dans notre premier article. Notre objectif est de 
tester si un suivi plus accru de la part des analystes se traduit par des prix de marchés 
reflétant plus d' informations sur les bénéfices futurs de l'entreprise. 
Dans la perspective de l' hypothèse d'efficience semi-forte, si les analystes financiers sont 
capables de collecter de 1' information privée, la publication des résultats de leurs recherches 
devrait être associée à des rentabilités anormales. Plusieurs études ont analysé cette question 
fondamentale et les résultats de ces recherches montrent que les recommandations des 
analystes créent de la valeur pour leurs clients (Womack, 1996; Green, 2006 et Barber et al. 
20 l 0). En 1996, Womack teste la réaction des prix et du volume des transactions aux 
recommandations des analystes financiers. Ses résultats suggèrent que les rendements des 
actifs financiers augmentent en moyenne de 5% à la suite d ' une recommandation à l'achat 
(recommandation favorable) et baissent de Il % suivant une recommandation à la vente 
(recommandation défavorable). Ceci signifie que les analystes financiers sont capables de 
sélectionner des titres sous-évalués ou surévalués. De leur côté, Mikhail et al. (2004) ont 
trouvé que les habiletés de sélection des analystes persistent dans le temps. En effet, Mikhail 
et al. (2004) ont identifié une persistance dans la réaction positive des prix des actions, et ce 
des mois après que des recommandations à l' achat ont été formulées. Cette persistance existe 
aussi dans le cas des réactions négatives des cours boursiers (recommandations 
défavorables). Dans le même état d 'esprit, Barber et al. (2001) ont documenté des 
rendements anormaux de +4 .13% annuellement suite à des recommandations d 'achat et de-
4.9% annuellement suite à des recommandations de vente. Dans une étude plus récente, 
Barber et al. (20 l 0) confirment toujours la présence de rendements anormaux qui peuvent 
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être générés en conditionnant ses décisions d'investissement aux recommandations des 
analystes. 
D'autres recherches estiment que les analystes financiers fournissent une meilleure 
mesure des bénéfices espérés futurs en comparaison à des modèles économétriques en séries 
temporelles qui extrapolent les bénéfices passés (Brown, 1978; Brown et Rozeff, 1978; 
Collins et Hopwood, 1980; Brown et al. 1987). De tels résultats suggèrent que les 
investisseurs peuvent «se fier» aux prévisions faites par les analystes au lieu de baser leurs 
décisions d'investissements sur de simples modèles mécanistes. Enfin, ce1taines contributions 
ont étudié le degré de précision des prévisions des résultats futurs en les comparants aux 
résultats réels de l'entreprise (erreur de prévision) . 
Dans notre deuxième article, nous proposons d'utiliser une mesure intuitive 
d'informativité des prix qui nous permet de juger si les prévisions des bénéfices par action 
(BPA) faites par les analystes sont des bons indicateurs des bénéfices futurs réels de 
l'entreprise. Notre mesure d' informativité des prix approxime la quantité d' information, au 
sujet des bénéfices futurs réels, qui est intégrée dans les prix de marché actuels. Par 
conséquent, si les activités des analystes financiers sont associées de façon positive à notre 
mesure d ' informativité des prix, nous pouvons conclure que les prévisions des BPA faites par 
les analystes sont une bonne approximation de la valeur réelle des bénéfices futurs de 
l'entreprise. En d'autres termes, les analystes peuvent être considérés comme des agents 
financiers dont l' influence est bénéfique au niveau des marchés . 
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Abstract 
We investigate whether cross-listing in the US contributes to impound more earnings 
information into stock priees. Our results indicate that US exchange cross-listings are not 
associated with more future earnings news reflected in current priees, in accord with the view 
that such mechanism does not improve the information environment of non US firms. This 
main finding is robust to many aspects of our methodology. 
Keywords: Stock priee informativeness, US cross-listings, earnings response coefficients, 
bonding hypothes is, corporate governance 
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1.1. Introduction 
ln this paper, we investigate the relation between US cross-listings and stock prtce 
informativeness. ln particular, we seek to measure the extent to which future earnings of 
newly cross-listed firms might be impounded in stock priees. The impact of US cross-listings 
on the information environment of non US firms is a much debated topic. Although the 
question is still open, the consensus is that foreign firms that list on US exchanges (NYSE 
and NASDAQ) become subject to stricter disclosure rules and to greater scrutiny and 
monitoring from the press and a variety of US market intermediaries (financial analysts, 
underwriters , etc.). Therefore, on a theoretical basis, a US cross-listing should improve 
transparency and reduce information asymmetries. lt follows that cross-listed stocks should 
be priced more correctly than non cross-listed stocks . 
To date, however, little evidence relates US cross-listing with stock transactions 
occurring at "fair" priees. Lang et al. (2003) find that cross-listed firms experience more 
analyst coverage and more accurate forecasts. Similarly, Baker et al. (2002) show thaTUS 
cross-listings are associated with more analyst and media coverage. These findings suggest 
that US cross-border listings mitigate the information barriers by stimulating media coverage 
("hits" in the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times) and increasing exposure to analysts 
monitoring. 
On the other hand, the expected positive relation between US cross-listings and priee 
informativeness has to be nuanced. For instance, Bailey et al. (2006) provide evidence 
suggesting that abnormal returns and trading volume, around earnings announcements by 
non-US companies, are economically and statistically larger after a US cross-listing. These 
resu lts suggest that such decision is associated with increased uncertainty and Jess 
transparency. Bailey et al. (2006) argue that pati of the problem is that researchers are still 
unable to determine clearly the motivations for pursuing international cross-listings in the 
first place. In fact, non US firms may be more attracted by higher liquidity, diversification 
gains, tax advantages and prestige rather than improving their information disclosure. 
Further, Fernando and Ferreira (2008) show that the added scrutiny and disclosure associated 
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with US cross-listing mechanism can have very different results for firm 's stock pnce 
informativeness around the world. They find a significant positive link between US cross­
listing and priee informativeness for developed markets firms but a negative association for 
emerging markets firms. In the case of emerging markets firms, Fernando and Ferreira (2008) 
argue that actions intended to enable stricter disclosure obligations can actually have counter­
effects. According to them, the increased disclosure associated with US exchange rules can 
crowd out private information collection. To address this issue, regulators should 
complement disclosure standards with other policy initiatives that encourage investment in 
the production of private information and minimize crowding out effects (Fernando and 
Ferreira, 2008). 
In the same line of reasoning, severa! studies (Bali et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002) 
have provided evidence that, in addition to accounting and disclosure standards, features of 
the institutional environment also play an important role in the improvement of corporate 
transparency. Their evidence indicates that despite efforts to impose stricter disclosure rules 
and standards, corporate transparency has been declining in many countries. ln fact, while the 
more stringent disclosure and accounting rules may have increased the quantity of 
information, we can have reservations about the quality of this information . 
In summary, sorne literature supports the expectation that cross-listed firms benefit from 
a richer information environment while other papers findings show neutra! or negative 
associations between US cross-listings and stock priee informativeness. 
For our part, we attempt to make severa! contributions to the literature. First, we propose 
an intuitive approach to assess whether cross-listing in the US brings stock priees closer to 
their fully informed (i.e. fundamentals) levels, given the upgraded disc losure requirements 
involved. The latter should help investors better predict future cash-flows. More specifically, 
we test whether current stock priees of cross-listed firm s contain more information about 
future earnings (as they should). If cross-listing in the US improves non-US firms' disclosure 
policies, it will leave Jess information about future eamings that can be privately discovered. 
Consequently, their stock priees should reflect more information about future earnings 
suggesting that the quality of the information environment has improved. 
17 
Second, the alleged benefits of US cross-listing are not easily ascertained (Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008; Lang et al., 2003), seemingly because direct measures of its effects are 
lacking. Most published studies involve indirect approaches focusing on coverage by analysts 
and media. Lang et al. (2003), for instance, equate information effects with the extent of 
analysts ' coverage (their number) and the accuracy of their forecasts, whereas Baker et al. 
(2002) also rely on analysts' coverage in addition to print media attention as reflected in the 
Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times . To overcome the difficulties in accounting for 
the information effects undergone by cross-listed firms, we use a direct measure of priee 
discovery that relies on fundamental data, namely earnings 1• 
Third, we investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act passed in 2002 on the 
relation between cross-listing in the US and corporate disclosure policy . The effect of US 
cross-listing on priee informativeness could also vary across different institutional 
environments. Consequently, we partition our sample into subsamples arranged by legal 
origin (common law versus civil law countries) and financial markets development. The 
results of such analysis should provide sorne confidence that our conclusions are (are not) 
driven by a subset of countries or institutional environments. 
Fourth, we tackle various complexities linked to cultural proximity and assets familiarity 
because many studies emphasize the importance of familiarity concerns and cultural 
homogeneity in cross-listing choices (Pagano et al. 2001, and Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). 
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that many various plausible factors, such as earnings 
timeliness and firm size, affect our measure of priee informativeness. Therefore, we see fit to 
include control variables to account for observed variations in the earnings- return relation 
deemed unrelated to the cross-listing decision. 
1 Note that Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) also propose a direct approach. ln their study, they deri ve 
stock priee informativeness from the market mode! (firm-specific retum variability). 
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We find that US exchange cross-listings do not improve stock priee informativeness 
despite the upgraded disclosure requirements of these programs. On the other hand, 
consistent with their minimal incrementai disclosure requirements, non-exchange ADRs 
(Leve! I/Rule 144A) also experience an insignificant change in their priee informativeness. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we describe the mechanisms of US cross­
li stings and summarize the cross-listing literature. In section 3, we present our empirical 
mode! and outline our methodology and testable hypotheses. We di scuss our data and sample 
in section 4. Section 5 presents empirical results characterizing the relation between US 
cross-listing and stock priee informativeness. Conclusions follow in section 6. 
1.2. Previous research work 
This paper investigates the hypothesis that information considerations, such as the 
commitment to increase levels of disclosure and reduce information asymmetries, are a key 
factor for cross-listing in the United States. However, the cross-listing literature supports 
other factors that affect US cross-listings, such as higher liquidity and lower financing costs. 
lt is worth mentioning that these factors are not mutually exclusive and complement the 
information considerations emphasized in our paper. Before we summarize the literature that 
examines the relation between US cross-listings and the information environment of non-US 
firms, we, first, describe the mechanics of such a decision . 
1.2.1 Mechanics of US cross-listings 
Foreign firms can cross-list on US markets via direct listings, New York Registered 
shares, or American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). The vast majority of foreign firms choose 
to cross-list using ADRs. Sorne firms (mostly Canadian and Israeli) use direct li stings 
(ordinary listings) rather than ADRs. ADRs are negotiable certificates that representa foreign 
firm's publicly traded equity or debt. Non US firms that cross-list via ADRs can choose 
between four possibilities: level I, level Il, Leve! III and Rule 144A. Leve! 1 ADRs trade 
over-the-counter (OTC) and offer limited liquidity . This type of ADR requires only minimal 
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US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure and no US generally accepted 
accounting principles (US GAAP) reconciliation. Leve! 1 programs don 't rai se capital. On the 
other hand, leve! II and Ill ADRs are exchange listed securities (NYSE/NASDAQ). Firms 
who choose leve! II and III programs must follow US GAAP and complete ali required 
filings with the SEC. Moreover, leve! Ill listings, contrary to leve! Il, allow foreign 
companies to raise capital. Finally, Rule 144A listings trade on the PORTAL (Private 
Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages) with limited liquidities, do not 
require compliance with GAAP and allow firms to raise funds as private placements to 
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). 
The legal implications of ADRs Il/III and direct cross-listings are essentially the same. 
Therefore, we treat direct listings by foreign firms as ADRs 111111. Futiher, because we are 
interested in whether cross-listing improves stock priee informativeness, we focus our 
analysis on firms that list via levels Il/III and ordinary listings. As mentioned earlier, these 
firms are required to conform to US GAAP and substantially increase their disclosure which 
is not the case for non-exchange listed ADRs (leve! 1 and Rule 144A). ln the robustness 
section, we complement our main tests using non-exchange listed ADRs. 
1.2.2. US cross-listings and the commitment to reveal information 
The expected relation between US cross listings and stock priee informativeness is 
commonly linked to the fact that high levels of disclosure stand to attract more investors. 
Voluntary disclosure makes investors more confident that stock transactions occur at "fair" 
priees (Bai ley et al. 2006). To date, however, little direct evidence associates US cross-listing 
with stock transactions occurring at "fair" priees. For instance, Fernando and Ferreira (2008) 
use firm-specific return variation as a measure of stock priee informativeness and test its 
possible association with the cross-listing decision. They find a significant positive relation 
between US cross-listing and priee informativeness for developed markets firms but a 
negative relation in the case of emerging markets firms. Bailey et al. (2006) measure the 
magnitude of priee and volume reactions to public information (earnings announcements) 
before and after the US listing. Knowing that more private information equates with higher 
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return volatility, Bailey et al. (2006) argue that if return volatility diminishes after the US 
listing, this could indicate less disagreement among investors. Their findings suggest that 
return volatility and volume reactions to earnings announcements increase significantly after 
a cross-listing on US markets, which runs contrary to the hypothesis that US cross-listings 
improve stock priee informativeness. Other studies focus on indirect approaches using, for 
example, the characteristics of analysts' forecasts and media coverage as proxies for the 
firm 's information environment. In particular, Lang et al. (2003) fi nd that cross-listed firms 
experience more analyst coverage and accurate forecasts. Similarly, Baker et al. (2002) show 
that US cross-listings are positively related to analyst and media coverage. 
In our paper, we propose a direct measure of stock priee informativeness. Particularly, we 
intend to test if US cross-listing is associated with stock priees reflecting more information 
about future earnings. Since the primary role offirms' disclosure is to inform investors about 
future cash-flows, if current stock priees reflect more future earnings news after a US cross­
listing, we can infer that there is, indeed, a positive direct association between cross-listing in 
the US and the commitment to reveal more information to investors. 
Our research is also linked to the bonding hypothesis. Coffee ( 1999) and Stulz ( 1 999) 
argue that firms can raise capital if they commit to return this capital to investors and to limit 
the expropriation of cash-flows by controlling shareholders and managers. Therefore, firms 
wishing to raise externat capital respond by bonding themselves to greater transparency 
(Coffee, 1999 and Stulz, 1999). One way to accomplish this bonding and to signal its 
commitment is to cross-list on a US exchange whose legal system allows a better protection 
of minority investors. In fact, such decision obligates foreign firms to conform to US GAAP 
and complete ali required filing with the SEC. It thus provides a mechanism by which non 
US firms can voluntarily subject themselves to better corporate governance practices under 
US securities laws (Coffee, 1999 and Stulz, 1999). Many papers in the literature examine the 
extent to which such voluntarily bonding explains the cross-listing behavior. Doidge (2004) 
finds that US exchange cross-listed firms have lower voting premiums in comparison to non 
cross-listed firms. In addition, the difference in voting premiums is larger for firms 
originating from countries with poor investor rights. Similarly, Doidge et al. (2009) examined 
the expected relations between private benefits of control, ownership and the cross-listing 
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decision. According to them, when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less 
likely to choose to list on US exchanges because they will be subject to strong US investors 
protection laws. Doidge et al. (2009) find that control rights, as weil as the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights, are significantly and negatively related to the 
existence of a US listing. 
On the other hand, a number of other contributions challenge the bonding hypothesis . For 
instance, Licht (2001, 2003) argues that little is done by the SEC to enforce corporate 
governance rules for foreign issuers . He blames the «hand off» po licy of the SEC and puts 
forward the avoiding hypothesis. According to Licht (2003), firms cross-list on US markets 
primarily to access cheaper finance and enhance their visibility rather than to improve their 
corporate governance. In the same line of reasoning, Siegel (2005) provides evidence of low 
SEC enforcement against Mexican firms with ADRs. 
1.3. Hypotheses and methodology 
Our main goal is to measure the association between current stock priees and future 
earnings for cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using data from 1990-2006 period . Many 
studies show that firms with more informative disclosures "bring the future forward" so that 
their cu1-rent market priees reflect more future earnings news (Lundholm and Myers, 2002). 
Theoretically, the enhanced disclosure activities of US cross-listed firms should reveal 
credible and relevant information in the current period that changes expectations about future 
earnings. To test this hypothesis, we base our methodology on the work of Warfield and Wild 
(1992), Collins et al. (1994 ), Ge lb and Zarowin (2002), and Lundholm and My ers (2002). In 
these papers, current returns are regressed against both current and future earnings: 
Where 
cO 
Rt =fla + fJ,ucet + L flz/::;.Et (fet+i) + &t 
i= l 
R1 stands for current stock return in period t, 
uce1 stands for synchronous unexpected current earnings, 
L1E1(fe1+;) stands for change in expectations about future earnings, and 
E1 for the error term. 
(!) 
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To better understand the intuition behind this mode!, we consider a firm over three 
periods and a discount rate of zero. We denote period t earnings by et> dividends by d, and 
book value by BV1• Following Lundholm and Myers (2002) and using the residual income 
valuation mode! (see Ohlson, 1995), priees at time 0 and time 1 can be expressed by: 
Po= BYo+ Eo(el) + Eo(e2) + Eo(e3) 
P1 = BV1 + E1(e2) + E1(e3) 
Assuming a clean surplus accounting system (see Lundholm and Myers, 2002), we can 
substitute BV 1 by BV0 + e1- d 1. Hence, we get: 
P1 = BVo+ e1- d1 + E1(e2) + E1(e3) 
P1 =Po- Eo(el)- Eo(e2)- Eo(e3)+ e1- d1 + E1(e2) + E1(e3) 
P1- Po+ d1 = e1 - Eo( e1) + E1( e2)- Eo( e2) + E1( e3)- Eo( e3) 
P1- Po+ d1 = Ue1 + 11 E1(e2) + 11 E1(e3) (2) 
Scaling equation (2) by P0, the left-hand side equates with the annual return . The right­
hand side becomes the scaled sum of the unexpected earnings for year 1 and the synchronous 
change in expectations during year ( 1) about earnings in year 2 and 3. As suggested by 
Lundholm and My ers (2002, p. 813 ): «the regressions coefficients in the more general model 
in (1) allow for many complications not present in the simple example shown in (2), such as 
time value, risk, and the precision of the proxies used to measure unexpected current earnings 
and changes in excepted future earnings» . 
In equation ( 1 ), the aggregated coefficients on the future earnings (Sum of ~2;s) represent 
the association between current returns and future earnings. In the literature, authors (Lev and 
Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lundho1m and Myers, 2002) use the leve! of 
earnings at periods (t) and (t-1) as a proxy for uce1. According to Lundholm and Myers 
(2002), wh en we include the past year's earnings ( e1_1 ), we allow the regression to fi nd the 
best representation of the prior expectation for current earnings. Lundholm and Myers (2002) 
argue that earnings are treated by the market as a random walk process when the coefficient 
on e1_1 is of similar magnitude but opposite signas the coefficient on e1 (current earnings). On 
the other hand, if the coefficient on e,_1 is approximately zero then earnings are treated as a 
white noise process . 
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The proxies for ~E1(fet+i) are the realized future earnings (et+i) and future returns (a proxy 
for the unexpected component of future earnings). Sorne papers (Bea ver et al. 1980; Warfield 
and Wild, 1992) only use realized future earnings as a proxy for ~E1(fet+ i ). However, relying 
on realized future earnings introduces an error in variables because future earnings have 
expected and unexpected components. To correct for the error and control for the unexpected 
component, we need an instrument that is correlated with the measurement error but 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable. Following Collins et al. ( 1994), we use future 
returns (Rt+i) since an unexpected shock to future earnings should have an impact on future 
returns. On the other hand, dropping future returns (Rt+i) from equation ( 1) does not affect our 
main findings. 
Earnings variables in equation (1) are earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) divided by the market value of common equity at the beginning of 
the firm' s fiscal year. Knowing th at depreciation and amortization are among the components 
of income most vulnerable to differences in accounting measurements, we argue that relying 
on EBITDA is more appropriate for our purposes than net income. lt allows us to mitigate 
sorne concerns about differences in accounting practices across countries . Furthermore, 
EBITDA is not sensitive to differences in capital structure (Durnev et al. 2003). 
To test whether cross-listing in the US is associated with stock priees that are more 
informative about future earnings, we follow Lundholm and Myers (2002) methodology and 
estimate the following regression (panel regression): 
3 
R1 = b0 + b1e1_ 1 + b2e1 + L (b3;e1+; + b4;R1+; ) + B0CL 1 + B1CL 1 * et-1 + B2CL 1 * e1 
i = l 
3 
+ L (B3;CL I * el +i + ()4;CL I * Rl+i ) + &1 (3) 
i = l 
CL1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an ADR that requires 
reconciliation to US GAAP (ADR II/III) and 0 otherwise. We use only three years of future 
earnings ( et+I, et+2 and et+3) and returns (Rt+I, Rt+2 and Rt+3) because prior research has shown 
that amounts further out intime add little explanatory power (Collins et al. 1994). Our main 
interest in equation (3) centers on the estimates ofthe coefficients 83;. We hypothesize that the 
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quality of the information environment improves after a listing on US exchanges because of 
more stringent disclosure rules. In other words, stock priees of US exchange cross-listed 
firms should contain more information about future earnings in comparison to non cross­
listed firms. Therefore, our first hypothesis predicts that the coefficients on CL1*et+i will be 
positive and significant. 
Hypothesis 1: Cross-listing in the US allows more information about future 
earnings to be impounded directly into current returns. 
This hypothesis implies the presence of an interaction effect between future earnings and 
the cross-listing decision . In fact, the interaction term CL1 *et+i proxies for the impact of 
cross-listing on the importance of future earnings news (more or Jess future earnings news 
that are reflected in current returns). 
As discussed in Lundholm and Myers (2002), there are 17 independent variables m 
regression (3). To rewrite equation (3) with parsimony, we define: 
e3t as the sum of et+I, et+2 and et+3 
R31 as the buy-and-hold return for the three-year period following year (t) 
and estimate : 
R1 = b0 + b1e1_1 +bA+ b3e3, + b4R31 + B0CL1 + B1CL1 * e1_1 + B2CL, * e, 
+ B3CL1 * e3, + B4CL1 * R31 + &, (4) 
By combining three years of data into one aggregate variable, we effectively force each 
year to have the same coefficient estimate, but we eliminate eight variables from regression 
(3) as noted by Lundholm and Myers (2002). Given that b3 represents the coefficient on 
future earnings for non cross-listed firms, the coefficient on future earnings for US exchange 
cross-listed firms becomes b3+83 and the percentage increase (decrease) is 83/ b3. If 83 is 
positive and significant, cross-listing in the US is associated with more information being 
revealed about future earnings. On the other hand, if 83 is negative and significant, cross­
listing in the US is not associated with more revealed information about future earnings. 
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We perform panel regressions using random or fixed effects models. ln our panel data set, 
the residuals may be cross-correlated (i.e across firms) and autocorrelated (across time). 
Should cross-correlations and autocorrelations exist, OLS standard errors can be biased and 
the true variability of our coefficients will be misestimated. We need then to adjust the t­
statistics in our regressions using clustered standards errors by firm and time (Petersen, 
2009). Further, to choose between fixed effects and random effects models estimation, we 
use the Hausman specification test. The latter compares the fixed versus random effects 
under the nu li hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors in the 
mode!. If the null hypothesis is rejected, a random effects mode! produces biased estimators 
in comparison to a fixed effects madel. Our Hausman test results reject the null hypothesis in 
favour of the fixed effects mode!. To control for industry, time and country fixed effects, we 
include industry, year and country dummies in our regression ( 4). For robustness , we re­
estimate our regressions using fixed firm and year effects models instead of country and 
industry fixed effects models. 
A remaining concern is endogeneity. Cross-listing is not a random decision and whenever 
an independent variable in a regression is the result of such a choice, it raises the possibility 
of an endogenous relation between the dependent variable and the chosen independent 
variable (CLr). However, the panel data approach and our firm-fixed effects models address 
this issue to a certain extent (see, Doidge, 2004; and Hail and Leuz, 2009 for a discussion). In 
addition, sorne of the main determinants of the cross-listing decision from prior literature, 
namely size and growth, are already in our robustness tests regressions, so the residual error 
is already orthogonal to these sources of variation in CL1• 
To reinforce our conclusions about the relation between the cross-listing decision and 
stock priee informativeness, it is useful to further investigate the potential differences 
between Rule 114A/Ievel 1 programs and leve! II/III programs. Theoretically, non-exchange 
listed ADRs should experience an insignificant change in their priee informativeness because 
of their minimal incrementai disclosure requ irements. This reasoning leads to the fo llowing 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: The extent to which future eamings news are reflected in current 
retums is less pronounced for firms that list in the US using Rule 144A or levet 1 
pro gram s. 
To verify hypothesis 2, we re-estimate equation ( 4) without considering US exchange cross­
listings. In this case, CL, becomes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a 
levet 1 or Rule 144A listings and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, we should also expect a more 
pronounced change in the quality of the firm 's information environment for emerging 
markets. On a theoretical basis, US exchange listings should have a larger impact on firms 
originating from countries where disclosure rules are weak. Knowing that emerging markets 
firms are subject to less stringent information disclosure requirements , we can propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which future eamings news are reflected m current 
retums is more pronounced for firms from emerging markets. 
To investigate any differentiai impact based on the levet of financial markets 
development, we estima te equation ( 4) separately for developed and emerging markets. 
Finally, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 is likely to have an 
effect on the intensity of the association between current stock retums and future eamings . 
The argument is that SOX imposes more severe disclosure rules to companies and their 
managers. In fact, as discussed in Doidge et al. (2009), this new legal environment creates 
significant legal exposures for firms as weil as for executives. Therefore, on the basis of this 
argument, we can propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The extent to which future eamings news are reflected in current 
retums is more pronounced after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 
in 2002. 
To test hypothesis 4, we use the results of regressions covering our data from 1990 
through 2002 and from 2003 through 2006 and compare the coefficients on the future 
eamings before and after the passage of SOX. 
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Specification checks 
An important empirical literature suggests that our measure of stock pnce 
informativeness is affected by a variety of factors (e.g. earnings timeliness and firm size). 
Therefore, we should include a set of variables in equation ( 4) to control for observed 
variations in the earnings-return relation that are likely due to causes other than firm ' s 
information environment. After controlling for these factors , our empirical measure should 
reflect informativeness. 
Earnings timeliness refers to the speed with which earnings information is reflected in 
stock priees. For example, in industries with shorter operating cycles, current earnings will be 
considered as a better measure for value creation; and thus, the association between current 
returns and future earnings should be Jess pronounced in these industries in comparison to 
industries with longer operating cycles . To examine the length of the operating cycles, we 
follow Lundholm and Myers (2002) who consider two industry classes: industries with 
shorter accounting lags and industries with longer accounting lags. Lundholm and Myers 
(2002) label mining, construction and manufacturing as longer operating cycles ' industries 
and the remaining industries as shorter operating cycles. We-then pool firms according to this 
classification be fore estimating regression ( 4 ). Timeliness is also linked to growth. Firms 
with high expected growth should exhibit a strong relation between current returns and future 
earnings in comparison to mature firms, ali else equal. Therefore, we should include a 
measure of firm growth opportunities to control for this factor. We define growth as the 
percentage growth in the firm's assets from year t-5 to year t. For robustness, we also use the 
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth. Other determinants of the earnings response 
coefficient may intrinsically affect the relation between cu1-rent returns and future earnings. 
For example, size might also be an important omitted variable because Freeman (1987) and 
Collins and Kothari ( 1989) fi nd that returns of larger firms impound earnings on a more 
timely basis than returns of smaller firms. We use the log of market value of equ ity to 
measure firm ' s size. 
A remaining concern is familiarity and cultural proximity. With regard to familiarity , 
Kang and Stultz ( 1997), and Dalhlquist and Roberston (200 1) argue that foreign investors 
tend to hold larger positions in firms that produce tradable outputs. For example, US 
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investors tend to invest more in Japanese firms with large tradable outputs such as Sony and 
Honda. On the other hand, the same investors will be Jess inclined to invest in Japan Telecom 
because they are not familiar with their products (little tradable outputs). If familiarity is 
important to investing agents, we argue that it will also impact financing agents 
(corporations) decisions and probably creates sorne heterogeneity in the sample. In fact, in 
comparison to Japan Telecom, Sony and Honda may pay Jess attention to information 
asymmetry issues once they cross-list their shares in the US market. To tackle this issue, we 
classify ali firms according to the type of produced goods (tradable versus little tradable 
outputs), before estimating equation (4). We follow Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and split our 
sample into tradable industries (consumer goods, electronics, oil and gas ... ) and non tradable 
industries (construction, leisure, retail, telecommunications .. . ). With regard to cultural 
proximity, we also study how differences in national culture may lead corporations to 
respond differently to the information asymmetry issue . It's plausible that disclosure rules 
and corporate management laws that work weil in the US may not be universal and fit with 
other national cultures. According to Hofstede, the core of culture is formed by values which 
shape people behavior as weil as their perception of what is preferable and not. Therefore, if 
sorne US disclosure rules or corporate management laws are inconsistent with these values, 
foreign managers are likely to feel uncomfortable and uncommitted (Newman and Nollen, 
1996). As a result, they may be Jess able or willing to respect these rules. In other words, 
what works for the Americans might work for sorne (e.g. Canadians or British) but not for ali. 
For instance, in countries low on the Hofstede individualism dimension (IDV), national 
culture encourages and legitimizes deference to others decisions and interests rather than 
protecting its persona) interests. In these nations, corporate management practices will be Jess 
compatible with giving power to investors and encouraging them to stand up and fight for 
their rights (Litch et al. 2005). This situation could create cross-sectional differences in the 
benefits of US cross-listing. Hence, we propose to include in our regressions Hofstede 
cultural variables (see more details on Hofstede cu ltural dimensions and scores in Table 1.9 
and 1.1 0) . 
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ln our analysis, earnings variables are earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA). As argued earlier, relying on EBITDA is more appropriate for our 
purposes because it allows us to mitigate sorne concerns about differences in accounting 
practices across countries. However, by ignoring interests, we do not consider the riskiness of 
debt and its potential impact on the return-earnings relation. Knowing that leverage could be 
considered as a proxy for credit risk (default ri sk), we propose to include this variable in our 
main equation. This additional test should control for potential differences in the earnings­
return relation between high leverage and low leverage firms, because highly leveraged firms 
are associated with high stock return volatility. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total 
as sets . 
Finally, we also control for liquidity because there is evidence of important changes in 
firm 's trading environment around US cross-listing (Mitto, 1992, 2001 ; Forester and Karolyi , 
1998; Smith and Sofianos, 1997); and these changes could impact the informational 
environment of non US firms. The intuition behind this additional analysis is that more active 
trading, rather than cross-listing, could explain any possible improvement in priee 
informativeness because market priees of actively traded stocks should react quickly to 
earnings information in comparison to Jess actively traded stocks. Liquidity is defined as 
volume divided by number of shares outstanding. 
1.4. Data 
Our sample construction starts by considering ali firms included in the country list 
provided by Datastream from 1990 to 2006. From this list, cross-listed firms are identified. 
Sampling stops in 2006 instead of 2009 because sorne of our variables require three years of 
data beyond any sampling year. The data on ADRs listing cornes from the Bank of New York 
(BNY), Citibank (CB), Deutsche Bank (DB), JP Morgan (JPM), the OTCBB, and The Pink 
Sheets. The information from these various datasets is manually cross-checked and verified. 
The websites of the major depositaries of ADRs provide the names, type of listings (Rule 
144A private placements, leve! l OTC, Leve! II and III), listing dates, sponsorship status, 
country of origin, and the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) of the 
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underlying share. Further, we obtain information on direct li stings (Canadian and Israeli 
firrns) from the NYSE and NASDAQ websites . The data provided by Citibank allows us to 
keep track of firms that had been delisted from the US market. Adding these delistings 
mitigates concerns about the survivorship bias. Combining ali the data gives a sample of 2 
586 cross- listings and 11 354 non cross-l isted firms. Note our exclusion of financial and 
banking firms because the financia l nature of their assets hinders accounting data 
comparisons with other firms . 
Table ( 1.1) presents summary statistics for our sample. As expected, US exchange cross­
listed firms are larger than non-cross-listed firms . The median size for exchange-listed firms 
is 14.855 while non cross-listed firms have a median size equal to 11 .508. Further, cross­
listed firms have higher returns and leverage in comparison to non-cross-1isted firm s. 
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics (reduced model: equation 4) 
This table presents descriptive stati stics for the reduced mode! (equation 4). Return (t) (Current retum) for year (t) is the fi scal­
year-end adjusted share priee, plus the adjusted dividends, ali divided by the adjusted priee at the end of the previous fi scal year 
(t-1). Return (3!) (Future retum) is the buy-and-hold return for the three-year period fo llowing the current year (for years t+ 1, 
t+2 and t+ 3). Earni ngs (t) (Current earnings) for year (t) is income be fo re interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EB!TDA) for year (1) divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of the firm 's fi scal year. Earnings (3t) (Future 
earnings) is the sum of earnings for the three years following the current year (for years t+ l, t+2 and t+3). Market value of 
equity is the share priee times the previous year number ofshares outstanding. Size is the logarithm of the market capi talization. 
Leverage is defined as the rati o of long-lerm debt to total assets. Exchange-listed firms are firms that are listed on U.S. 
exchanges (A ORs ll/lll and direct cross-listings). The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. 
Variable Ali firm s Non-cross-li sted firms 1 Ex chan ge-l isted firms 
Mean median Std N Mean median Std N Mean median Std N 
de v de v de v 
Stock relu ms and earnings slatistics 
Retum (t) 1.358 1.071 1.475 79457 1.355 1.068 1.485 77 103 1.451 1.162 1.097 2354 
Earnings (t) 0.225 0.154 0.7 19 72684 0.226 0. 153 0.728 70482 O. 196 O. 156 0.270 2202 
Earnings (3 t) 0.625 0.459 1.356 78346 0.627 0.459 1.372 760 15 0.550 0.464 0.65 1 233 1 
Retums (3t) 2.047 l .180 3.447 88651 2.041 1.173 3.463 86125 2.25 1 1.398 2.878 2526 
Size 11.646 11572 2.012 89394 11 .550 11 .508 1.946 86773 14.72 1 14.855 1.919 262 1 
Leverage O. !58 0.062 4.265 101251 O. 1576 0.060 4.326 984 11 O. 182 0. 163 0.152 2840 
When we measure the Pearson correlations between our variables (reduced mode!), 
multicollinearity is not an issue since current earnings, future earnings (Earnings (3t)) and 
future return (Return (3t)) are not highly correlated (Table 1.2). The same conclusion holds 
for the detailed mode! (equation 3 ). In addition, we a Iso use the variance inflation factor and 
find no evidence of multicollinarity. Our main hypothesis implies a positive interaction effect 
between the cross-listing decision and firm 's future earnings. The negative correlation 
between CL(t) and Earnings (3t) in Table 1.2 does not confirm this hypothesis. However, we 
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argue that our tests are best performed using multivariate regression analysis because the 
conclusions from our univariate variab les do not account for a variety of factors known to 
affect the earnings-return relation . 
Table 1.2: Pearson correlations for the reduced mode! (p-values) 
This table ~resents the correlations between variab les of the condensed mode!. 
Return (t) Return (3t) Earnings (t-1) Earnings (t) Ear nings (3!) CL(t) 
Return (t) 1.00000 0.25968 0.0302 1 0.13354 -0.0323 1 -0.0010 1 
(0.0001) (0 000 1) (0 000 1) (0.000 1) (0.7756) 
Return (3t) 0.25968 1.00000 0.0194 1 0.03833 0.09489 -0.00581 
(0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0 .000 1) (0.0838) 
Ear nings (t-1 ) 0.0302 1 0.0 194 1 1.00000 0.22 155 0.222 10 -0.0 104 1 
(0 000 1) (0 000 1) (0 000 1) (0.000 1) (0.0086) 
Earni ngs (t) 0.13354 0.03833 0.22 155 1.00000 0.274 10 -0.0 1027 
(0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0.0056) 
Earnings (3t) -0.03231 0.09489 0.222 10 0.274 10 1.00000 -0.0 1478 
(0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0000 1) (0.000 1) (0.000 1) 
CL(t) -0.00 101 -0.0058 1 -0.0104 1 -0.01 027 -0.01478 1.00000 
(0.7756) (0.0838) (0.0086) (0 0056) (0 000 1) 
1.5. Empirical Results 
Because we are interested in whether US cross- listing a llows stock priees to impound 
more information about future earnings, we focus on the coefficient of the interaction 
variab le CL1*e31 in equation (4) . If US cross-listing is associated with priees reflecting more 
information about future earnings, the coefficient of the interaction term CL1*e31 should be 
positive and significant. 
Tab le 1.3 reports the coefficients estimates of equation ( 4 ). Mode! 1 serves as our starting 
point in that we drop future returns from equation ( 4) and control for country and industry 
fi xed effects. Note that standard errors in ali models are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the firm leve!. ln mode! 2, we estimate equation ( 4) adding country and industry 
dummies . Mode! 1 and 2 yield similar results suggesting that our findings are not affected 
when we drop future returns from our main specification. For mode! 2, the coefficient of the 
interaction term CL1*e31 is -0.0997 with a p-value of 0.06 . This result suggests that there is a 
s ignificant ( 10% leve!) negative association between US exchange cross-listings and priee 
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informativeness. In fact, US exchange cross-listed firms have lower future earnings response 
coefficient -0.1912 (-0 .0915 + (-0.0997)) in comparison to non cross-listed firms -0.0915. On 
the other hand, when we control for year fixed effects (mode! 3 and 4) to account for residual 
correlations across firms in a given year (cross-sectional dependence), our primary results 
change and the coefficient of interest in both models becomes non significant (-0.0543 with a 
p-value of 0.266 for mode! 4) . This finding suggests that the relation between current returns 
and future earnings is the same for cross-listed and non cross-listed firms. Further, adding 
year dummies in mode! 2 increases R2 from 0.2144 to 0.2452. 
So far, our evidence on how US cross-listing activity impacts the relation between current 
returns and future earnings is mixed. However, in table 1.3, we do not control for various 
plausible factors known to affect the earnings-return relation. In the literature, timeliness and 
firm size have been shown to be significantly related to current and future earnings response 
coefficients. Therefore, an alternative explanation for our primary findings is that the cross­
listing variable (CL1) is merely proxying for these fundamental determinants of the earnings 
response coefficients. To explore this issue, we include the percentage growth in the firm 's 
as sets and firm size as control variables in equation ( 4 ). 
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Table 1.3 : Panel regressions of current returns on current and fut ure earnings and interactions 
with cross-listing (ADRs li/Ill) 
R, = b0 + b1e ,_ 1 + b2e, + b3e 3, + b4 R3 , + 80 CL , + B1CL , * e ,_1 + B2CL, * e, 
+ B3CL, * e 3, + 8 4CL, * R3 , + & , 
Return (t) (Current return) is the fiscal-year-end adj usted share priee , plus the adjusted dividends, ail divided by the adjusted 
priee at the end of the prev ious fiscal year (t- 1). Return (3t) (Future return) is the buy-and-hold return for the three-year period 
fo llowing the current year (for years t+ 1, t+2 and t+ 3). Earnings (t) (Current earnings) for year (t) is in come before in te rest, 
taxes , depreciation and amortization (EB ITDA) fo r year (t) divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of the firm 's 
fiscal year. Earnings (3t) (Future earnings) is the sum of earnings for the three years fo llowing the current year (for years t+ 1, 
t+2 and t+3). CL, is a dummy vari able that takes the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed on U.S. exchanges, and zero otherwise. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm leve!. P-values for two-tailed tests are in 
parentheses. To avo id drawing spurious inferences fro m extreme values, regress ions results are robust to outli ers. One, two or 
three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% Jevels, respectively. Country , industry and year dummy variab les are 
included but not reported 
Independent Mode! (1) Mode! (2) Mode! (3) Mode! (4) 
Variables 
ln terce pt 1.5074 1.4528 1.2484 1.1103 
(0 00 1) ••• (0 00 1) ... (0 00 1)"' (0 00 1)'" 
Earnings (t·l> 0.0376 0.0351 0.0383 0.0359 
(0 .007) ... (0.0 14) .. (0 .005) ... (0.010)" 
Earnings (tl 03436 03369 03324 03253 
(0 001) ... (0 001) ... (000 1)'" (0.00 1) '" 
Earnings (31) -0.0668 -0.09 15 -0.0583 -0.0847 
(0 .00 1)'" (000 1) ... (0 .00 1)'" (0.00 1)"' 
Retum (31) 0.0726 0.0822 
(0 .001) ... (0 .00 1)'" 
CL, -0.0753 -0 .0324 -0.0660 -0.0340 
(0 081). (0 .506) (0 .11 8) (0.466) 
CL,* Earnings(l· l> 0.0450 0.0208 0.0545 0.0243 
(0.699) (0858) (0.574) (0 .800) 
CL,* Earningst•> 0.4002 03867 0.2542 0.2338 
(0 .024) .. (0 .028) .. (0 .094). (0 .11 7) 
CL,* Earnings (3t) -0.0984 -0.0997 -0.0577 -0.0543 
(0.067) ' (0.060)' (0.243) (0 .266) 
CL,* Return (3 t) -0.0169 -0.0 11 0 
(0385) (0 .550) 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Jndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummies No No Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.1946 0.2144 0.2209 0.2452 
N 58 139 57653 58 139 57633 
We also extend our robustness checks in many different ways. First, we propose to 
include leverage and liquidity into equation ( 4). Second, we explore whether differences in 
firm s' operating cycles and institutional characteristics, familiarity and cultural proximity are 
associated with cross-differences in the benefits of the US cross-listing mechanism . We begin 
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by analysing whether the length of the operating cycles impacts our findings. The intuition 
behind this idea is that future earnings will be considered as a better measure of value 
creation for industries with longer operating cycles, but a Jess relevant measure for industries 
with shorter operating cycles. Therefore, any commitment to reveal more information about 
future cash-tlows should be more effective in industries with longer operating cycles, since 
firms in these industries have more future earnings news to disclose (Lundholm and Myers, 
2002) . To test this argument, we consider two operating cycles (shorter versus longer 
operating cycles) and partition our sample according to this classification. The results (not 
tabulated) show that the cross-listing effect on stock priee informativeness is the same for 
both industries suggesting that our results are not driven by a subset of firms with shorter 
operating cycles. The same conclusion holds when we partition our sample into subsamples 
arranged by legal origin (common versus civil law countries) and the type of produced goods 
(tradable versus little tradable outputs). Furthermore, adding assets growth, market-to-book 
ratio, firm's size, leverage and liquidity to equation ( 4) does not alter our primary results. In 
fact, the coefficients of the interaction term CL1*e31 in table 1.4 remain not significant in ali 
specifications. 
The above diagnostic checks have demonstrated that our primary empirical results are 
robust to controls for earnings timeliness, firm's size, leverage, differences in industry cycles 
and legal environment, familiarity and stock liquidity. As further robustness tests, we also 
study how differences in national culture may lead foreign managers to respond differently to 
the new legal environment they face once their firms' cross-list on US markets. Again, when 
we use Individualism (IDV) and Power Distance Index (PDI) as additional control variables 
in equation ( 4), the interaction effect between future earnings and the cross-listing 
mechanism remains not significant (mode) 3 in Table 1.4, where the coefficient of the 
interaction term CL1*e31 is -0.0043 with ap-value of0.949). 
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Table 1.4 : Panel regress ions with con trois for the determinants of earnings response coefficients 
To avoid drawing spurious inferences from extreme values, regressions resul ts are robust to outli ers. One, two or three asteri sks 
denote s igni fica.nce at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respecti vely. Country, industry and year dummy vari ables are included but not 
reported. Standard errors are adj usted for heteroskedasticity and cl ustering at the fi rm leve l. P-values fo r two-tailed tes ts are in 
parentheses 
Independent Mode! ( 1) Model(2) Model(3) 
Variables 
ln tercept 0.1894 0.1880 -6.2 112 
(0.124) (0 .1 04) (0498) 
Earnings (t· I> 0.0287 0.0243 0.0290 
(0 001)"" (0.002) ••• (0.00 1) ••• 
Earnings (tl 03677 03229 03674 
(0 .00 1)''' (0.00 1) ••• (0.00 1) ••• 
Earnings (3 t) -0.0935 -0.0778 -0.0934 
(0 001) ••• (0 00 1) ••• (0 .00 1) ••• 
Retum (3 t) 0.0898 0.0757 0.0897 
(0 .00 1) ... (0 .00 1) ••• (0 001)'" 
CL, -0. 1862 -0.2372 -0. 1857 
(0 .048) •• (0 .00 1) ••• (0 00 1) ... 
CL,* Earnings,,_,> 0.0042 -0 00 12 0.0049 
(0.976) (0.993) (0 .972) 
CL, * Earn ings,,> 0.240 1 0.2229 0.2403 
(0. 123) (0. 179) (0. 125) 
CL, * Earnings (3 t) -0.0051 -0.0414 -0.0043 
(0.938) (0.539) (0.949) 
CL,* Return (3t) -0.0243 -0.0133 -0 0254 
(0.086) (0369) (0 077) 
Growth, 0.0000 0.0000 
(0 001) ... (0 00 1) ••• 
Market-to-Book, -0000 1 
(0 .003) ••• 
Size, 0.0639 0.0760 0.0638 
(000 1) ... (0 001) ... (000 1)"' 
Leverage, 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 
(0.783) (0.976) (0 783) 
Liquidity, -0.0004 -0 0003 -0 0004 
(0 .045) •• (0.0635). (0.045) •• 
POl 0.0049 
(0 849) 
IDV 0. 1700 
(0.546) 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es 
Year dum mies Y es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.2949 0.2274 0.2923 
N 41 202 54 372 40 975 
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Next, we propose to re-estimate our regressions using fixed firm and year effects instead 
of country and industry fixed effects models. Firm fixed effects estimation accounts for time­
invariant firm characteristics that are unobservable. As suggested earlier, this should mitigate 
concerns about correlated omitted variables and selection bias based on unobservable time­
invariant firm characteristics. The firm fixed effects estimates are obtained by demeaning the 
observations with respect to the firm average for each variable. Year dummies are included in 
the estimation. Again, our primary findings remain unchanged when we re-estimate equation 
(4) based on fixed firm and year effects models (results not tabulated). 
So far, our empirical evidence suggests that US exchange cross-listings do not improve 
stock priee informativeness. In this paper, we also estimate the relation between stock priee 
informativeness and US cross-listing separately for developed and emerging markets. This 
additional analysis allows us to isolate the effect of the cross-listing decision in these two sets 
of environments with different characteristics . Mode) 1 and 2 in Table 1 .5 report the 
coefficient estimates for developed and emerging markets firms. The findings do not support 
the hypothesis of a differentiai effect across these two markets . For instance, in the case of 
developed markets, the coefficient of the interaction between US cross-listing and future 
earnings is positive (0 .0095) but non significant (p-value of 0.922) wh ile the same coefficient 
is negative and non significant ( -0.0067 with a p-value of 0.936) for emerging markets. 
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Table 1.5 : Panel regressions using separate estimations for developed and emerging markets 
To avoid drawing spurious infe rences from extreme values , regressions results are robust to outliers. One, two or three as terisks 
denote signilicance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Country , industry and year dummy variables are included but not 
reported. Standard errors are adjusted fo r heteroskedas ticity and clustering at the firm leve!. P-values for two-tailed tests are in 
parentheses 
lndependent Mode! ( 1) Mode! (2) 
Var iab les Oeveloped markets Emerging markets 
lntercept 0.1658 0.5948 
(0373) (0.02 1)" 
Earnings (t·l> -0.0088 0.0439 
(0.573) (0.00 1) ... 
Earnings l•> 0.5772 0.2587 (0.00 1) ... (0.001) ... 
Earnings (3t) -0.1300 -0.0526 
(0.00 1) ... (0 00 1) ... 
Retum (3 t) 0.1360 -0.0252 
(0 00 1)'" (0.00 1) ... 
CL, -0.1258 -0.2845 
(0. 11 3) (0.00 1) ... 
CL,* EarningS(t· ll 0.0496 0.0177 
(0 .826) (0 .9 14) 
CL, * Earningsltl 0.0060 0.4 165 
(0 982) (0 015) .. 
CL,* Earnings (3 t) 0.0095 -0.0067 
(0.922) (0.936) 
CL, * Return (3t) -0.0229 -0.0014 
(0.173) (0.962) 
Growth, 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.799) (000 1)'" 
Size. 0.0504 0.0783 
(0001)'" (0.00 1) ... 
Leverage, 0.000 1 -0.0043 
(0.905) (0 819) 
Liquidity, -0.0006 -0.0004 
(0.937) (0.029) 
Country dummies Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es 
Adj usted R2 03744 0.1436 
N 21 156 16 905 
We now turn to investigate whether the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 
2002 is likely to have an impact on the intensity of the association between current returns 
and future earnings. The argument is that SOX creates severe legal exposures for firms as 
weil as fo r managers. Therefore, this new legal environment should reinforce the 
commitment to reveal more information about future earnings. To examine this hypothesis, 
we re-estimate our equation ( 4) be fo re and after the enactment of SOX and compare the 
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coefficients of the interaction term CL1*e31• Our results (Table 1.6) suggest that the degree to 
which future earnings news are reflected in current priees is more pronounced after the 
passage of SOX (the interaction coefficient is 0.0658 for the period after SOX and -0.0808 
for the period before SOX). However, the positive association between US exchange cross­
listings and stock priee informativeness after the enactment of SOX is not significant 
(coefficient of0.0658 with ap-value of0.575). 
Table 1.6 : Pa nel regressions us ing separa te estimations bef ore and after the enactment of SOX 
To avo id drawing spurious in fe rences fro m ex treme values, regressions resul ts are robust to Olttliers. One, two or three asteri sks 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respective ly. Country, industry and years du mm y vari ables are included but not 
reported. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedastic ity and clustering at the fi rm leve l. P-values for two-tailed tests are in 
Independent Model (1) Model (2) 
Variabl es Be fo re SOX ( 1990-2002) After SOX (2003 -2006) 
lntercept 0.7420 0.265 1 
(0 00 1) ... (0 079)' 
Earnings Il· li 0.0199 -0.0268 
(0 09 1)' (0 03 1) .. 
Earnings 111 0.2794 0.6 161 (0 00 1) ... (0 00 1)' .. 
Earnings (3t) -0.0666 -0.1395 
(0 00 1)' .. (0 00 1)' .. 
Return (3t) 0.0962 0.0900 
(0 00 1)' .. (0 00 1 )' .. 
CL1 -0.0072 -0.2638 
(0.934) (0 00 1) ... 
CL1 * Earnings(\· ll 0.0839 - 0.1386 
(0 648) (0 570) 
CL1 * Earnings111 0.2327 0.2605 
(0.229) (0.4 19) 
CL1 * Earnings (31) -0.0808 0.0658 
(0.334) (0.575) 
CL1 * Return (31) -0.047 1 0.0039 
(0.025) .. (0.849) 
Growth1 0.0000 0.0000 
(0 00 1)' .. (0 86 1) 
Size1 0.0629 0.06 18 
(0 00 1)' .. (0.00 1 )' .. 
Leverage1 -0.0027 0.0002 
(0 597) (0. 786) 
Liquidi ty1 -0.0002 -0.00 18 
(0.151) (0 86 1) 
Country dummies Y es Y es 
lndus1ry dummies Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.4552 0.2209 
N 22 9 11 14 870 
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Our final analysis addresses the relation between US cross-listing and stock priee 
informativeness for non-exchange ADRs . As mentioned earlier, the legal and disclosure 
implications of ADRll/III and leve t l/Rule 144A programs are different because non ­
exchange listings require minimal disclosure and US GAAP reconciliation . In Table 1.7, 
CL1 becomes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a levet I or Rule 144A 
listings and 0 otherwise. Consistent with our hypothesis 2, non-exchange ADRs experience 
an insignificant change in their stock priee informativeness (table 1.7). For instance, In the 
case of OTC listings, the coefficient of the interaction term CL1 * e31 is -0.0219 with a p-value 
of0.666 
Table 1.7: Panel regressions for non-exchange ADRs (Levell!Rulel44A) 
To avoid drawing spurious inferences from extreme values, regress ions results are robust to outliers. One, two or three as teri sks 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Country, industry and years dummy variables are included but not 
reported. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedas ticity and clustering at the firm levet. P-values for two-tailed tests are in 
parentheses 
Independent Mode! ( 1) Mode! (3) 
Variables 144A cross-listings OTC cross-listings 
lntercept 1.2147 0.8880 
(0 001 ) ... (0001)'" 
Earnings <•· •> 0.0327 0.0328 
(0.026) .. (0.023) .. 
Earnings <•> 0.3388 0.3284 
(000 1)'" (0.00 1)"' 
Earnings (3 t) -0.09 11 -0.0842 
(0001 )'" (0.001) ... 
Retum (3 t) 0.0734 0.0838 
(0.001 ) ... (0001 )'" 
CL, 0.11 90 0.0767 
(0 010) .. (0.042) .. 
CL, * Earnings<•-• > 0.1044 0.0257 
(0.058). (0 739) 
CL, * Earnings<•> -0.1329 0.1476 
(0.239) (0.21 0) 
CL,* Earnings (3 t) 0.0163 -0.0219 
(0.749) (0 .666) 
CL, * Return (3 t) -0.0966 -0.0845 
(000 1) ... (0.00 1) ... 
Country dummies Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.2 11 0 0.24 19 
N 55697 54869 
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1.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether US cross-listings affect the information environment 
of non US corporations. We hypothesize that the quality of the information environment 
improves after a listing on US exchanges because of more stringent disclosure rules . 
However, our results indicate that such mechanism is not associated with more future 
earnings news reflected in current priees, which is consistent with the view that cross-listings 
in US exchanges do not improve stock priee informativeness. This finding is robust to many 
aspects of our methodology. As Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), we argue that the enhanced 
disclosure standards associated with US exchange cross-listings can crowd out private 
information collection. In fact, it is possible that the commitment to reveal more information 
substitutes for the collection of private information by sorne market participants, so that, on 
balance, an insignificant amount of future earnings news will be impounded into stock priees. 
Therefore, other type of policies should be developed by regulators in order to complement 
the US stricter disclosure requirements and minimize the crowding out effect. This is 
particularly important because a necessary condition for better functioning stock markets is 
that stock priees track firm fundamentals closely. 
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Table 1.8 : Cross-listings and delistings by country: 1990 to 2008 
This table shows the number of cross-l istings and delistings in the U.S by country. We obtain data on ADRs listing from the 
Bank of New York (BNY), Citibank (CB), Deutsche Bank (DB), JP Morgan (JPM), the OTCBB, The Pink Sheets, and CRSP. 
Information on direct li stings (Canadian and lsraeli firms) is from the NYSE and NAS DAQ websites. The data prov ided by 
Ci ti bank and CRSP allows us to keep track of firms that had been delisted by June 2008. Firms can cross-list in the US via Rule 
144A private pl acement, leve! 1 Over-the-Counter, and Leve! Il and Ill. 
US cross-listings US delistings 
Country Rule 144A OTC Exchange OTC Exchange 
Argen tina 7 3 16 6 8 
Australia 6 92 13 37 33 
Austria 3 10 0 0 0 
Bahamas 0 0 3 0 0 
Belgium 1 3 1 2 1 
Bermuda 0 1 56 1 1 
Bolivia 0 1 0 0 0 
Brazil 27 25 38 36 13 
Brit. Virgin Islands 1 0 20 0 0 
Canada 0 0 123 0 0 
Cayman Islands 0 0 16 0 0 
Ch ile 3 1 12 1 18 
China 4 28 67 2 4 
Colombia 0 2 1 1 1 
Croatia 4 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 2 0 0 0 0 
_Denmark 1 0 2 1 4 
Ecuador 0 1 0 0 0 
Egypt 10 2 0 0 0 
Estonia 1 0 0 0 0 
Fin land 1 2 2 2 4 
France 3 16 12 9 19 
Germany 0 23 18 6 13 
Greece 3 3 12 0 1 
Hong Kong 1 89 14 38 10 
Hungary 4 3 1 2 0 
ln dia 74 2 13 1 3 
lndones ia 3 5 2 1 1 
Ire land 3 8 10 4 25 
Israel 2 5 68 0 5 
Ital y 8 7 7 3 9 
Jamaica 0 3 0 1 0 
Japan 0 35 24 4 9 
Jordan 1 2 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 9 1 0 0 0 
Korea 17 5 9 1 4 
Kuwait 1 0 0 0 0 
Le banon 3 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 2 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 1 0 4 2 6 
Malays ia 0 9 0 4 0 
Malta 1 0 0 0 0 
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Table 1.8: Continued 
US cross-listings US delistings 
Country Ru le 144A OTC Ex change OTC Exchange 
Marshall Islands 0 0 15 0 0 
México 13 21 21 26 23 
Netherlands 2 14 16 17 5 
New Zealand 0 2 1 1 12 
Nigeria 3 0 0 0 0 
Norway 1 6 3 16 5 
Oman 1 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 7 0 0 0 0 
Panamâ 0 2 3 0 0 
Peru 1 4 1 0 2 
Phi lippines 4 4 2 3 0 
Po land 12 2 0 1 0 
Portugal 1 4 1 2 2 
Puerto Rico 0 0 9 0 0 
Qatar 1 0 0 0 0 
Russia 36 39 5 4 1 
Singapore 2 13 5 6 1 
South Africa 5 30 7 17 6 
Spain 2 2 3 2 10 
Sri Lanka 1 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 8 2 9 19 
Switzerland 3 7 8 Il 9 
Taiwan 47 0 6 0 1 
Thailand 0 14 0 4 0 
Tunisia 1 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 15 5 1 3 0 
Ukraine 3 10 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 9 65 41 99 166 
Venezuela 1 5 0 6 4 
Table 1.9: Hofstede cultural dimensions 
Variable 
Power di stance index (PDI) 
Individualism/Collectivism 
(IDV) 
Masculinity/Femininity (MAS) 
Uncertainty avoidance index 
(UAI) 
Long term/short term 
orientations 
(LTO) 
Source : www.geert-hofstede.com 
Definition 
Degree to which the Jess powerful members of 
organizations and institutions (like the family) accept 
that power is unequally distributed. 
Refers to the ties between individuals: in sorne societies, 
where everyone is expected to look after him/herself and 
his/her immediate family , these ties are weak. ln other 
societies, individuals are integrated into strong cohesive 
groups. 
Refers to the distribution of the raies between genders. 
Degree to which members of a society tolerate 
uncertainty and ambiguity 
Values associated with long term orientation are thrift 
and perseverance; while values associated with short 
term orientation are respect for tradition, fulfilling social 
obligations, and protecting one's 'face'. 
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Table 1.10 : Hofstede cultural scores 
Country POl IDV MAS UAI LTO 
Arab World (Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 80 38 52 68 Saudi Arabi a, United Arab Emirates) 
Argentina 49 46 56 86 
Australia 36 90 61 51 31 
A us tria Il 55 79 70 
Belgium 65 75 54 94 
Brazil 69 38 49 76 65 
Canada 39 80 52 48 23 
Chile 63 23 28 86 
China 80 20 66 30 118 
Colom bi a 67 13 64 80 
Czech Republic 57 58 57 74 13 
Den mark 18 74 16 23 
Estonia 40 60 30 60 
Fin land 33 63 26 59 
France 68 71 43 86 
Germ any 35 67 66 65 31 
Greece 60 35 57 11 2 
Hong Kong 68 25 57 29 96 
Hungary 46 80 88 82 50 
lndia 77 48 56 40 61 
lndonesia 78 14 46 48 
lreland 28 70 68 35 
Israel 13 54 47 81 
Ital y 50 76 70 75 
Jamaica 45 39 68 13 
Japan 54 46 95 92 80 
Malaysia 104 26 50 36 
Malta 56 59 47 96 
Mexico 81 30 69 82 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 44 
New Zealand 22 79 58 49 30 
Nonvay 31 69 8 50 20 
Pa kistan 55 14 50 70 0 
Peru 64 16 42 87 
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Philil!l!ines 94 32 64 44 19 
Pola nd 68 60 64 93 32 
Portugal 63 27 31 104 
Russia 93 39 36 95 
Singa(!ore 74 20 48 8 48 
South Africa 49 65 63 49 
South Korea 60 18 39 85 75 
S(!ain 57 51 42 86 
Sweden 31 71 5 29 33 
Switzerland 34 68 70 58 
Taiwan 58 17 45 69 87 
Thailand 64 20 34 64 56 
Turkey 66 37 45 85 
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 25 
United Sta tes 40 91 62 46 29 
Venezuela 81 12 73 76 
Source : www.geert-hofstede.com 
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STOCK PRICE INFORMA TIVENESS AND ANAL YST CO VERA GE 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether more analyst coverage translates into more informative 
stock priees. The examination is applied to both developed and emerging markets. Our results 
indicate that analyst coverage in developed markets improves the flow of priva te information 
into stock priees. In parallel, we find that increased coverage in emerging markets translates 
into Jess future earnings information being impounded in stock priees, in accord with the 
view that financial analysts would act as intermediaries rather than private information 
providers. 
Keywords: analyst coverage, stock priee informativeness, firm-specific information, earnings 
forecasts. 
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2.1. Introduction 
In this paper, we propose to clarify the impact of analyst coverage on stock pnce 
informativeness. Allegedly, security analysts impact capital markets by providing firm­
specific information, including foremost earnings forecasts. Their activities are meant to 
reduce the information asymmetry between market participants, thereby contributing to keep 
stock priees in tine with firm fundamentals. Such informational rote is deemed important, 
given that innumerable small investors lack both time and resources to fully appraise firm 
stocks . 
The impact of analysts' activities on the firm's information environment has been the 
subject of extensive analysis in accounting and finance . However, there has been little 
evidence showing that analyst coverage is related to priee discovery (process by which 
information is incorporated into stock priees). Using a statistical methodology developed by 
Collins et al. (1994), we try to address this deficiency in the literature by examining the 
relation between analysts ' coverage and a direct measure of priee discovery that relies on 
fundamental data, namely earnings. We expect this research to contribute to a better 
understanding of how analysts impact the priee information process. Indeed, it' s not clear 
whether financial analysts act as intermediaries (filtering channels) or true providers of 
private information. Such intermediation, according to Lang and Lundholm (1996), calls for 
the information to go from the firm to analysts who then process and transmit it to capital 
markets. Hence, analysts do not really compete with firm disclosure sources and act mainly 
as outside filtering channels, the information asymmetry reducing role being left to firm 
insiders. Th us viewed, analysts essentially access a large amou nt of market-wide information. 
In contrast, assuming that financial analysts act primarily as private information 
providers, their coverage should entai t more fi rm-specific informat ion being transmitted to 
the markets, better value-related forecasts and stock priees more in tine with firm 
fundamentals. 
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We consider that higher stock priee informativeness is associated with more information 
about future earnings being impounded in current priees, in accord with a growing literature . 
For instance, Gelb and Zarowin (2002), Lundholm and Myers (2002) as weil as Durnev et al. 
(2003) define priee informativeness along this line. To measure the association, they regress 
current returns against both current and future earnings (more informative stock priees should 
contain more information about future earnings). Therefore, we choose future earnings 
response coefficients as our proxy for priee informativeness in our own regressions and 
expect that it will correlate positively with the level of analyst coverage. 
We claim that our study makes severa( contributions. First, we propose a novel approach 
to assess whether financial analysts perform a vital economie role by reducing information 
asymmetries between market participants. To our knowledge, and despite its common sense 
appeal, our approach has yet to appear in the literature. Should we find a positive association 
between our proxy of stock priee informativeness and the level of analyst coverage, we will 
have indications that analysts ' earnings forecasts act as valid signais for real future earnings. 
Second, through a global investigation, we cover analysts ' activities in both developed and 
emerging markets. So far, few studies focus on the potential cross-sectional differences in the 
role played by analysts in different economie and institutional environments. Obviously, in 
countries with weak institutions and less stringent information disclosure requirements, 
financial analysts stand at a disadvantage over insiders in accessing firm-specific 
information. Hence, we expect a weaker link between our measure of priee informativeness 
and analyst coverage for firms originating from countries with weak institutions. Finally, as 
suggested by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), the existing literature does not provide 
conclusive evidence regarding whether a firm' s information environment induces higher 
analyst coverage, or whether greater analyst coverage leads to an improvement in priee 
informativeness. Therefore, we propose to supplement our main regression analysis with a 
more robust specification that controls for the simultaneous effects between our adopted 
proxtes. 
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We document two primary empirical results. First, we find that analysts' forecasting 
activities improve the flow of private information into stock priees developed markets. 
Second, analyst coverage can produce different results depending on a country ' s home 
environment. In fact, the positive impact of analysts ' activities is concentrated in countries 
with stronger institutions and stricter disclosure rules. In emerging countries, our results 
suggest that financial analysts' activities do not reduce information asymmetries between 
market participants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work on 
analyst activity and our priee informativeness measure. ln section 3, we present our empirical 
mode! and outline our methodology and testable hypotheses. We discuss our data and sample 
in section 4. Section 5 presents and analyses our main empirical results, which is followed by 
concluding remarks in section 6. 
2.2. Previous research work 
Our study is related to two streams of literature: (1) research on the impact of analysts' 
activities, and (2) research on stock priee informativeness measures. 
2.2.1. Analyst coverage and market efficiency 
The typical investor does not have the time nor the resources for performing detailed firm 
evaluations. Therefore, there is a demand for security analysts who produce information for 
small investors. The ability of analysts to predict or influence stock priees is a much debated 
topic. Although the question is still open, numerous studies show that investors can profit 
from the publicly available recommendations of security analysts . Theoretically, the semi­
strong form of market efficiency posits that investors shou ld not be able to trade profitably on 
the basis of public information, such as analysts' recommendations. On the other hand, we 
have brokerage firms that spend millions of dollars in collecting data, analyzing, and 
publishing research and recommendations. ln a rational world, these activities must be 
compensated by profits in the form of underwriting fees and trading commissions. 
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Actually, abundant evidence exists which supports the argument that analysts' earnings 
forecasts are informative for investors. For instance, severa( papers compare the predictive 
ability of analysts' earnings forecasts with time-series models (Brown, 1978; Brown and 
Rozeff, 1978; Collins and Hopwood, 1980; Brown et al. 1987). Their results suggest that 
security analysts' earnings forecasts are more accurate than time-series model forecasts. In 
1996, Womack analyses the priee and volume reactions to different types of analysts' 
recommendations. His results suggest that stock priees adjust either up 5% (for buy 
recommendations) or down 11 % (for sell recommendations) over the next severa( months. 
These findings offer evidence that security analysts have market timing and stock picking 
abilities. In addition, Mikhail et al. (2004) investigate whether analysts stock picking abilities 
persist in the future. They find that security analysts whose recommendations earned the 
highest returns in the past continue to outperform in the future . 
In the same line of reasoning, Barber et al. (2001) examine whether investors can profit 
from the publicly available recommendations of financial analysts. Barber et al. (200 1) 
document that purchasing (short selling) stocks with the most (least) favorable consensus 
analysts' recommendations provide an average an nuai abnormal gross return of 4.13% (-
4.91%). In a more recent study, Barber et al. (2010) confirm their previous results and show 
that investment returns may be enhanced by conditioning on financial analysts' 
recommendations . According to Barber et al. (20 1 0), the predictive power of analysts' 
recommendations reflects analysts' ability to generate valuable private information . Further, 
the abnormal returns to analysts' recommendations stem both from the ratings levels assigned 
and the changes in th ose ratings (Barber et al. 201 0). As for Green (2006), he finds that 
financial analysts' recommendations do provide brokerage firms clients with incrementai 
investment value. Indeed, after controlling for transactions costs, Green (2006) shows that 
purchasing (selling) quickly following upgrades (downgrades) by financial analysts results in 
an average two-day returns of 1.02% (1 .50%). Similarly, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) investigate 
the source of investment value provided by analysts ' recommendations and changes in 
recommendations. They find that the marginal predictive abi lity of the level of analysts' 
recommendations is not significant. However, the predictive power of changes (revisions) in 
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analysts' recommendations is more robust than the predictive power of the leve! of their 
recommendations . 
In other studies, financial analysts have been found to issue, on average, earnings' 
forecasts that tend to be systematically above the actual value of earnings. For instance, Hong 
and Kubik (2003) find that brokerage houses reward optimistic analysts who promote stocks . 
Further, Lim (200 1) argues that financial analysts have incentives to issue earnings forecasts 
that tend to be upward biased, because optimistic forecasts can improve access to 
management. Lim (200 1) proposes a mode! in which analysts optimistic forecasts are rational 
and intentional. ln the same line of reasoning, Mest and Plummer (2003) show that analysts 
upward bias tend to decrease when optimistic forecasts are Jess likely to affect management 
relations . This result suggests that financial analysts behave rationally. 
Finally, a number of other contributions indicate that higher analyst coverage equates 
with more market-wide information and Jess firm-specific information. For instance, 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that, in the US, stock return variation attributable to the 
general market and industry movements is positively associated with analysts ' activities, 
consistent with analysts decreasing the amount of firm-specific information that is 
incorporated into stock priees. For emerging markets, the results of Chan and Hameed (2006) 
also show that stock return synchronicity with the market is positively correlated with analyst 
coverage, providing more evidence supporting the fact that security analysts increase the 
amount of market levet information in priees. 
As for us, we fashion our own way to estimate the extent to which analyst coverage 
enhances, or tessens, the impounding of firm-specific information into stock priees. Using a 
measure of stock priee informativeness based on fundamentals , we examine its relation with 
the intensity of analyst activity, as rendered at firm levet by the number of analysts issuing 
earnings forecasts . 
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2.2 .2. Stock priee informativeness: 
Our proxy of stock priee informativeness is based on Collins et al. ( 1994). It is meant to 
measure directly the association between current stock priees and future eamings. In fact, this 
measure defines how much information current stock priees contain about future earnings. 
Informative priees should «bring the future» so that they can track and retlect more future 
earnings news. We estimate that many papers (Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm and 
Myers, 2002; Durnev et al. 2003) support the relation between our proxy and priee 
informativeness. In these papers, current returns are regressed against both current and future 
earnings: 
00 
RI = flo + fl1uce1 + '2: /l2; t!..EI(jel+i ) +cl (1) 
i= l 
Where 
R, current stock return (period t) 
uce, unexpected current earnings (period t) 
f.. E,(fe,+;) change in expectations about future earnings 
e1 error term 
The explanatory variables in regression ( 1) being unobservable, similar proxies are used 
by authors su ch Lev and Zarowin ( 1999), Francis and Schipper ( 1999), Lundholm and Myers 
(2002), and Durnev et al. (2003). To proxy for the unexpected current earnings in period t, 
these authors rely on the leve! of earnings at periods (t) and (t-l). Lundholm and Myers 
(2002) argue that the inclusion of the past year earnings (e,_ 1) allows the regress ion to dictate 
the best representation of the prior expectation for current earnings. Jf earnings are treated by 
the market as a random walk process, then the coefficient on e1_1 and e, are of similar 
magnitude but opposite signs. In contrast, if the coefficient on e1_1 is approximately zero then 
earnings are treated as a white noise process (Lundholm and Myers, 2002). 
Furthermore, to proxy for the changes in the expected future earnings, we follow the 
standard practice in the literature (Col lins et al. 1994; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm 
and Myers, 2002; and Durnev et al. 2003) and use the realized future earnings (e1+;) and future 
returns (R,+;) as proxies. Note that Beaver et al. (1980) and Warfield and Wild (1992) proxy 
for f..E,(fe,+; ) by using only realized future earnings. However, Collins et al. (1994) 
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recommend including future stock returns as an additional control variable. They argue that 
the omission of this variable introduces an error in variables because realized future earnings 
have expected and unexpected components. To correct for this bias and control for the 
unexpected component, an instrument (future retums) is needed that correlates with the 
measurement error but not with the dependent variable. The underlying intuition being that 
an unexpected shock to future earnings (t+i) shou ld have an impact on future retums (R1+;). 
The regression we estimate to proxy for stock priee informativeness goes as follows: 
3 
R, =ba+ blet-!+ b2et + L (b3iet+l + b4i R, +, ) + &, (2) 
i= l 
We use only three years of future earnings ( e1+1, e1+2 and e1+3) and corresponding returns 
(R1+1, R1+2 and R1+3) because prior research has shown that amounts further out in time add 
little explanatory power (Collins et al. 1994 ). The aggregated coefficients on the future 
earnings (Sum of b3;) represent the association between current return and realized future 
earnings. The more current return, R" contains information about future earnings, the higher 
the coefficients are expected to be. When we measure the Pearson correlations between 
variables in equation (2), multicollinearity is not an issue since current earnings, future 
earnings and future returns are not highly correlated. We also use the variance inflation factor 
and fi nd no evidence of multicollinarity . 
R1 are the buy-and-hold returns for the 12 months period starting at the fiscal-year-end 2• 
Earnings e1 equates with income before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), recorded at the end of fiscal year (t) divided by the initial market value of equity 
recorded at (t-1). The equity is valued at (t-l) by taking stock priee times the number of 
shares outstanding. [t is worth mentioning that interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
are quite sensitive to differences in discretionary accounting rules. Knowing that such 
differences in the accounting practices are country-or industry-specific, the advantage of 
relying on EBITDA is increasing with trans-industry and transnational sampling. Therefore, 
we will circumvent needless noises by relying on raw EBITDA rather than net income. 
2 The fiscal-year-end adjusted share priee, plus the adjusted dividends, ali divided by the adjusted priee 
at the end of the previous fiscal year (t-l). The adjustment factor reflects stocks splits th at occurred 
during the fiscal year. 
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Furthermore, the country or the industry fixed effects in our regressions models are likely to 
pick up these differences in the accounting rules (see, Hait and Leuz, 2006, 2009 for a 
discussion). 
We measure stock priee informativeness by the sum ofthe coefficients on future earnings: 
(3) 
This variable cumulates the sensitivities of current priees to future earnings. Thus, Pl is 
likely to retlect how weil current priees predict future earnings. On the other hand, an 
important empirical literature (Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm and Myers, 2002; and 
Durnev et al. 2003) suggests that our measure of priee informativeness is affected by a 
variety of factors (e.g. size, growth, earnings volatility ... ). Therefore, we should include in 
our regressions a set of variables to control for observed variations in the earnings-return 
relation that are likely due to causes other than analyst following. After controlling for these 
factors, our empirical measure should retlect informativeness. 
2.3. Hypotheses and tests 
In this section, we define our variables and their measures, state our key hypotheses and 
describe our methodology for testing the latter. The main purpose is to measure directly the 
association between stock priee informativeness and analyst coverage. 
2.3.1. Construction of variables 
Most of our variables can be found in the existing literature. The measures can differ, 
including our own. 
63 
2.3.1.1. Priee informativeness (Pl). 
As defined earlier, PI represents the amount of information about future earnings that is 
reflected in current priees (future earnings response coefficients) . To estimate Pl, we follow 
Durnev et al. (2003); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and use a cross-section of similar firms 
(pooling firms in the same industry). This approach consists of measuring Pl estimates each 
year for ali firms in a given two-digit industry. We do not estimate Pl for each finn for three 
main reasons. First, it's not possible to measure Pl for each firm and each year because we 
use annual data frequencies in equation (2). Second, ifwe intend to calculate PI for each finn 
over the 1990-2006 period, the problem is that we will use few observations for our 
estimation purpose (maximum 17 observations). The result could be unreliable measures for 
PI. Finally, as stressed by Durnev et al. (2003), polling years of data for each firm to estimate 
stock priee informativeness may be problematic because changes in macroeconomie 
environment, industry conditions, accounting rules, and financial regulations can cause 
intertemporal changes in our future earnings coefficients. 
The simple correlations between Pl estimates and analyst activity, as measured by 
coverage, are of interest. However, our analysis is best performed using a multivariate 
regressions framework. Of course, we need to include control variables in our regressions and 
the most recurrent in the literature being earnings timeliness and earnings volatility. 
2.3.1.2. Earnings timeliness: 
Earnings timeliness refers to the speed at which stock priees respond to earnings news. 
For example, growth stocks compared to mature stocks, should display a much stronger 
relation between current returns and future earnings, a li else equal. Therefore, we shou ld 
include in our regressions a measure of firm growth opportunities to control for this factor. 
Growth is defined as the percentage growth in the firm 's assets from year t-5 to year t. 
Furthermore, the relation between returns and earnings can also vary when the firm is 
releasing good news or bad news. Basu ( 1997) shows that due to conservatism princip le in 
accounting; bad news is impounded in earnings more quickly than good news. An 
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implication is that good news firm s should exhibit a strong relation between current returns 
and future earnings than bad news firm s. Basu ( 1997) suggests that the sign of the current 
stock return can be used as a proxy for bad news (negative sign) versus good news (pos itive 
s ign). Therefore, as a further check, we include the current return as an addi tional control 
variable. Finally, size might also be an important omi tted variable. Freeman ( 1987) and 
Collins and Kothari ( 1989) fi nd that returns of larger firm s impound earn ings on a more 
timely bas is than returns of sm aller firm s. To measure the size, we use the log of firm ' s 
market value of equity. 
2.3.1.3. Earnings volatility: 
Other determinants of the earnings response coeffic ients may intrinsica lly affect our 
measure of priee inform ativeness. For example, vo latile earnings may be hard to forecast. 
Thus, firm s with more volatile earnings should have a lower re lation between current returns 
and future earnings. To control for this factor, we add earnings standard dev iation over the 
previous 5 years as an independent variable. 
2.3.1.4. Analyst coverage: 
We measure analyst fo llowing as the average number of analysts who issued earnings 
forecasts fo r a li fi rms in a given two-digit industry during a given fi scal-year. We gather data 
on the num ber of ana lysts issuing forecasts through 1/B/E/S. As suggested by Piotroski and 
Roui stone (2004), if I/B/E/S does not report an analyst forecast for fi rm i in year t, we assume 
that the number of analysts fo llowing that firm is zero. In our robustness checks, we also 
perfo rm our analys is by excluding firms with no earnings forecasts. 
Analysts' forecasting activity should be dependent on the assoc iated costs and benefits. 
For instance, larger companies tend to attract more analysts because there are s ignificant 
fixed costs in fo llowing larger companies. Indeed, Bhushan ( 1989) shows that the number of 
analysts is increasing in firm size. Furthermore, in larger companies, there is greater 
separation between ownership and control , which can create potential agency prob lems and 
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thus increase the need for analyst monitoring. As a consequence, we should expect a positive 
association between firm size and the number of analysts. Furthermore, because there is more 
private information when retum volatility is higher, analyst following should be positively 
related to the standard deviation of firm's retums. We measure retums volatility as the 
average standard deviation of retums over the previous five years. 
Finally, trading volume can also affects the incentives of security analysts to follow the 
activities of the firm. Barth et al. (200 1 ), and Al ford and Berger (1999) show that analyst 
coverage is increasing in trading volume. We argue that analysts have an incentive to cover 
firms with high trading volumes because such firms are associated with more brokerage 
commissions. Therefore, we should expect a positive relation between the number of analysts 
and our trading volume variable. 
2.3.2. Empirical methodology: 
To test whether analyst following influences stock priee informativeness, we estimate the 
following regression for developed markets, emerging markets and U .S market: 
P Ii,t =a+ /31 log(l + NAi,t) + /32 log(Si,t) + /33 ( G~,~) + /34 (E~,,) + /35 ( controlsi,t) 
+ IoJD(, +&i,l (4) 
k = l 
Note that i indexes two-digit SIC industries and t indexes years. The two-digit SIC 
industry approach consists of pooling ali firrns in a two-digit industry and calculate the 
corresponding variables. Therefore, in equation (4), we regress our industry average priee 
informativeness estimates on industry average analysts following and industry average 
measures of our control variables. Ali variables in equation ( 4) are defined in table (2.1). 
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We assume that security analysts collect, process, and produce firm-specific information 
that is useful in identifying undervalued or overvalued stocks. Therefore, our first hypothesis 
predicts that analysts' coverage allows stock priees to track firms' fundamentals closely: 
Hypothesis 1: Financial analysts' activities bring more scrutiny and provide the market with 
more precise firm-specific information 
In our study, we also examine analysts' activities around the world . An important issue is 
to verify if there are cross-sectional differences between countries that stem from economie 
and institutional environments . On a theoretical basis, in countries with weak institutions and 
Jess stringent information disclosure requirements, financial analysts should have Jess 
informational advantage over insiders due to the difficulties associated with accessing firm­
specific information. Furthermore, as suggested by Morck et al. (2000), weak property rights 
might discourage arbitrage based on private information (firm-specific information) . 
Therefore, there will be fewer benefits for analysts to gather firm-specific information in 
countries with weak property rights. Consequently, we expect Jess pronounced associations 
between our measure of priee informativeness and analyst coverage for firms originating 
from countries with weaker legal institutions. This reasoning leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The association between priee informativeness and analyst following is more 
pronounced for firms originating from countries with stronger legal institutions (developed 
markets and U.S market versus emerging markets). 
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Table 2. 1 :Variables definitions and measures 
Variable Definition 
PI;,1 Priee informativeness equates with the future earnings response 
coefficients. This measure represents the sum of the coefficients on future 
earnings (t=l , 2, 3) from regression (2). 
The regression is performed on a two-digit SIC industry cross-section of 
firms . 
NA;,1 Number of analysts is measured by the average number of analysts who 
issued earnings forecasts during year (t) for ali firms in a two-digit 
industry 
si,t Size. Measured by the log of firm ' s market value of equity. We use the 
average size of ali ftrms in a two-digit industry. 
GR;,t Growth. We use two-digit industry average growth in the firms ' assets 
from year t-5 to year t. 
EV;,1 Earnings volatility. We use two-digit industry average earnings volatility 
over the previous 5 years. 
CR;,1 Current return. We use two-digit industry value-weighted return in (t) 
RV;,t Returns volatility. We use two-digit industry average returns volatility 
over the previous 5 years. 
TV;,1 Trading volume. We use two-digit industry average trading volume . We 
take the logarithm of the respective realization ofthat proxy. 
NF;,t Square root of the number of ftrms in the industry used in estimating Pl. 
ID Dummy variable to control for industry-level fi xed effects. 
YD Dummy variable to control for year-fixed effects. 
CD Dummy variable to control for country-fixed effects. 
2.4. Data 
Different sources of data are used for the construction of our variables. We obtain data on 
analysts ' following and their earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. Information on stock priees, 
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returns and firm-level accounting data are drawn from Datastream and Worldscope. Our 
sample construction begins with ali firms included in the country list provided by Datastream 
from 1990 to 2006. The sample period stops in 2006 because in sorne of our variables 
construction, we need data up to 2009. The second step consists of matching firms from 
I/B/E/S and Datastream. Note our exclusion of financial and banking firms because the 
financial nature oftheir assets hinders accounting data comparisons with other firms. 
2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents a summary of the sample firms included in the study. The sample 
includes firms from 42 countries (22 developed countries, 19 emerging countries and the 
US). The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. To enhance the comparability of our study 
with prior literature, we do not include the US market into our developed countries sample. 
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Table 2.2 : Number of firm-year observations in the sample 
US market Developed markets Emerging markets 
Year Number offirm-years Year Number of finn- Year Number offirm-years 
years 
1990 378 1990 1040 1990 -
1991 390 199 1 1287 1991 -
1992 406 1992 1590 1992 -
1993 484 1993 1829 1993 -
1994 578 1994 1969 1994 234 
1995 638 1995 1878 1995 382 
1996 858 1996 2242 1996 636 
1997 985 1997 2603 1997 939 
1998 1103 1998 2943 1998 1104 
1999 1233 1999 3175 1999 1201 
2000 1460 2000 3596 2000 1377 
2001 1595 2001 4290 2001 1737 
2002 1759 2002 5293 2002 2196 
2003 1832 2003 5605 2003 2520 
2004 1758 2004 5928 2004 3450 
2005 1806 2005 6217 2005 3737 
2006 1855 2006 5955 2006 3338 
Total 19 118 Total 57 440 Total 22 851 
Table 2.3 presents univariate statistics for our sample. Firms, in table 2.3, are partitioned 
into two groups based on the number of analysts covering the firm. The first group includes 
firms followed by less than four analysts. The second group contains firms covered by more 
than four analysts. The intuition behind this classification is to investigate potential 
differences in our main estimates between firms with low analyst coverage and firms with 
high analyst coverage. For US and emerging markets, stock priee informativeness tends to 
decrease for firms with more analyst coverage, suggesting a negative relation between our 
priee informativeness measure and analyst activity. For instance, The PI measure is -0 .259 
for US firms covered by less than four analysts and -0.278 for US firms with more than four 
analysts. ln the case of developed markets firms, we find that stock priee informativeness is 
positively correlated with analyst coverage. In fact, the Pl statistics are -0 .203 and -0.142 for 
the groups with low numbers of analysts and the groups with high numbers of analysts, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.3 : Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for two portfolios. The first portfolio includes firms foll owed by Jess than four analysts. 
The second portfolio contains firms followed by more than four analysts. N is the number of firm-year observations for each 
group. The sample includes firms from 42 countries (22 developed countries, 19 emerging countries and the US). Ali variables 
are defined in table 2.1. The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. Ali observations, including those firms with zero analyst 
coverage, are used in the estimation. Ali variables are constructed using two-digit SIC cross-industry approach . This approach is 
conducted by polling firms in a two-digit SIC industry to calculate the corresponding measures. The mean of a variable is 
calculated as the average across ali industries and years, and the corresponding standard deviation is indicated in parentheses. 
Variable US market Developed markets Emergin markets 
Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than 
four analysts four analysts four analysts four analysts four analysts four analysts 
Pl -0.259 -0 .278 -0.203 -0 .142 -0.301 -0.626 
(0.252) (0.103) (0 .129) (0.127) (0.330) (0.216) 
s 12.627 13 .609 12.175 12.79 11 .653 12.889 
(0.331) (0 .696) (0.500) (0.41 0) (0.621) (0.627) 
GR 2.230 1.166 1.208 1.052 3.731 5.642 
( 1.593) (0.578) (0.850) (0.290) (2 .081) (1.733) 
EV 0.316 0.350 0.285 0.332 0.262 0.057 
(0.234) (0.335) (0.236) (0 .269) (0.120) (0.074) 
RV 0.608 0.415 0.530 0.665 1.432 0.493 
(0.269) (0 .171) (0.097) (0 .275) ( 1.037) (0.586) 
TV 9.318 9.646 8.990 9.928 9.296 8.340 
(0.371) (0.222) (0.38) (0.280) (0.492) (0.640) 
N 12 206 6912 55 818 1622 21 069 1782 
It is worth mentioning that these mixed preliminary results only represent a univariate 
relation. Our tests are best performed using multivariate regression analysis because PI is also 
affected by other factors (size, growth ... ). On the other hand, consistent with associations 
documented in prior literature, we find that the number of analysts is correlated with other 
variables. For instance, the firm size is generally higher for groups with higher number of 
analysts, suggesting that large companies tend to attract more analysts. In addition, analyst 
coverage is also increasing in trading volume (US and developed markets). 
Table 2.4 presents correlations between our key variables. If analysts forecasting 
activities provide the market with more precise firm-specific information, we should expect a 
positive correlation between stock priee informativeness and analyst following. Severa! key 
relations are apparent in table 2.4. First, stock priee informativeness and analyst following 
display an insignificant correlation in ali cases (developed, emerging and US markets). 
Second, in the case of developed and emerging markets, the Pearson correlations between 
firm size and stock priee informativeness are significantly negative. Third, we have a positive 
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and significant correlation between analyst activity and market capitalization (Size). Finally, 
the relation between stock priee informativeness and assets growth is significantly negative 
for developed and emerging markets firm s. So far, our univariate evidence on how analyst 
activity impacts stock priee informativeness is mixed. However, in tables 2.3 and 2.4, we do 
not control for various plausible factors known to affect our PI estimates . 
Table 2.4 : Pea rson Correlations (p-values): 
This table presents the correlations between variables. Ali observations, including those firms with zero analyst coverage , are 
used in the estimation. Ail vari ab les are defined in table 2.1. The sample peri od is from 1990 to 2006. Ali variables are 
constructed using two-digi t SIC cross-industry approach. This approach is conducted by pol ling fi rms in a two-dig it SIC 
industry to calculate the corresponding measures. 
Panel A: US market: 
PI NA s GR EV CR RV TV 
Pl 1.0000 -0.0766 -0.0944 0.067 1 0.0403 0.036 1 0.02 17 0 .11 68 
(0.226 1) (0 .1355) (0.2985) (0.5252) (0.5702) (0 73 18) (0 .0645) 
NA -0.0766 1.0000 0.44 16 -0.0834 -0.0009 -0.0344 -0.0509 -0.0392 
(0.226 1) (0 000 1) (0 1303) (0 .9863) (0.5277) (0.3486) (04702) 
s -0 .0944 0.4416 1.0000 -0.11 27 -0.0251 -0.0298 -0.153 1 0 .3 548 
(0.1355) (0000 1) (0 .0406) (0 .6449) (0.585 1) (0 0046) (0.0001) 
GR 0.067 1 -0.0834 -O.il27 1.0000 -0.0 12 1 0.107 1 0.2136 0.3024 
(0 2985) (0.1303) (0.0406) (0 8256) (0 0525) (0.000 1) (0.000 1) 
EV 0.0403 -0.0009 -0.025 1 -0.0 12 1 1.0000 0.3294 0.0524 0.0684 
(0 5252) (0 9863) (0.6449) (0.8256) (0.000 1) (0.3241 ) (0 .2085) 
CR 0.036 1 -0.0344 -0.0298 0.1071 0.3294 1.0000 0.1422 0 .132 1 
(0.5702) (0.5277) (0 585 1) (0 0525) (0.000 1) (0 0073) (0.0150) 
RV 0.02 17 -0.0509 -0.153 1 0.2 136 0.0524 0.1422 1.0000 0.3 162 
(0.73 18) (0.3486) (0.0046) (0.000 1) (0.3241 ) (0 0073) (0.000 1) 
TV 0.11 68 -0.0392 0.3548 0.3024 0.0684 0.132 1 0.3 162 1.0000 
(0 0645) (04702) (0000 1) (0 000 1) (0.2085) (0.0150) (0 .000 1) 
- -
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Table 2.4-continued 
Panel B: Developed markets: 
Pl NA s GR EV CR RV TV 
PI 1.0000 0.0439 -0.1874 -0.3474 0.111 3 -0.0004 -0.025 1 0.1688 
(0.3866) (0.0002) (0 .000 1) (0 .0278) (0.9929) (0.6200) (0.0008) 
NA 0.0439 1.0000 0.353 1 0.13 14 0.0346 -0.1475 -0.1434 0.383 1 
(0.3866) (0.000 1) (0.0078) (0.4854) (0 0035) (0.0037) (0.000 1) 
s -0.1874 0.353 1 1. 0000 0.1002 -0.2846 0.0335 -0.2589 -0.0755 
(0 0002) (0.000 1) (0.0429) (0 000 1) (0.5093) (0 .000 1) (0 .1278) 
GR -0.3474 0.13 14 0. 1002 1. 0000 -0.0256 -0.0 174 0. 1894 0. 1798 
(0.000 1) (0.0078) (0.0429) (0 .6049) (0 73 19) (0 000 1) (0 0003) 
EV 0. 111 3 0.0346 -0.2846 -0.0256 1. 0000 -0.1440 0.0920 0.2655 
(0.0278) (0.4854) (0 .000 1) (0 .6049) (0 .0044) (0 .0632) (0000 1) 
CR -0.0004 -0.1475 0.0335 -0.0174 -0.1440 1.0000 -0.023 1 -0.2873 
(0.9929) (0 .0035) (0.5093) (0 .73 19) (0 .0044) (0 .6494) (0.000 1) 
RV -0.025 1 -0. 1434 -0.2589 0.1894 0.0920 -0.023 1 1.0000 0.3000 
(0.6200) (0.0037) (0 .0046) (0 .000 1) (0 .0632) (0 .6494) (0.000 1) 
TV 0. 1688 0.3831 -0.0755 0.1798 0.2655 -0.2873 0.3000 1.0000 
(0.0008) (0 000 1) (0 .1278) (0 .0003) (0 000 1) (0 0001) (0 .000 1) 
Panel C: Emerging markets : 
Pl NA s GR EV CR RV TV 
PI 1.0000 -0.06 15 -0 .2309 -0.5685 0. 1081 0.0272 0.0520 -0.083 7 
(0.3 144) (0.000 1) (0 000 1) (0.0779) (0 .6755) (0.3979) (0 1789) 
NA -0.06 15 1. 0000 0.3284 0.0 140 -0.23 17 -0.0030 -0.0479 0. 123 1 
(0.3 144) (0 .000 1) (0.79 14) (0 000 1) (0.9523) (0.352 1) (0.0 131) 
s -0.2309 0.3284 1.0000 0.0862 -0.1943 0.00 12 -0.0555 0.1862 
(0.000 1) (0.000 1) (0.1 029) (0.0002) (0 9808) (0 .28 16) (0.0002) 
GR -0.5685 0.0 140 0.0862 1.0000 -0.050 1 -0.0 12 1 -0.0 178 0.02 16 
(0.000 1) (0 .79 14) (0 1029) (0.3664) (0 .8273) (0 7470) (0.682 1) 
EV 0.108 1 -0.23 17 -0. 1943 -0.050 1 1. 0000 0.0328 -0.0264 0.23 12 
(0.0779) (0 .000 1) (0.0002) (0.3664) (0.5495) (0 6137) (0 .000 1) 
CR 0.0272 -0.0030 0.00 12 -0.012 1 0.0328 1.0000 -0.0065 0.0018 
(0.6755) (0 9523) (0 .9808) (0 .8273) (0.5495) (0 .9040) (0 .972 1) 
RV 0.0520 -0.0479 -0.0555 -0.0178 -0.0264 -0.0065 1.0000 -0.0165 
(0.3979) (0.3521) (0.28 16) (0 .7470) (0.6137) (0.9040) (0 .7546) 
TV -0.0837 0. 123 1 0.1862 0.02 16 0.23 12 0.00 18 -0.0 165 1. 0000 
(0. 1789) (0.0 131) (0.0002) (0 .682 1) (0.000 1) (0 .972 1) (0.7546) 
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2.5.2. Multivariate regression analysis 
To test whether analysts forecasting activities influence stock pnce informativeness, we 
estimate variants of our equation ( 4): 
+ Isk iD;~, + 5 ;,, 
k=l 
The dependent variable PI is computed based on equation (3): 
3 
PI= Ib3i 
i= l 
ln the case of developed and emerging markets estimations, our cross-industry approach 
consists of pol ling firms originating from different countries according to their two-digit SIC 
code. This approacn might control for industry-specific impacts on Pl , but it will poorly take 
into consideration potential country-specifie impacts on PI. Therefore, to ascertain the 
robustness of our empirical findings , we add country dummies to equation (2) before 
estimating Pl. 
3 
R, = b0 + b1e,_1 +b2e, + L(b3;e, +i + b4;R,+; ) + Countrydummies + &, 
i= l 
Later, we will re-estimate our equation (4) by pooling firms according to their country of 
origin rather than their industry code. Table 2.5 reports the coefficients estimates of panel 
regressions of equation (4) . Ali observations, including those firms with zero analyst 
coverage, are used in the estimation. Mode! (1) serves as our starting point in that we include 
firm size and assets growth as additional control variables . To control further for differences 
among industries, we follow Durnev et al. (2003) and use a one-digit industry-fixed effects 
mode! (we do not use two-digit industry dummies to conserve degrees of freedom) . The 
coefficients on the industry dummy variables (IDk) are not tabulated for parsimony. ln 
equation ( 4), year dummies are not included to conserve degrees of freedom , but standard 
errors in ali models are adjusted for clustering at the time levet. However, adding year 
dummies in equation ( 4) does not alter our findings . 
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Mode! ( 1) reports estimates of the basic equation using market capital ization and as sets 
growth as control variables. For the US market, the analyst coverage coefficient is 0.1069 
with a p-value of0.005 . This result indicates a positive and significant (1 % leve!) association 
between analyst following and stock priee informativeness. Further, the results of mode! ( 1) 
also confirm a positive and significant (5% leve!) relation between analyst following and 
priee informativeness in developed countries . However, this relation becomes neutra! in the 
case of emerging countries firms (the coefficient of interest is -0.0136 with a p-value of 
0.817). 
Table 2.5 : Stock priee informativeness and analyst coverage: Primary results 
This table reports the results of the foliowing regression: 
Pl u = a+ /]1 log( 1 +NA;,) + f3 2 log( S,,, ) + fJ 1 (GR u ) + /], (EV ~,~ ) + L o, ID ,~, +e,, 
k =l 
Where i indexes two-digit SIC industri es and 1 indexes years. The two-digit SIC industry approach consists ofpooling ali fi rms 
in a two-digit industry and calcul ale the corresponding variables. For the US market, the sample size of speci fi cations 1 and 2 is 
24 two-digit industries constructed using 2903 firrns. For developed markets, the sam pie size of specifications 1 and 2 and is 24 
two-digit industri es constructed using 874 1 firms. For emerging markets specifi cations, the sample size is 24 Iwo-d igit industries 
constructed using 5553 firms . Financial industri es are omitted. Ali vari ab les are defined in tab le (2 .1 ). lndustry dummy variables 
are included but not reported. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the time leve!. P-values for two-tailed tes ts are in 
parentheses. One, two or three asterisks denote sign ificance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
lndependent variab les US market Developed markets Emergin markets 
Modell Model2 Modell Model2 Modell Mode12 
ln terce pt 3.0325 3.0655 1.1 288 1.0487 0.3959 0.2006 
(0.001)"" (0.001)"" (0.005)" ' (0.019)" (0 565) (0.774) 
Analyst activity 0.1069 0. 1073 0.0519 0.0513 -0.0136 -0.0093 
(0.005)'" (0.008)"" (0,048)" (0.051) ' (0 817) (0.878) 
Size -0.2750 -0.2777 -0.1140 -0.1 094 -0.0981 -0.08 12 
(0.001)"' (0.001)'" (0.003)' " (0.005) '" (0.100)' (0.180) 
Growth -0.0050 -0.005 1 -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.302) (0.298) (0.069) ' (0.069)' (0.001 )"' (0.001)'" 
Earnings volatilrty 0.0000 0.0263 0.1469 
(0.988) (0.632) (0 11 8) 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
R' 0.1610 0.1628 0.1754 0.1759 0.4051 0.4095 
N 242 24 1 390 390 240 239 
When we include earnings volatility (mode! 2), the ev idence of a positive and significant 
association between stock priee informativeness and analyst following remains consistent for 
both U.S and developed markets firm s. In addition, our emerging markets primary findings 
are not affected when we add earnings volati li ty as an additional control variable. In fact, 
mode! (2) results show an analyst activity coefficient of -0.0093 with a p-value of 0.878. 
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Overall, our primary results establish a positive and significant relation between stock 
priee informativeness and analyst coverage for US and developed markets. ln these countries, 
financial analysts act primarily as private information providers, so that their activities bring 
more scrutiny and provide market participants with more precise information. On the other 
hand, consistent with our second hypothesis, our findings show a neutra! relation between 
stock priee informativness and analyst coverage in the case of emerging markets firms. 
Therefore, it seems that financial analysts have less informational advantage over insiders in 
countries with weaker legal institutions. As suggested by Morck et al. (2000), the weak 
property rights in emerging countries may discourage arbitrage based on private information, 
so that there will be fewer benefits for financial analysts to gather firm-specific information. 
2.5.3. Robustness tests 
For our robustness checks, we conduct our analyses in many different ways: 
2.5.3.1. Elimination of observations with zero analysts following 
Our main analysis includes firms with no earnings forecasts. A potential concern is that 
our results can be influenced by these observations. ln fact, as suggested by Chan and 
Hameed (2006), the presence of zero analyst coverage could mean that there is no analyst 
coverage or that the data for the firm were not captured by l/B/E/S. Therefore, we also 
perform our tests without these observations. Estimations excluding observations without 
analyst activity are reported in table 2.6. For the US market, the results of our first robustness 
checks show that the positive association between stock priee informativeness and analyst 
activity is robust to the elimination of observations with zero analyst coverage. On the other 
hand, the weaker relation between stock priee infonnativeness and the forecasting activ ities 
of analysts, in emerging markets, becomes more pronounced. ln fact, two of the three 
coefficients on analyst following are negative and significant in the case of emerging markets 
estimations. For instance, in mode! (3) (table 2.6), the coefficient of interest is -0.0505 with a 
p-value of 0.030 suggesting that emerging countries analysts act mainly as intermediaries 
rather than private information providers. This additional evidence provides further support 
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fo r our second hypothesis. Finally, the re lation between priee informativeness and analyst 
activity becomes non significant in developed markets estimations. 
Table 2.6 : Stock pr iee infor mativeness and ana lyst coverage excluding zero coverage cases 
This table reports the results of the following regression : 
PI ,,,= a+ /3, log( l +NA ,,,)+ /3 21og( s,,~) + /l,(GR ,,~ )+ /l,(EV ,,~ ) + L o,ID ,~, +t: ,,, 
k • \ 
Where i indexes two-digit SIC industries and t indexes years. The two-digit SIC industry approach consists ofpooling ali firms 
in a two-digit industry and calculate the corresponding variables. Observations with zero analyst coverage are excluded from the 
estimation. lndustry dummy variables are included but not reported. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the time leve l. 
P-values for two-tail ed tests are in parentheses. One, two or three aste risks denote significance at the 1 0, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Independent US market Developed markets Emerg ing markets 
var iables Modell Model2 Model3 Modell Model2 Model3 Modell Model2 
lntercept 1.4029 1.4997 1.4956 1.1627 1.1 675 1.0759 0.2394 -0.4038 
(0.067)' (0.055) ' (0.057)' (O.Q05)" ' (0.005)"' (0.018)" (0.738) (0.524) 
Analyst activity 0.4967 0.4753 0.4720 0.0078 0.0 178 0.0166 -0.006 1 -0.0526 
(0.031)" (0.046)" (0.052)' (0.660) (0.293) (0324) (0 .824) (0.023)" 
Size -0.1921 -0.1963 -0.1952 -0 .1077 -0.11 26 -0.1065 -0.1738 -0.0087 
(0.005)'" (0.006)'" (0.007)'" (0.009)'" (0.007)' " (0.009)" ' (0.010)"' (0.878) 
Growth -0 0024 -0.0023 -0.0149 -0.0148 -0.0000 
(0.669) (0.687) (0.087) ' (0.088) ' (0.00 1)'" 
Earnings volati lity 0.0004 0.0268 
(0.920) (0.635) 
Industry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
R2 0.2067 0.2 135 0.2 136 0.0632 0.1599 0.1604 03580 0.4726 
N 25 1 242 24 1 390 390 390 268 240 
2.5.3.2. Joint analysis of the role played by financial analysts around the world 
We conduct our joint analysis by using the entire data set in one regression and adding a 
dummy variable to distinguish between firms originating from countries with stronger legal 
institutions (developed and US markets) and firms from countries with weaker legal 
institutions (emerging countries). The following model is used: 
+B2~.' x log(Si,, )+B3~1 x G~1 +B4~., xEV,1 + L8k!/J;; + LÂmYl:{; +&,1 
k=l m=l (5) 
Where, Di,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for emerging countries and 0 
otherwise. The results of our joint analysis are reported in table 2.7. 
Model 3 
-0.5709 
(0372) 
-0.0505 
(0.030)" 
0.005 1 
(0.929) 
-0.0000 
(0.00 1)"' 
0.1227 
(0. 184) 
Y es 
0.4780 
239 
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Table 2.7 prov ides sorne interesting conclusions. First, it shows that stock priees fail to 
reflect more information about future earnmgs in emerging countries markets (negative 
coeffic ient for the dummy variable). Second, the coefficient of the interaction term 
Di,t* log( l +NAi,t) is -0.0236 with a p-value of 0.069. This result suggests that the relation 
between priee informativeness and analyst activity is less pronounced for firms originating 
from emerging countries . 
Table 2.7 : Stock priee informativeness and analyst activity: Regression analysis using the entire 
data set 
Th is table reports the results of the fo llowing regress ion: 
Pl u =a+ /]1 log( 1 + NA,,, )+ (J, l og(S~,~ ) + /]3 (GR ~,~ )+ (J, (EV,,,)+ B0 D,,, + B,D,,, x log( 1 +NA, ,,) 
+ B, D,,, x log( s,,,) + 83 D,,, x GR u + B, D.., x Ev,,, + L t5JDt, + + L. À., YD ,~; +&, ,, 
• k~l "'"'\ 
Where i indexes two-digi t SIC industries and 1 indexes years. The two-digi t SIC industry approach consists ofpooling ali firrns 
in a two-digi t industry and calculate the corresponding variables. Ali observations, incl uding those firms with zero analyst 
coverage, are used in the estimation. 0 ;,1 is a dummy variable thal takes the value of 1 for emerging countries and 0 otherwise. 
Ali other variables are defined in table 2.1. The sample period is fro m 1990 to 2006. lndustry and year dummy variables are 
included but not reported. One, two or three asteri sks denote sign ificance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
Independent variables Joint analysis 
Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 1.2775 0. 001 
Analyst activity 0.03 15 0.059' 
Size -0. 12 11 0.00 1'" 
Growth -0.011 7 0.00 1"' 
Earnings volatility 0.001 6 0.609 
Oum my -0.9059 0.660 
Dummy * Analyst activity -0.0236 0.069' 
Dummy * Size 0.0660 0. 147 
Dummy * Growth 0.0 11 7 0.00 1"' 
Dummy * Earnings volati lity 0.1784 0.085' 
Industry dummies Y es 
Year dummies Y es 
Rz 0.2 11 
N 872 
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To allow a clearer interpretation of our joint analysis checks, table 2.7 results show that 
the coefficient on analyst activity is 0.0315 for US and developed markets and 0.0079 
(0.0315 +(-0.0236)) for emerging markets; a decrease of75 percent. In addition, this decrease 
is eco nom ically significant at 10% lev el. 
We interpret these results as follows: when a country's environment is characterized by 
poor governance practices, weak institutions, and less stringent information disclosure rules; 
financial analysts' fait to provide the market with more precise firm-specific information. 
Therefore, analysts' activities in emerging markets are associated with less efficient capital 
allocation and investment decisions . These findings are consistent with the results of Chan 
and Hameed (2006) who show that analyst following is negatively related to firm-specific 
return variation. 
2.5.3.3. Alternative measures ofPI and additional control variables 
In the literature, Sorne papers (Beaver et al. 1980; Warfield and Wild, 1992) only use 
realized future earnings as a proxy for LlE1(fe1+;) in equation (1). For robustness, we drop 
future returns from equation (2) and reestimate our PI measures . Using the new PI estimates 
in equation (4) yield similar results (not tabulated), suggesting that our main findings are not 
affected when we drop future returns from equation (2). Moreover, our results are also robust 
to the use of only two years of future earnings (e1+1 and e1+2) in equation (2) instead of three 
years. Finally, in the interest ofparsimony, we define: 
e31 as the su rn of e,+], e,+2 and e,+ 3 
R3, as the buy-and-hold return for the three-year period following year (t) 
and estimate : 
Relying on equation (6), our measure of stock priee informativeness becomes b3 (one 
coefficient) rather than the sum of three coefficients on future earnings (equation 3). Again, 
our main results remain unchanged when we combine three years of future earnings data into 
one aggregate variable. 
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Further, to be consistent with Durnev et al. (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), 
we add the square root of the number of firms in the industry used in estimating PI as an 
additional in dependent variable in equation ( 4 ). This variable is expected to control for any 
differences in R2 arising from differences in sample size used for estimation purposes (see 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004 for a discussion). We also include in equation (4) the current 
return as an additional control variable. As suggested by Basu ( 1997), the sign of the current 
stock return can be used as a proxy for bad news (negative sign) versus good news (positive 
sign). Basu (1997) shows that due to conservatism principle in accounting; bad news is 
impounded in earnings more quickly than good news. An implication is that good news firms 
could exhibit a strong relation between current returns and future earnings in comparison to 
bad news firms. Knowing that these potential differences in the future earnings response 
coefficients might create sorne heterogeneity in the sample, we propose to add current stock 
return in equation (4). When we add these two additional explanatory variables, our main 
findings remain unchanged (table 2.8). 
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Table 2.8 : Stock priee informativeness and analyst activity: additiona l tests 
This table reports tl1 e results of the following regress ion: 
Pl ,,~ = a+ /], log( 1 +NA ,_,)+ /], log( S, ) +/],(GR,,)+ /] , (EV, _,)+ fJ ,conlrols + L o,ID ,', +li,_, 
.. ,
Where i indexes two-digit SIC industries and 1 indexes years. The two-digit SIC industry approach consists of poo ling ali firms 
in a two-digit industry and calculate the corresponding vari abl es. For the US market, the sampl e size of specifications 1 and 2 is 
24 two-digit industries constructed using 2903 fi rms. For developed markets , the sampl e size of specifications 1 and 2 is 24 Iwo­
digit industries constructed using 874 1 firms. For emerging markets specifications, the sample size is 24 two-digit industri es 
constructed using 5553 firms . f'inancial industries are omitted. Ali variables are defined in tab le (2 .1 ). lndustry dummy variabl es 
are included but not reported . Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the time leve!. P-values for two-tail ed tests are in 
parentheses. One, two or three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respecti vely . 
lndependent variables US market D eveloped markets Emerging markets 
Mode! 1 Model 2 Mode! 1 Model 2 Modell Model 2 
lntercept 3.0655 2.8586 1.0487 0.9580 0.2006 0.3289 
(0.001) '" (0.001)"' (0.019)" (0.064)' (0 .774) (0 .6 16) 
Analyst activity 0.1073 0.100 1 0.05 13 0.052 1 -0.0093 -0.0 170 
(0.008)"' (0 .023)" (0.051)' (0.059)' (0 .878) (0 .760) 
Size -0.2777 -0.26 15 -0.1094 -0.1046 -0.08 12 -0.0682 
(0.001)'" (0.001)" ' (0.005)'" (0.026)" (0 .180) (0 .232) 
Growth -0.005 1 -0.0085 -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.298) (0 . 146) (0 .069)' (0.071)' (0.001)" ' (0.001)" ' 
Earnings volatility 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0263 0.0298 0.1469 0.0536 
(0.988) (0 .983) (0 .632) (0 .643) (0 .118) (0 532) 
Current return 0.0 11 5 0.013 1 0.0001 
(0.52 1) (0 667) (0 360) 
Number of firms 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0011 
(0.11 7) (0.978) (0.006)'" 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
R2 0.1628 0.1654 0.1759 0.1761 0.4095 0.4926 
N 241 239 390 37 1 239 2 10 
2.5.3.4. Polling firms based on their country of origin 
As suggested earlier, our cross-industry approach might control for industry-specific 
impacts on PI, but it will poorly consider potential country-specifie impacts on PI. Therefore, 
we extend our analyses of the relation between stock priee informativeness and ana lyst 
activity by poo ling firms according to their country of origin . We also add industry dummies 
to equation (2) before estimating PI. 
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Table 2.9 provides coefficient estimates of regresstons based on a cross-country 
approach. Again, our primary findings remain unchanged when we pool firms according to 
their country of origin. ln the case of developed countries, the results of ali models confirm 
the positive and significant relation we found in tables 2.5 and 2.8. ln addition, the 
coefficients on analyst activity are higher in magnitude in comparison to those reported in 
tables 2.5 and 2.8. For emerging countries, the cross-country methodology provides further 
evidence of the weak association between stock priee informativeness and analyst activity in 
these countries. ln fact, ali the coefficients on analyst activity are non significant for 
emerging market specifications. 
Table 2.9 : Stock priee informativeness and analyst activity: a cross-country approach 
This tab le reports the results of the following regress ion : 
PI ,,~= a + [J , Iog( 1 +NA ,,~ ) + fJ 2 log( S .., ) + [J 1 (GR ,,~ ) + [J , (E V, ,, ) + [J , controls + L tS,CD ,~, +c, _, 
k • i 
Where i indexes countries and t indexes years . The cross-country approach consists of pooling ali firms according to their 
country of orig in be fore calculating the corresponding variables. For developed markets, the sample size of spec ifications 1, 2, 3 
and 4 is 22 countries constructed using 874 1 firms . For emerging markets specifications, the sample size is 19 countries 
constructed using 5553 firms . Ali variables are defined in table (2.1 ). Country dummy variab les are included but not reported. 
Standard errors are adj usted for cl ustering at the time leve!. P-values fo r two-tai led tests are in parentheses. One, two or three 
asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively . 
lndependent Developed Countries Emerging countries 
variab les 
Modell Model2 Model 3 Model4 Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 
lntercept 1.7872 1.6971 1.7322 1.9580 0.9308 0.8831 1.1554 1.2976 
(0.007)" ' (0.012)" (0.014)" (0.040) ' ' (0.075)' (0.095)' (0.042)" (0.050)" 
Analyst activity 0.2083 0.1952 0.2 146 0.2293 0.0332 0.0409 0.02 11 0.05 18 
(0.032)" (0.041)" (0.022)" (0.053)' (0 129) (0 127) (0.475) (0.11 0) 
Size -0.1616 -0. 1546 -0.1582 -0.1765 -0.1031 -0.0989 -0.11 23 -0.1356 
(0.006)'" (0 .010)'" (0.011)" (0.031)" (0 .035)" (0.043}" (0.025)" (0.026)" 
Growth 0.0064 0.006 1 0.0064 -0.0049 -0.0030 -0.0036 
(0.082)' (0.095)' (0.087)' (0.4 14) (0.56 1) (0388) 
Earnings vo lati lity 0.0065 -0.0097 -0.1553 -0.1550 
(0.729) (0.242) (0.037)" (0.049)" 
Current return 0.0007 -0.0003 
(0.11 0) (0.755) 
Number of firms -0.000 1 0.0005 
(0.67 1) (0.208) 
Country dum mies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
R2 0.1552 0.1603 0. 16 19 0.1674 0. 1508 0. 1560 0.1855 0.2759 
N 346 346 340 33 1 205 204 192 14 1 
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2.5.3.5. Simultaneous equations estimation 
Finally, given the potential endogeneity between stock priee informativeness and security 
analysts' activities, our estimates of equation ( 4) are likely to be biased and inconsistent. For 
instance, security analysts could self-select the firm they follow based on the higher quality 
of its information environment. In the same line of reasoning, firm priees could be more 
informative because there are more analysts covering the firm , bringing higher scrutiny and 
monitoring. Therefore, knowing that stock priee informativeness and analyst coverage could 
affect each other simultaneously, we test our hypotheses based on the following simultaneous 
system: 
+ L c5JDi~l + L elllrD:~~ + ëi ,l 
k ; l m ; l 
+ I oJDt~ + I e,Jn::·~ +si.' 
k = 1 rn = 1 
Ali variables in our simultaneous equations system are previously defined in table (2.1 ). 
The above system will be estimated based on two-stage !east squares method (2SLS). In 
equation (7), we expect the coefficient associated with log (S;,1) to have a positive sign, 
because there are significant fixed costs in following larger companies. In addition, the 
coefficient associated with log (TV;,1) should also have a positive sign because high trading 
volumes are associated with more brokerage commissions. Thus, more analysts will be 
following stocks that trade more frequently. Finally, the likely relation between analyst 
coverage and stock priee informativeness in equation (7) is unclear. In fact, transparent 
corporations should reduce analysts' competitive advantage by driving out private 
information acquisition. Therefore, this should lead to a negative relation between analyst 
coverage and stock priee informativeness. In other words, when stock priees track firm 
fundamentals closely, financial analysts have Jess incentive to cover the firm because there is 
Jess private information to collect. In this case, financial analysts should be considered as 
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private information providers who compete with firm-provided disclosure made directly to 
investors (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). On the other hand, it is also possible that firm 's 
disclosures and the information produced by analysts complement each other, suggesting that 
analysts might be attracted to firms with more informative disclosure policies. The previous 
argument suggests that financial analysts act primarily as information intermediaries relying 
heavily on additional disclosures by corporations to collect firm-specific information. 
Therefore, more informative stock priees should be associated with higher analyst coverage. 
After controlling for the effects of simultaneity, we confirm again our primary results, 
although sorne of the coefficient estimates are even stronger. Table 2.10 presents the results 
of our simultaneous equations estimation. In the equations that explain stock priee 
informativeness, the coefficients on analyst activity are positive and significant in the case of 
US and developed markets. For emerging markets, the same coefficient is negative and non 
significant. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficient estimates in equation (7) are in general 
intuitive and consistent with prior literature, suggesting that our simultaneous equations 
system is estimated properly. More specifically, the negative coefficient on PI for developed 
markets, and the positive coefficient on PI in the case of emerging market specification 
further support the fact that financial analysts act primarily as private information providers 
in developed countries and information intermediaries in emerging countries. 
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Table 2.1 0: Simultaneous estimation of the relation between stock priee in formativeness and 
analyst activity 
This table reports the results of the fo llowing system: 
Pl ' ·' = /] 0 + /]1 log( 1 + NA, , )+ (J , log( S,,) + /] 3 (GR u ) + (J , (EV ,,,)+ L o, ID ,~, + L B, YD ;:; +&,, 
k =l m =l 
Log (1 + NA,,)= a 0 +a 1 Pl ,_,+ a 2 log( s,_,) +a , ( RV,,) + a , log( TV ,_,) + L 0' ID ,', + L e, YD ::: + &, _, 
k ,. ] m=l 
Where i indexes two-digit SIC industri es and 1 indexes years. The two-di git SIC industry approach consists ofpooling ali firm s 
in a two-digit industry and calculate the corresponding variables. P-values fo r two-tai led tests are in parentheses . One, two or 
three asterisks denote signifi cance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respecti ve ly. 
Dependent variable US market Developed Emerging 
(Pl) markets markets 
ln terce pt 2.5379 0.80 11 -1. 838 1 
(0.006)"' (0.040)' ' (0.485) 
Analyst activity 0.4226 0.7826 -0.3240 
(0.036)" (0.001) '" (0347) 
Size -0.2439 -0.1297 0.19 13 
(0.003)'" (0.001)'" (0.550) 
Growth -0.0049 -0.0177 -0.0000 
(0.4 19) (0.001) '" (0.001) '" 
Earnings; volatil ity -0.0000 0.0348 -03034 
(0.985) (0.52 1) (0.425) 
R' 0.1431 0.0630 0.0330 
Dependent variable US market Developed Emerging 
(NA) markets markets 
Intercept -4.9400 -1.09 15 - 1.1 953 
(0.001)'" (0.001)'" (0.001)'" 
Priee inforrnativeness 0. 1493 -0.19 12 0.0473 
(0. 785) (0.026)" (0.105)' 
Size 0.2303 0.0434 0.166 1 
(0.017)" (0.025)" (0.001)'" 
Retums vo lati lity -0.0020 -0.4083 -0.003 1 
(0.820) (0.001)' " (0348) 
Trading volume 0.3 144 0.1697 -0.0288 
(0.001)" ' (0.001) '" (0.004) '" 
R' 0.7202 0.2827 0.5076 
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2.6. Conclusion 
ln this paper, we examme whether analysts' following affects stock pnce 
informativeness. If financial analysts ' activity is meant to reduce the information asymmetry 
between market participants, stock priees which are covered by more analysts should contain 
more information about future earnings. We attempt to make two main contributions to the 
literature . First, we propose an intuitive approach to assess the role played by financial 
analysts. More specifically, our priee informativeness proxy measures how much information 
current stock priees contain about future earnings (more informative stock priees should 
reflect more information about future earnings). To our best knowledge, our approach ts 
applied for the first time in the analyst coverage literature. 
Our second main contribution is to document cross-sectional differences in the role 
played by financial analysts around the word. In countries with stronger institutions, our 
results suggest that increased analyst coverage fosters the production of private information, 
and thus contributes to better capital allocation and investment decisions. However, in 
countries with weaker institutions, analysts' activities are associated with smaller amount of 
information about future earnings embedded in stock priees. Therefore, analyst coverage can 
provide different results depending on a country's home environment. 
The results presented in our paper have sorne implications for emerging market regulators 
who are striving to promote stricter disclosure rules in their countries. In fact, this research 
shows the importance of actions intended to promote accounting transparency and improve 
corporate governance practices in emerging countries. This is particularly important because 
a necessary condition for better functioning stock markets is that stock priees track firm 
fundamentals c losely . 
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FTNANCTNG CONSTRATNTS AND INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTING 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether relaxation of financial constraints is an important 
outcome of the US cross-listing mechanism . Consistent with the bonding argument, our 
results suggest that a foreign firm's cross-listing on a US exchange would contribute to 
alleviate its financial constraints. In addition, the financial benefits associated with exchange 
cross-listings are larger in comparison to private placements listings (Rule 144A). On the 
other hand, over the counter (OTC) programs have no effect on firm ' s financing constraints. 
Our findings also indicate that the financial impact of US cross-listings is more pronounced 
for emerging markets firms. Finally, we show that US exchange cross-listing benefits have 
not been eroded by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. 
Keywords: US cross-listings; bonding hypothesis; investment spending; financing constraints 
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3.1. Introduction 
ln this paper, we examine whether cross-listing in the US alleviates firms ' financing 
constraints. Severa! theories (market segmentation, investor recognition, bonding, etc.) have 
been offered to explain the benefits of the cross-listing decision . In early academie studies, 
the focus was on the valuation effects, liquidity effects, and the impact of cross-listing on the 
firm ' s cost of capital, shareholder base, visibility and prestige (Karolyi , 2006). In the more 
recent years, we have witnessed an increasing number of studies that depart from earlier 
conventional market segmentation focus. The new research initiatives stem in part from the 
effects of globalized equity issuance and trading, but especially concern risk factors 
connected with agency conflicts, information asymmetry problems, and a host of other 
corporate governance issues (Karolyi , 2006). The empirical evidence supports the notion that 
U .S cross-listings offer substantial benefits. 
To date, however, there is limited direct evidence on the relation between firms' 
financing constraints and US cross-listing. One strand of literature tests the changes in risk 
exposure and cost of capital for firms interlisting their shares in the US market. For instance, 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find that exposure to the local market risk has diminished and 
exposure to global market risk has not significantly changed for firms that cross-list on US 
markets. Errunza and Miller (2000) investigate the impact of the introduction of ADRs on the 
cost of capital. They document a significant decline of 42% in the cost of capital. Similarly, 
Hail and Leuz (2009) find that firms with cross-listings on US exchanges experience a 
decrease in their cost of capital between 70 and 120 basis points. Other studies findings 
suggest that US listing makes it easier for the firm to raise external capital. For instance, 
Reese and Weisbach (2002) examined the expected relations between cross-listings, 
shareholder protection, and equity offerings. Their main result was that cross-listed firm s 
significantly increase their equity offerings. In addition, this increase in equity offerings is 
stronger for companies from weaker legal systems. ln the same line of reasoning, Lins et al. 
(2005) investigate wh ether relaxation of capital constraints is an important result of the cross­
listing decision . Their findings suggest that non US firms benefit from a US listing through 
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an enhanced access to external funding. However, one important question that remains 
unanswered by the existing literature is whether and to what extent US cross-listing alleviates 
tirm ' s tinancing constraints. 
Financing constraints appear to matter because external funds are not a perfect substitute 
for internai capital. Explanations why debt tinancing and new shares issues are more costly 
than internai funds abound . Among the most prominent are agency problems and asymmetric 
information (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Greenwald et al. 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988). In fact, 
when the cost differentiai between internai and external finance is large, tirms are more likely 
to face binding tinancial constraints. As discussed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), 
US cross-listing typically improves transparency and reduces information asymmetries by 
imposing disclosure requirements on non US tirms that are stronger than their domestic 
disclosure requirements. In addition, foreign tirms that list in US exchanges (NYSE and 
NASDAQ) are also subject to U.S laws and to greater scrutiny and monitoring from the press 
and a variety of US market intermediaries (tinancial analysts, underwriters, etc.), which 
further reduce the information incompleteness and increase the protection of minority 
shareholders . Therefore, tirms that cross-list in US markets are bonding themselves to an 
increased leve! of transparency, disclosure and scrutiny. Such bonding mechanism should 
reduce information asymmetries between market participants, which in turn lead to Jess 
financing constraints on investment. If this hypothesis is correct, we can in fer th at cross-listed 
firms are priced correctly in comparison to non cross-listed firms and that cross-listings in the 
US lead to more efficient capital allocation and investment decisions. 
To test such vital economie raie, we follow the approach advocated by Fazzari et al. 
(1988) who argue that investments decisions of financially constrained firms are more 
sensitive to internai cash flow. Considerable research examines the relation between 
investment and cash flow to test for the presence and importance of tinancing constraints. 
These studies interpret greater investment-cash flow sensitivity as evidence that tirms are 
tinancially constrained. In our study, we differentiate between cross-listed and non cross­
listed firms and compare the investment-cash flow sensitivity between the two subsamples. 
By relying on this measure, we address the fo llowing questions re lated to the benetits of the 
cross-listing decision: ( 1) does cross-listing in the US alleviates fi rm s fi nancing constraints? 
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(2) To what extent US cross-listing reduces the differentiai cost between internai and external 
finance? 
This study makes severa( contributions. First, we propose an intuitive approach to asses if 
U .S cross-listings lead to more efficient capital allocation and investment decisions. To our 
best knowledge, Lins et al. (2005) paper is the only research that directly addresses how a 
commonly used measure of financial constraints is related to the US cross listing decision. 
However, Lins et al. (2005) examine the sensitivity ofinvestment to cash flow only for ADRs 
listings (before and following the US listing). In their study, they do not differentiate between 
cross-listed and non cross-listed firms and compare the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
between the two subsamples. In addition, Lins et al. (2005) limit their analysis to a sample of 
NYSE and NASDAQ ADRs listings. Over the counter (OTC) listings in developed countries 
and private programs are not investigated . ln our study, we examine the impact of ali types of 
ADRs on firm ' s financing constraints. 
Second, we argue that our research provides a valuable setting that directly examines the 
relation between US cross-listings and shareholder protection. This is important because the 
bonding hypothesis proposed by Coffee ( 1999, 2002) and Stulz ( 1999) have been questioned 
within the literature (Siegel, 2005 ; and Litch, 2003). ln fact, if non US firms voluntarily 
subject them selves to better corporate governance practices un der US securities laws ( coffee, 
1999); providers of external funding should be able to better assess the investment 
opportunities of US cross-listed firms. This will reduce the cost premium that these firms 
must pay for external finance and ultimately alleviate their financing constraints. 
Third, we innovate by attempting to document if the passage of SOX had effects on the 
relation between US cross-listing and firms ' financing constraints. In the literature, it has 
been argued that SOX act has imposed substantial costs on cross-listed firm s that may 
outweigh any potential benefits of the cross- list ing decis ion. Therefore, it is important to 
examine if US exchange listings still have unique governance benefits for non US fi rms even 
after the enactment of SOX in 2002. 
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Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, we find that US exchange cross-listing 
significantly alleviates firrn's financing constraints. In addition, the financial benefits 
associated with exchange listings are larger in comparison to the other types of ADRs. We 
also find evidence that priva1e placements allow foreign firms to strengthen their financial 
status. However, in contrast to exchange and private placements programs, OTC listings 
exhibit a significant increase in their investment-cash flow sensitivity suggesting that these 
programs are not weil received by outside investors. Further corroborating the bonding 
argument, our findings also indicate that the degree to which US exchange cross-listing 
alleviates firm financial constraints is more pronounced for firms from countries that provide 
poor legal protection to minority investors. Finally, we show that the significant financial 
benefits associated with exchange cross-listings are still present after the passage of SOX in 
2002. 
The paper proceeds as follow: In section 2, we review the existing literature. In section 3, 
we present our empirical mode! and outline our methodology and testable hypotheses. We 
discuss our data and sample in section 4. Section 5 presents empirical results characterizing 
the relation between US cross-listing and firms' financing constraints. Conclusions are 
offered in section 6. 
3.2. Previous research worl 
Our study is related to two streams of literature: ( 1) research on the motivations and 
benefits of the cross-listing decision, and (2) research on the measures of firm's financial 
constraints . 
3.2.1. Why do firms cross-list in the US? 
Before we review the lite rature that examines the motivations and benefits of the cross­
listing decision, we, first, describe the mechanics of such decision . 
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3.2.1.1. Mechanics of US cross-listings 
A non US firm can list its shares on US markets via direct listings or via an American 
Depositary Receipts program (ADRs). The vast majority of foreign firms choose to cross-list 
in the US using ADRs. There are four types of ADRs (leve! 1, leve! Il, Leve! III and Rule 
144A), and the choice of a specifie ADR listing depends on firm 's objectives. For firms that 
want access to new capital , leve! III and Rule 144A listings provide such opportunity. Firms 
who choose to cross-list via leve! III must follow US generally accepted accounting 
principles (US GAAP) and complete ali required filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). However, Rule 144A listings do not require compliance with GAAP and 
SEC disclosure rules . In addition, Rule 144A programs trade on the PORT AL (Private 
Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages), and allow firms to raise funds 
as private placements to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Leve! 1 ADRs trade over-the­
counter (OTC), offer limited liquidity, and are exempt from SEC disclosure rules and US 
GAAP reconciliation. On the other hand, level II listings allow firms to broaden their 
shareholder base and improve the liquidity of their shares. The legal implications of leve! 
II/III listings are essentially the same. The only main difference is that leve! II programs 
don ' t rai se capital. 
3.2.1.2. A review of early academie research on US cross-listings 
3.2.1.2.1. Share priee reactions to cross-listing in US markets. 
During the 1990s, many empirical studies addressed share priee behavior around cross­
listings using, as a rule, event-study methodology. Their main prediction is that stock priees 
will rise in the home country in response to a cross-listing on US markets. The most 
comprehensive studies include those of Foerster and Karolyi ( 1999) and Miller (1999). 
According to Foerster and Karolyi (1999), foreign firms earn cumulative abnormal returns of 
19% during the year before listing on US exchanges and an additional 1.20% during the 
listing week, but incur an abnorma11oss of 14% during the year following listing. Moreover, 
they find priee changes to be robust to changing market exposure and related to an expansion 
of the shareholder base. Finally, they argue that their findings provide support for the market 
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segmentation hypothesis and Merton's ( 1987) investor recognition hypothesis. Miller ( 1999) 
finds that 1.15% average abnormal return coïncides with the dates of 183 ADR initiating 
announcements during the 1985-1995 period. Abnormal returns in Miller's analysis are large 
for firms that list on major US exchanges (NYSE/NASDAQ) and small for firms that list on 
PORTAL. In addition, significantly higher announcement priee reactions were obtained for 
emerging markets firms. According to Miller (1999), these findings are consistent with the 
fact that investment barriers and low investor recognition segment capital markets. 
3.2.1.2.2. Market risk exposure, cost of capital and the cross-listing decision 
According to international asset pricing models , segmented economies stand to benefit 
from access to the international capital market, because diversified capital sources means a 
lower cost of capital. These models imply that cross-listing firms may experience significant 
changes in their local and global market risk exposures. Numerous empirical studies tested 
the changes in risk exposure and cost of capital for firms interlisting their shares in the US 
market. For instance, Foerster and Karolyi ( 1999) fi nd that local market risk exposure has 
diminished for US cross-listed firms , while their global market risk exposure remains 
unchanged . As for Errunza and Miller (2000), they document a significant decline in the cost 
of capital for firms with ADRs listings. Similarly, Hail and Leuz (2009) find that firms with 
cross-listings on US exchanges experience a decrease in their cost of capital between 70 and 
120 basis points. 
3.2.1.2.3. Liquidity 
As discussed in Karolyi (2006), surveys of corporate managers that have initiated 
overseas listings for the ir firms (Mittoo, 1992b) often cite increased liquidity as the primary 
motivation or benefit. So do, Ban cel and Mittoo (200 1) after investigating the perceptions of 
79 European managers . Bancel and Mittoo (200 1) fi nd that liquidity is significantly 
correlated with total trading volume after cross-listing. Most of the contributions surveyed by 
Karoly i (1998, 2006) examine patterns in bid-ask spreads, priee volatility and trading 
volumes after a cross-l isting on US markets. For example, Foerster and Karo lyi ( 1998) report 
29% increase in intraday volume and a 44 basis points dec line in intraday effective spreads 
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for 52 Canadian cross-listing companies. Similarly, Glen and Madhavan ( 1998) examined 
weekly returns, volatility and volume of 25 cross-listed Mexican firms and show that higher 
volume and lower market costs arise for these firms . For a sample of 128 NYSE cross-l isted 
companies, Smith and Sofianos ( 1997) document an increase in the ir combined value of 
trading from $ 260 million to $ 340 million per day. 
3.2.1.3. A review of the new research initiatives 
According to Karolyi (2006), recent research ts mainly fuelled by a general 
dissatisfaction with the «conventional wisdom» based on capital market segmentation 
argument. ln fact, many authors criticize the market segmentation hypothesis . A major 
criticism stems from the fact that foreign firms originated from countries, like Canada, that 
are substantially integrated with the US market (see Calvet, 1994; Mittoo, 1992) also benefit 
from the cross-listing decision. For example, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show that Canadian 
firms experience similar priee reactions toUS listings when compared to European and Asian 
firms. Furthermore, cross-listings on US markets have continued to generate positive 
announcement effects and to grow even after international capital markets have become more 
integrated (Karolyi, 2006). ln the same line of reasoning, an implicit criticism lies in the fact 
that only a minority of foreign firms cross-list their shares on US markets when we expect a 
majority to do so in the face of sizable investment barriers. In fact, Doidge et al. (2004) 
document that on ly one in ten large companies from outside the US choose to cross-list their 
shares on US markets. As a result of these criticisms, a new strand of studies explores other 
potential benefits and costs for the cross-listing decision. The focus of the new research is 
mainly on legal and corporate governance issues. 
3.2.1.3.1. Legal bonding and the cross-listing decision 
Under the bonding hypothesis, US exchange listings (Leve) II-III and direct listings) are 
viewed as a mechanism by which non US firms can voluntarily subject themselves to better 
corporate governance practices und er US securities laws . According to Coffee ( 1999) and 
Stulz ( 1999), foreign firms can use a US listing to overcome the ir weak domestic legal 
environment and enhance the protection of minority investors. Many papers in the literature 
- - --- -- - --- - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - -
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examine the extent to which such voluntarily bonding explains the cross-listing behaviour. 
For instance, Reese and Weisbach (2002) examined the expected relations between cross­
listings, shareholder protection, and equity offerings. They surveyed 1158 cross-listings and 
benchmarked them with 17 387 domestic firms. Using logistic regression analysis, Reese and 
Weisbach (2002) find that firms from weak investors ' protection environments are more 
likely to cross-list. Their other main finding was that cross-listed firms significantly increase 
their equity offerings. In addition, this increase in equity offerings is stronger for companies 
from weaker legal systems, which is consistent with the legal bonding hypothesis. 
Along the same vein, Doidge (2004) shows that cross-listed firms have significantly 
lower voting premiums in wmparison to non cross-listed firms. Furthermore, the difference 
in voting premiums is larger for firms originated from countries with poorer investor rights. 
This evidence is interpreted as a direct empirical support for the bonding hypothesis . As for 
Frésard and Salva (2008), they investigated how the value of corporate cash holdings changes 
when non U.S firms list their shares in the US Frésard and Salva (2008) focus on the value of 
cash because it is the type of assets that is easier to expropriate when managers do not act in 
the best interests of shareholders. They argue that a unit of cash under insiders ' control is 
worth less than a unit for investors when insiders pursue their own interests . Therefore, if 
cross-listings in the US constrain insiders from expropriating shareholders, investors should 
raise their valuation of cash. Accordingly, Frésard and Salva (2008) find that investors raise 
their valuation of cash once a firm cross-list in the US and this relation is strongest for firms 
from countries that provide poor protection to minority investors. These results suggest that 
investors view cross-listing as an effective mechanism that enhances their protection. 
From a different perspective, Lei and Miller (2008) test the bonding hypothesis by 
examining a direct outcome ofcorporate governance: the propensity to identifY and terminate 
poorly performing CEOs. 'They argue that a necessary component of effective corporate 
governance is the ability to identifY and replace poorly performing CEOs. To investigate this 
prediction, they construct a database of 10 976 firm-year observations from 4 7 countries and 
find that cross-listed firms <Jriginated from countries with weak investor protection regimes 
are more likely to terminale poorly perform ing CEOs, in comparison to non cross-listed 
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firms. Further, their results show that OTC and Rule 144A listings are not associated with a 
higher propensity to terminate poorly performing CEOs. 
On the other hand, a number of other contributions question the bonding argument. For 
instance, Licht (200 1, 2003) argues that little is do ne by the SEC to en force corporate 
governance rules for foreign issuers. According to Licht (2003), non US firms ' cross-list on 
US markets primarily to enhance their visibility rather than to improve their corporate 
governance. ln the same tine of reasoning, Siegel (2005) provides evidence of low SEC 
enforcement against Mexican firms with ADRs. 
3.2.2. Corporate investment and financing constraints 
Under the perfect and complete capital markets assumptions, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) argue that firm's investment decisions are independent from the financing sources. 
However, many studies appeal to problems in capital markets, especially asymmetric 
information, to suggest that financial structure is relevant to the investment decisions. For 
example, Myers and Majluf (1984), Greenwald et al. (1984), and Myers (1984) provide 
strong support of the fact that external funds are not a perfect substitute for internai capital. 
As a result, the cost of externat finance may differ substantially from internai capital. 
According to this view, investment expenditures may depend on financial factors , such as the 
availability of internai funds (Fazzari et al. 1988). When the wedge between internai and 
externat cost of capital increases, firms are considered as financially constrained (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997). 
To study the impact of US cross-listing on firm ' s financial constraints, we exploit an 
approach advocated by Fazzari et al. ( 1988). In particular, we use the relation between 
investment and cash flow to test for the presence and extent of fi nancing constraints. ln the 
Jiterature, the investment-cash flow sensitivity has been extensively used as a measure of 
financial constraints . According to Fazzari et al. (1988), firm ' s internai cash flow may impact 
investment expenditures because of a «financing hierarchy» in which internai capital have a 
cost advantage over externat capital. The intuition behind this assertion is that a value 
maxim izing finn will issue new debt or shares only after it exhausts internai capital (Fazzari 
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et al. 1988). In fact, more financially constrained firms will increase investment when they 
have enough cash flow to do so. Therefore, we should expect high investment-cash flow 
sensitivity for constrained firms. In contrast, unconstrained firms have the possibility to 
increase their investment expenditures even when they do not have enough cash flow. Hence, 
unconstrained firms should exhibit low investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
A number of empirical studies have provided strong support for the «financing hierarchy 
hypothesis». The traditional approach of this research is to sort firm s according to a variety of 
characteristics (dividend payout, size, etc.) before measuring the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. The main results of these papers suggest that investment expenditures are more 
sensitive to internai funds for firms with high levels of financial constraints. For instance, 
Hoshi et al. (1991) rely on the Fazzari et al. (1988) methodology to examine the investment 
behaviour of two sets of Japanese firms. In the first group, firms are members of a Keiretsu 
and have close ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external 
finance. According to Ho shi et al. (1991 ), the first set of firms is likely to face lower financial 
constraints. The second set of firms has weaker links to banks and presumably faces higher 
financing constraints. Their findings show large investment-cash flow sensitivity for the 
second set of firms . On the other hand, investment spending of firms affiliated with Japanese 
banks is not sensitive to internai capital. Oliner and Rude busch ( 1992) use proxies of 
information asymmetry based on firm age, exchange listing and firm 's patterns of insider 
trading. The ir results suggest th at investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for stocks traded 
over-the-counter, firms tended to be young, and that exhibit patterns of insider trading 
behaviour. Scaller ( 1993) studies the investment behaviour of 212 Canadian firms. He uses 
the maturity of the firm, the ownership concentration, and the availability of collateral as 
proxies for information asymmetry. According to Scaller (1993), mature firms are Jess likely 
to face informational problems because they have extended and repeated relationships with 
lenders . Similarly, the availability of collateral reduces the importance of informational 
asymmetries between the firm and potential lenders. He shows that investment spending of 
young firms is more influenced by cash flow in comparison to mature firms . ln addition, 
Scaller empirical results suggest that firms with unspecialized assets, which can serve as 
collateral, have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
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As for Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), they find no excess sensitivity of investment to 
internai funds for firms with easy access to publicly traded debt. On the other hand, 
investments spending of firms with only limited access to public debt markets appear to be 
highly sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). A related 
study by Ascioglu et al. (2008) examines investment-cash flow sensitivity by employing 
three direct measures of information asymmetry (relative effective spread, priee impact of 
trade, and probability of information trading (PIN)). Their findings suggest that firms facing 
high information asymmetry problems have greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. ln the 
same tine of reasoning, Guariglia (2008) find that investment-cash flow sensitivity tends to 
increase monotonically with the degree of externat financial constraints faced by firms. 
Finally, Lins et al. (2005) examine whether relaxation of financial constraints is an important 
result of the US cross-listing mechanism. They use only cross-listings on NASDAQ and 
NYSE and find a significant decline in the investment-cash flow sensitivity following the US 
listing. The financial benefits of the cross-listing decision are limited to emerging market 
firms. ln contrast, Lins et al. (2005) find no changes in the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
for developed markets ftrms with ADRs. 
3.3. Hypotheses and methodology 
The major focus of our methodology is to compare investment-cash flow sensitivity 
across two different groups of firms (US cross-listed firms versus non cross-listed firms). 
Under the bonding hypothesis, coffee ( 1999, 2002) and Stultz ( 1999) argue that firms can 
raise capital if they commit to return this capital to investors and to limit expropriation of 
cash-flow. One way to signal firm 's commitment to better corporate governance practices is 
to cross-list on a US exchange whose legal system allows a better protection of investors. 
Therefore, US cross-listing should improve transparency, reduce information a ymmetries 
between market participants, and ultimately alleviate firm ' s financial constraints. To test this 
hypothesis, we base our empirical investigation on the work of Fazzari et al. ( 1988). 
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In previous studies (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lins et al. 2005; 
Cleary, 2006), the estimation of investment-cash flow sensitivity is based on the following 
equation: 
(! 1 K); ,, = f(X 1 K) ;, , + g(CF 1 K); ,, + &;, ( 1) 
Where 1;,1 represents investment in plant and equipment for finn i during period t; 
following Lins et al. (2005), K denotes the beginning-of-period va lue of total assets and CF is 
the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation net of cash dividends (we also 
measure CF as : net income + depreciation and/or amortization +changes in deferred taxes); 
fi:X/K) is a function of a vector of variables related to investment opportunities; g(CF/K) is a 
function of the firm 's internai cash flow (it represents the investment-cash flow sensitivity). 
According to Fazzari et al. ( 1988), the investment spending of constrained firms should be 
more sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow. In our study, we hypothesize that US cross­
listings enhance the protection of outside investors, which in turn makes it easier for firms to 
raise external capital. Therefore, our main hypothesis predicts that cross-listed firms should 
face lower financial constraints in comparison to non cross-listed firms. 
To test whether cross-listing in the US is associated with Jess investment-cash flow 
sensitivity; we run pooled regressions for the two groups with a dummy variable for US 
cross-listed firms : 
(! 1 K) ;,, = jJ0 + jJ1 (CF 1 K) ;,, + jJ2 (M 1 B) ;, ,_1 + jJ3 (Size ), , _1 + (}0CLi.t + (}1CL;, *(CF 1 K) ;, 
+ (}2CL ;, * (M 1 B);,,_1 + fJp L;, * (Size ) i,t - t + &,, (2) 
CL;,1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of l if the firm has an ADR and 0 
otherwise; M/B denotes the market to book ratio, and Size denotes the natural logarithm of 
firm size. The market to book ratio is a proxy for investment opportunities and growth, wh ile 
size variable controls for potential market imperfections related to firm size . As stressed by 
Fazzari et al. ( 1988), it is possible to include lagged va lues of firm investment or cash flow in 
equation (2). Given that ~ 1 represents the investment-cash flow sensitiv ity for non cross-listed 
firms, the investment-cash flow sensitivity for cross-listed firms (direct listings, OTC, ADRs 
Il/III, and 144A listings) becomes ~ 1 +8 1 and the percentage increase (decrease) is 81/ ~ 1 • 
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Our main interest in equation (2) centers on the estimate of 81, the coefficient in which 
cash flow is interacted with the cross-listing dummy. If 81 is negative and significant, cross­
listing in the US is associated with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity suggesting that the 
cross-listing mechanism alleviates firm 's financial constraints. Hence, our first hypothesis 
predicts that the coefficient of CL;,1 * (CF/K);,1 will be negative and significant: 
Hypothesis l: lnvestment spending of cross-listed firms has lower sensitivity to 
internai funds than that of non cross-listed firms. 
To rein force our conclusions about the relation between US cross-listing and firm 's 
financial constraints; it is useful to further examine the potential differences between ali types 
of US cross-listings. For instance, given the regulatory consequences of exchange listings 
(direct listings and ADRsllllll), we hypothesize that the financial benefits should be higher 
for these programs. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The degree to which US cross-listing alleviates firm 's financial 
constraints is more pronounced for firms that cross-list on U.S exchanges. 
To verify hypothesis (2), CL;,1 in equation (2) becomes a dummy variable that takes the 
value of l if the firm has an exchange listing and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, it is not 
clear whether private placement listings (Rule 144A) should experience any reduction in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Theoretically, Rule 144A programs do not require 
compliance with GAAP or any additional disclosures rules. Therefore, we should not expect 
any reduction in information asymmetries. However, knowing that Rule l44A listings allow 
firms to raise funds as private placements to qualified institutional buyers, such mechanism 
entails giv ing a specifie group of investors ' privileged access to firm-specific information, 
which in turn makes it easier for the firm to raise external capital from institutional investors. 
Consistent with this claim, we should also expect lower investment-cash flow sensitivity for 
Rule 144A cross-listings : 
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Hypothesis 3: Private placements listings make it easier for non US firms to raise 
capital. 
The bonding argument suggests that a US listing should have a larger impact on firms 
originating from countries where investors are poorly protected . Prior research findings 
support this argument and suggest that the benefits of US cross-listing may differ across 
countries based on the country's leve) of development. Obviously, in emerging markets, 
outside investors stand at a disadvantage over insiders in accessing firm-specific information. 
Hence, emerging markets cross-listed firms should benefit from stronger reductions in their 
financial constraints. On basis ofthese arguments, we can propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The degree to which US cross-listing alleviates firm ' s financial 
constraints is more pronounced for firms originating from emerging markets. 
Finally, the debate about the potential costs of the SOX act questions whether US cross­
listing benefits are still present after the passage of SOX. In the literature, it has been argued 
that SOX has imposed substantial costs on cross-listed firms that may outweigh any potential 
benefits of the cross-listing decision. However, recent studies (Doidge el al.2009, Hail and 
Leuz, 2009, and Boubakri et al. 201 0) show that US cross-listing benefits have not been 
eroded by SOX. In fact, as discussed in Doidge et al. (2009), the new legal environment 
imposed by SOX creates significant legal exposures for firms as weil as for executives. 
Therefore, US exchange listing still has unique governance benefits for non US firms even 
after the passage of SOX in 2002 (Doidge el al.2009). Consistent with this argument, we 
hypothesize that US cross-listings benefits should be sustained after the SOX act. 
3.4. Data 
Hypothesis 5: US cross-listing benefits have not been eroded by the enactment of 
SOX in 2002. 
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firms over the 1995-2007 period. We start 
by considering ali firms included in the country li sts provided by Datastream . From these 
lists, we identify cross-listed firms . We obtain a complete list of ADRs from the Bank of 
New York (BNY), Citibank (CB), Deutsche Bank (DB), JP Morgan (JPM), the OTCBB, and 
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The Pink Sheets. The information from these various datasets is manually cross-checked and 
verified. In addition, NYSE and NASDAQ websites provide information on direct listings. 
The data provided by Citibank allows us to keep track of firms that had been delisted from 
US exchanges . Adding these delistings mitigates concerns about the survivorship bias. To be 
consistent with Lins et al. (2005), financial and banking firms were deleted from the initial 
sample. As noticed by Lins et al. (2005), the Fazzari et al. (1988) methodology cannat be 
applied easily to financial firm s because accounting figures for firms in finance and banking 
are not comparable with other firms . Further, these firms are highly regulated in most 
countries. Combining ali the data gives a final sample of 550 ADRs listings and 22 048 non 
cross-listed firms . Knowing that the legal implications of ADRs II-III and direct cross-listings 
are essentially the same, we treat direct listings in US exchanges as ADRs II-Ill. Our final 
sample includes 148 Levet 1, 86 Rule 144A, and 316 levet Il-III ADRs. We obtain firm­
specific information such as investment spending, cash flow, and dividends payout from both 
Wordscope and Datastream. 
3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
ln our study, we examine the investment behavior of two sets of firms (US Cross-listed 
versus non cross-listed firms) . Our main hypothesis is that cross-listed firms are less 
financially constrained . Therefore, these firms should exhibit lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. However, before undertaking our multivariate regression tests, we propose to 
compare the estimates of a set of variables designed to measure directly firm's financial 
constraints . ln fact, the standard practice in corporate investment literature is to classify 
firm , first, into most financially constrained and least financia lly constrained according to a 
variety of characteristics (dividend payout ratio, size, debt ratio etc.), and then estimate the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity across the two groups. For instance, Fazzari et al. (1 988) 
classify firm s with high dividend payout ratios as unconstrained and firms with low dividend 
payout ratios ( dividends/EBIT) as financially constrained. Other studies categorize 
companies according to size (Kadapakkam et al. 1998). Following this univariate measure of 
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firm's financial constraints, srnaller firms are considered to be more financially constrained 
because they face higher information asymmetry problems. As for Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
(1995), they find no excess sensitivity of investment to internai funds for firms with easy 
access to publicly traded debt. On the other hand, investment spending of firms with only 
limited access to public debt appears to be highly sensitive to fluctuation s in cash flow 
(Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1 995). 
In our paper, we adopt a different approach by classifying firms , first, according to their 
cross-listing status. As noticed earlier, we assume that US cross-listed firms and non cross­
listed firms are respectively less constrained and most constrained . Second, we compare our 
set of variables between the two subsamples in order to verify if US cross-listed firms have 
indeed higher dividend payout, size, cash flow, and debt ratios because firms with such 
characteristics are supposed to be less financially constrained. Finally, we perform our 
multivariate analysis according to Fazzari et al. (1988) methodology. 
Severa( descriptive statistics for the firms in each class are presented in table (3 .1 ). In 
addition, we also perform mean difference tests to examine the statistical significance of the 
differences among our sets <Jf firms. The results are reported in table (3.2). Our univariate 
findings indicate that US cross-listed firms have significantly higher dividends payout, size, 
and cash flow. For instance. the overall mean firm size is 14.146 for cross-listed firms and 
11.470 for non cross-listed firms (NCL). In the case of dividends payout, the statistics are 
0.1884 and 0.151 1 for the group firms with a US cross-listing and the group firms without a 
US cross-listing, respectively. These results clearly support the view that US cross-listed 
firms are less financially comtrained. To reinforce our conclusions about the relation between 
US cross-listing and firm 's financial constraints; we tried further splits of US cross-listed 
firms based on the type of the listing program. 
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Table 3.1 : Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descri ptive statistics related to a variety of fi rm-level variables. Ali fin ancial variables are for the beginning 
of the fiscal year, expect fo r investment and cash flow. The sample period is from 1995 to 2007. To deal wi th outliers, we 
winsorize the upper and lower 1% univariate extremes. 
Panel A: Non cross-listed firms 
Variab le NCL firms 
Mean Std dev N 
lnvestment (1/K) 0.0620 0.78 13 138 327 
Cash fl ow (CF/K) 0.0425 4.7139 138 327 
Size 11.470 1.9784 Ill 890 
Market-to-Book (M/B) 2.0756 5.3667 11 2 48 1 
Dividend payout 0.1511 1.4 144 128 172 
Debt ratio 0.2273 1.028 1 138 327 
Panel 8 : Cross-listed firm s 
Variable 144A, OTC, and Exchange listings 
Mean Std dev N 
lnves tment (1/K) 0.06 19 0.063 1 5168 
Cash fl ow (CF/K) 0.0975 1.2923 5168 
Size 14.146 2.1030 4687 
Market-to-Book (M/B) 2.2278 4.1054 4555 
Dividend payout 0.1884 0.5854 4976 
Debt ratio 0.2357 0.3257 5168 
Panel C: Exchange listed firms 
Variab le Direct li stings and ADRll-III 
Mean Std dcv N 
lnvestment (1/K) 0.0736 0.0720 2797 
Cash fl ow (CF/K) 0.0796 0.1443 2797 
Size 14.777 2 0430 2495 
Market-to-Book (M/B) 2.6795 4.985 1 241 0 
Dividend payout 0.1747 0.4887 2727 
Debt ratio 0.2193 0.1910 2797 
Panel 0 : Privatc listings 
Variable 144A 1 istings 
Mean Std dev N 
lnves tment (1 /K) 0.072 1 0.0752 87 1 
Cash fl ow (CF/K) 0.094 1 0.08 11 87 1 
Size 13.83 1 1.4980 799 
Market-to-Book (M/B) 1.9989 1.9339 770 
Dividend payout 0.1409 0.7427 808 
Debt ratio 0.2202 0.1658 87 1 
Panel E: Over-the-Counter listings 
Variable OTC listings 
Mean Std dev N 
lnvestment (1/K) 0.0537 0.0640 1500 
Cash flow (CF/K) 0.1075 2.0523 1500 
Size 13.184 2 0354 1393 
Market-to-Book (M/8) 1.7287 2.9320 1375 
Dividend payout 0.1985 0.5372 144 1 
Debt ratio 0.2430 0.467 1 1500 
Size 
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Our second hypothesis suggests that the potential financial benefits should be higher for 
US exchange cross-listings. Indeed, when we compare exchange listings with private 
placements and OTC listings, we find that exchange listed firms have significantly higher 
size value. 
Overall, our univariate evidence indicates that US cross-listings make it easier for foreign 
firms to raise capital. In addition, the degree to which US cross- listings alleviate firm's 
financial constraints is more pronounced for companies that cross- list on US exchanges. 
However, it is worth mentioning that these preliminary results on ly represent a univariate 
data analysis. Our tests are best performed using multivariate regression analyses, because 
the conclusions from our univariate variab les do not account for the potential 
interrelationships among these variables. 
Table 3.2: Z-test results for differences in the means 
This tab le presents mean difference tests. Ail financial variables are for the beginning of the fiscal year, expect for cash fl ow. 
Th 1 . ct . f 1995 2007 e samp e peno 1s rom to 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Z-test Z-test Z-test Z-test 
CL firms NCL Ex change Private OTC (1) vs. (2) (3) vs . (4) (3) vs . (5) (3) vs . (2) 
firms listings listings li stings 
14.146 11.470 14.777 13.83 1 13.1 84 85.54 14.14 14.12 80.02 
Dividend payout 0.1884 0.1 511 0.1747 0.1409 0.1985 4.05'" 1.2 1 -1.40 2.23" 
-1.88' Debt ratio 0.2357 0.2273 0.2 193 0.2202 0.2430 1.58 -0 .13 - 1.75 
Cash flow 0.0975 0.0425 0.0796 0.0941 0.1075 2.50" -3 .74'" -0.52 2.86'" 
3.5.2. Multivariate regression analysis 
We employ an empirical specification derived from Fazzari et al. (1988). Based on this 
approach, investment is determined according to equation ( 1 ). In our study, we do not run 
separate regressions for US cross-listed firms (CL) and non cross-listed firms (NCL) 
according to equation (1 ). Instead, we run poo led regressions for the two groups with a 
dummy variable for CL firms (equation 2). Table 3.3 provides estimates of the investment­
cash flow sensitivity for CL and NCL firms. The equations were performed using fixed 
effects models. To control for industry, time and country fixed effects, we include industry, 
year and country dummies in equation (2). Standard errors in ali specifications are adjusted 
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for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm leve!. Mode! (1) serves as our starting point 
in that we have CLi,t as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm hasan ADR and 
0 otherwise. The results of mode! ( l) in table (3 .3) show large estimated cash flow coefficient 
for NCL firms (0.7149), which suggests that investment spending of NCL firms is highly 
sensitive to the availability of internai capital. This positive and significant relation between 
investment and internai capital is consistent with the existence of a financial hierarchy. More 
important, NCL firm s exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in comparison to US 
CL firms. ln mode! ( 1 ), the coefficient of the interaction term CLi.t * (CF/K)i,t is -0.0170 with 
a p-value of 0.001 , indicating a cash flow coefficient of 0.6979 (0.7149- 0.0 170) for U.S CL 
firms. Based on mode! (!) findings, it appears that the cross-listing impact is not 
economically significant. ln fact, US CL firms only witness a reduction of 2.37% 
(0.0 170/0.7149) in their investment-cash flow sensitivity. lt is not surprising to find such 
weaker cross-listing effect because not ali types of ADRs are required to comply with US 
GAAP and SEC disclosure rules. Therefore, it is important to further investigate any potential 
differences in the estimated cash flow coefficients across ali types of ADRs. We argue that 
the cross-listing impact should be stronger for exchange listings because of the regulatory 
consequences of these programs. To test this hypothesis, we estimate mode! (2) in table (3 .3) 
where CLi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has an Exchange ADR 
and 0 otherwise . Again, our results indicate a large estimated cash flow coefficient for NCL 
firms (0.7070). On the other hand, when we examine the coefficient of the interaction term 
CLi,t * (CF/K)i,t. we find that investment outlays of exchange listed firms are significantly less 
sensitive to internai capital in comparison to NCL firms. More important, the reduction in the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is economically significant. In fact, based on mode! (2) 
results, the cash flow coefficient for exchange listed firms is 0.1237 (0.7070- 0.5833) which 
indicates a decrease of 82% in investment-cash flow sensitivity once a foreign finn cross-lists 
it shares on US exchanges. 
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Table 3.3 : US cross-listing and lnvestment-Cash flow sensitivity: primary results 
This tabl e presents the results of the fo llowing regression: 
(! 1 K) ,,~ = (3 0 + (J,(CF I K), ,, + (J 2 (M 1 8) ,,~ _ 1 + (J , (Si:::e );, . 1 + B0CL,,, + B,CL ,,, *(CF 1 K) ,,~ 
+ B2CL,,, * (M 1 8) ,,,_ 1 + @3CL ,,, * (Size ),_, + e 1 ,~ 
Investment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total assets (CF/K), Firm 's market-to­
book ratio (M/8), firm 's size are the independent variables. In mode! (1), CLuis a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the fi rm has an ADR and 0 otherwise. ln mode! (2), CL;, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has an 
Exchange ADR and 0 otherwise. In mode! (3), CLu is a dummy vari ab le that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a private 
placement li sting (Rule I44A) and 0 otherwise. In mode! (4), CL1•1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of I if the fi rm hasan 
Over-the-Counter listing (OTC) and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted fo r heteroskedastici ty and clustering at the fi nn 
levet. P-values for two-tailed tests are in parentheses. One, two or three asteri sks denote signifi cance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectiveiy. Country, industry and year dummy vari ables are included but not reported 
Jndependent Mode/ ! Mode/2 Mode/3 Mode/ 4 
Variables NCL versus Ali NCL versus Exch NCL versus 144A NCL versus OTC 
ADRs listings li stin gs listings 
In terce pt -I.2685 -I .3884 -1 .3580 -1.8006 
(O.OII )'" (0 005) ... (0 .006) ... (0.00 1) ... 
Cash Flow 0.7 149 0.7070 0.7 11 3 0.63 13 
(0.001) ... (0 00 1) ... (0.00 1) ... (0 00 1)'" 
Market-to-Book -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 
(0.939) (0.918) (0.922) (0.937) 
Size 0. 1506 0. 1609 0.1590 0. 1954 
(0 001) ... (0.00 1) ... (0.00 1) ... (0 00 1) ... 
CL -1 .3920 0.32 18 -0.36 17 -1.0759 
(0.160) (0.060). (0.025) .. (0.00 1) ... 
CL * Cash Flow -0.01 70 -0.5833 -0.1335 0.1419 
(0.0()1) ... (0.001) " ' (0.001) ... (0.001) ... 
CL * Market-to-Book -0.0196 0.0003 -0.0495 -0.0268 
(0.225) (0 944) (0.160) (0 07 1)' 
CL * Size 0.1145 -0.0440 0.20 14 0.0602 
(0.101) (0.028) .. (000 1)'" (0 00 1)"' 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
N 106829 106829 106829 106829 
This pnmary finding clearly supports the fact that exchange listed firm s' face lower 
binding financing constraints in comparison to NCL firm s. In addition, the observed 
differences in levels of financ ing constraints between NCL firms and exchange listed fi rms 
are stati stically ( 1% leve!) significant. 
Next, we extend our primary ana lys is in two different ways . F irst, we estim ate mode! (3) 
in table (3 .3) where CLi.t is a dummy variable that takes the va lue of 1 if the fi rm has a private 
placement li sting (Rule 144A) and 0 otherwise . This additional test is performed in order to 
examine the financial impact of private placements li stings. Theoretically, as Rule 144A 
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programs have only weak regulatory consequences, we should expect them to have no effect 
on firm 's financing constraints. However, we argue that private placements can still alleviate 
binding firm 's financing constraints because such mechanism entails giving a specifie group 
of investors (institutional investors) privileged access to firm-specific information. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, we find strong evidence that private placements listings significantly 
reduce firm ' s financing constraints. To allow a clearer interpretation of our private 
placements tests, the results of mode! (3) in table (3.3) indicate that the coefficient on cash 
flow is 0.7113 for NCL firms and 0.5778 for Rule 144A listings; a decrease equivalent to 
18.76%. Even though private placements significant1y reduce the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity for foreign firms, the estimated effects are smaller in comparison to exchange 
listings effects. Second, we also predict that OTC listings do not offer comparable financial 
benefits as exchange or private placements listings. Mode! (4) in table (3.3) provides 
coefficient estimates of our OTC listings tests. In contrast to exchange and private 
placements programs, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction variable CLi,t 
* (CF /K)i,t suggests that OTC listings are associated with higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. 
ln sum, our primary empirical result is that investment decisions of exchange cross-listed 
firms are found to be significantly less sensitive to firm internai funds, which is consistent 
with the fact that US exchange cross-listing alleviates firm financing constraints. Further, the 
reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity is larger for US exchange listings in comparison 
to the other types of ADRs. ln the case of private placements, the results suggest that US 
cross-listing makes it easier for foreign firms to raise externat finance even though these 
programs do not require compliance with US disclosure rules. On the other hand, we show 
that OTC listings exhibit a significant increase in their investment-cash flow sensitivity. So 
far, consistent with the bonding hypothesis, we have established that US exchange cross­
li stings enhance the protection of outside investors which in turn makes it easier for the firm 
to raise externat capital. The bonding argument also implies that US cross-listing benefits 
should be larger for firm s originating from countries with weak institutions and less stringent 
information disclosure rules. To test this hypothesis, we propose to estimate the relation 
between US cross-listings and firm's financial constraints separately for developed and 
---- --- - - - -------
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emerging markets firms . Table (3 .4) reports results for developed markets sample. Using the 
estimates of81 in each model of table (3.4), we find that US cross-listing benefits are limited 
to US exchange programs, which provides further support for the bonding argument. In fact, 
in model (1 ), 81 is negative ( -0 .4397) showing that investment spending is less sensitive to 
internai capital for exchange CL firms . This result is also economically and statistically (5% 
level) significant. On the other hand, in model (2), our coefficient of interest is not significant 
(-0.5320 with a p-value of 0.424) suggesting that private placements do not alleviate firm's 
financing constraints for developed markets firms. Model (3) findings show that investment 
spending is more sensitive to internai funds for OTC firms. 
Table 3.4: US cross-listing and lnvestment-Cash flow sensitivity Developed markets results 
This table presents the results of the following regression: 
(! 1 K) ,,, = {J 0 + {J,(CF 1 K) ,,, + {J , (M 1 8) ,,,_, + {J , (Size ) ,,,_ , + fJ 0 CL ,,, + fJ ,CL ,,, *(CF 1 K) ,,, 
+ fJ ,CL '·' * (M 1 8) ,,,_ 1 + e ,CL ,,~ * (Si:e ) , _, + c ,,~ 
1 ndependent Mode/ 1 Model2 Mode/3 
Variables NCL versus Exch NCL versus 144A NCL versus OTC 
listings listings listings 
ln terce pt -0.0099 -0.0 158 -0.3576 
(0.929) (0.887) (0001)'" 
Cash Flow 0.8040 0.8045 0.6786 
(0.00 1) ... (0 001) ... (0.00 1) ... 
Market-ta-Book 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0 942) (0.94 1) (0 991) 
Size 0.0073 0.0071 0.0366 
(0.030) .. (0 .037) .. (0.00 1) ... 
CL 0.2406 0.1403 -0.1552 
(0.001) ... (0 001)'" (0 001)"' 
CL* Cash Flow -0.4397 -0.5320 0.1595 
(0.026) .. (0.424) (0.001) ... 
CL* Market-ta-Book 0.0000 0.0086 -0.0002 
(0.953) (0.930) (0.920) 
CL* Size -0.0152 -0.0090 0.0010 
(0.005) ... (0.644) (0.770) 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 
N 65487 65487 65487 
In the case of emerging markets firms, our results show that US cross-listing benefits are 
not limited to exchange programs. Table (3.5) reports the coefficients estimates for emerging 
markets specifications. It appears that private placements (madel 2) also allow emerging 
markets firms to face lower binding financial constraints . On the other hand, the cross-listing 
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impact remams larger for exchange listings. Furthermore, when we compare exchange 
listings effects between developed and emerging markets, our findings indicate that the 
degree to which US cross-listing alleviates firm financial constraints is more pronounced for 
firms originating from emerging markets. This additional result is consistent with our fourth 
hypothesis. Finally, in the case of OTC listings, the coefficient of the interaction variable 
CLi,t * (CF/K)i,t is positive and significant (l % leve!) indicating that OTC listings are 
associated with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity . 
Table 3.5: US cross-listing and Investment-Cash flow sensitivity Emerging markets results 
This table presents the results of the following regress ion: 
(Il K) ,,, = /] 0 + [J,(CF 1 K), ,, + [J 2 (M 1 8) ~,~ _ 1 + [J,(Size ) ,,1_ 1 + fJ 0 CL ,,, + fJ,CL~,~ *(CF 1 K )~,~ 
+ fJ 2CL •.t * ( M 1 8), ,,_, + fJ,CL '·' * (Size ) ,,,_, + c , ,~ 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/to tal assets (CF/K), Firm 's market-to­
book ratio (M/B), firm 's s ize are the independent variables. ln mode! (1), CLL, is a dummy variable thattakes the value of 1 if 
the firm has an Ex change ADR and 0 otherwise. ln mode! (2) , CLi.t is a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a 
private placement listing (Rule 144A) and 0 otherwise. ln mode! (3), CLi.t is a dummy variable thal takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has an Over-the-Counter listing (OTC) and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the firm leve!. P-values fo r two-tail ed tests are in parentheses. One, two or three asteri sks denote signifi cance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
leve ls, respective ly. Country, industry and year dummy variables are included but not reported 
lndependent Modell Model2 Model3 
Variables NCL versus Exch NCL versus 144A NCL versus OTC 
listings listings listings 
lntercept -4.9278 -4.9034 -6.4020 
(0001 )'" (0.001) ... (0.001 ) ... 
Cash Flow 0.7024 0.7070 0.6288 
(0.001) ... (0.001 ) ... (0 001 )'" 
Market-to-Book -0.001 9 -0.0019 -0 .0018 
(0 .41 9) (0.419) (0.454) 
Size 0.4232 0.4167 0.5092 
(0 00 1)'" (0.00 1) ... (0 .00 1) ... 
CL -0.1976 -1 .3959 -2.3475 
(0.609) (0 001 )'" (0001 )'" 
CL * Cash Flow -0.5901 -0.1318 0.1392 
(0.001) ... (0.001) ... (0.001) ... 
CL * Market-to-Book -0.1133 -0.0514 -0 .3 580 
(0.697) (0.3 58) (0 001) ... 
CL * Size -0.0 155 0.2540 0.1788 
(0.800) (0 .00 1) ... (0.00 1)"' 
Country dummies Ye V es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es V es Y es 
Year dummies V es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 
N 41342 41432 4 1342 
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To further asses any potential asymmetric impact of the cross-listing mechanism on 
firms' financing constraints, we also partition our sample into subsamples based on the leve) 
of investors ' protection . In particular, we use the anti-director rights scores from Djankov et 
al. (2008) (see appendix 1 for more details) to differentiate between countries that provide 
strong legal protection to minority investors and countries with poor protection of minority 
shareholders interests. Countries with scores above the sample median fall into the category 
with strong protection of minority investors. 
We expect firms originating from countries with poor investors protection to benefit more 
from the US cross-listing. Therefore, we should have more pronounced decline in the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity for these firms . Indeed, the results in table (3 .6) suggest that 
the investment to cash flow sensitivity declines significantly following an ADR listing in 
countries with poor legal protection of minority investors. For instance, in the case of 
exchange cross-listings, we find a large negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
between cash flow and the cross-listing dummy variable (-0.6634 with a p-value of 0.001). 
The coefficient of this interaction variable is not significant, however, for firms from 
countries that provide strong legal protection to minority investors (-0.2662 with a p-value of 
0.835). Consistent with prior literature, our findings show that US cross-listing benefits are 
large for firms originating from countries with lower rankings of shareholders' rights. 
117 
Table 3.6: US cross-listing and lnvestment-Cash flow sensitivity Separate estimations based on 
the level of investors' protection 
This tab le presents the results of the following regression: 
(1 1 K) ,,, = /] 0 +/],(CF 1 K), ,, + /l,(M 1 8), ,,_, + /l , (Size );,, _, + B0CL~,~ + B,CL,,~ *(CF 1 K) ,,, 
+ B,CL u * (M 1 8) 1,, _ , + B,CL 1 ,~ * (Size ) ,,,_, + e,,, 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total assets (CF/K), Firm's market-to­
book ratio (M/B), firm 's size are the independent variables. We use the anti-director ri ghts scores from Djankov et al. (2008) to 
differentiate between countries that provide strong legal protection to minority investors and countries with poor protection of 
minority shareholders interests. Countries with scores above the sample median fall into the category with strong protection of 
minority investors. Countries with scores below the sample median fall into the category with poor protection of minority 
investors. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm leve!. P-values for two-tailed tests are in 
parentheses. One, two or three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Country , industry and year 
du mm y variables are included but not reported 
Countries with strong legal protection Countries with poor legal protection 
lndependent 
for minori y investors for minoritv investors 
Mode/ / Mode/ 2 Mode/ 3 Mode/ 4 Variab les 
NCL versus Exch NCL versus 144A NCL versus Exch NCL versus 
listings listings listings 144A listings 
lntercept -1.51 12 -1.3587 -0 .9886 -1.1068 
(0.011) .. (0 .022) .. (0 .83 1) (0.81 0) 
Cash Flow 0.5819 0.5815 0.8066 0.8210 
(0.001 ) ... (0.001) ... (0 001)"' (0 001) ... 
Market-to-Book 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0 0002 
(0.896) (0.878) (0 .949) (0.947) 
Size 0.1545 0.1364 O. 1020 0.1086 
(000 1)"' (0.001) ... (0 .00 1)'" (000 1)"' 
CL 1.8282 0.7649 0.9738 -1.6881 
(0.402) (0.001) ... (0.650) (0 001) ... 
CL* Cash Flow -0.2662 0.0204 -0.6634 -0.2520 
(0.835) (0.960) (0.001)"' (0.001) ... 
CL* Market-to-Book -0.0002 -0.0542 -0.0370 -0.0532 
(0.956) (0.846) (0.79 1) (0. 117) 
CL * Size -0.1680 -0.0553 -0.0701 0.4784 
(0335) (0353) (0.658) (000 1)'" 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R' 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
N 50268 50267 56562 56562 
We also analyse whether the cross-listing benefits have faded after the enactment of SOX 
m 2002. As noted earlier, a number of recent studies examined the potential costs and 
benefits associated with SOX compliance. In the literature, it has been argued that SOX new 
rules can create significant costs for cross-listed firms that may outweigh any potential 
benefits. To test this hypothesis, we partition our sample into two subsamples. The first 
subsample includes only the pre-SOX data (1995-200 1) wh ile the second subsample covers 
the post-SOX data (2003-2007). Model (1) and (2) in table (3.7) report the coefficient 
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estimates for the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods, respectively. As expected, the resu lts of 
model (1) suggest that exchange cross- listings significantly alleviate firm 's financing 
constraints . In addition, for the post-SOX specification, the coefficient of the interaction 
variable CLi,t * (CF /K)i,t remains negative ( -0.6689) and significant ( 1% level), indicating th at 
exchange listings sti ll offer sign ificant financial benefits after the enactment of SOX. These 
findings are consistent with recent evidence in Doidge el al.2009, Hai l and Leuz, 2009, and 
Boubakri et al. 20 1 O. 
Table 3.7: lnvestment-Cash flow sensitivity for cross-listed and non cross-listed firms Sepa rate 
estimations before and after the enactment of SOX 
This table presents the results of the following regress ion: 
(! 1 K )u = flo + (J,( CF 1 K) 0 + (J,(M 1 8 ) ,,~_ 1 + (J,(Si=e ) ,_ ,_, + B0 CL, _, + B,CL , ,~ *(CF 1 K) 0 
+ B2CL 0 * (M 1 8),,,_1 + B,CL ,,~ * (Size ) 0 _1 + e, ,, 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total as sets (CF/K), Firm 's market-to­
book ratio (M/B), firm 's size are the independent variables. CL1, is a dummy vari able th at takes the value of 1 if the firm has an 
Ex change ADR and 0 otherwise. ln mode! ( 1 ), regress ion estimates are for the period be fore the enactmtnt of SOX ( 1995 -2001 ). 
ln mo del (2), regress ion estimates are for the period after the enactment of SOX (2003-2007). Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasti city and clustering at the firm leve!. P-values for two-tailed tests are in parentheses. One, two or three asteri sks 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Country, industry and year dummy variab les are included but not 
reported 
Jndependent Mode/ 1 Mode/2 
Variables Before SOX After SOX 
(1 995-200 1) (2003-2007) 
lntercept -5.1469 0.1 847 
(0. 00 1) ••• (0.725) 
Cash Flow 0.6658 0.7511 
(0 001 ) ... (0 00 1) ••• 
Market-to-Book -0.0006 0.000 1 
(0.870) (0.985) 
Size 0.4276 -0. 0214 
(0 00 1) ... (0 176) 
CL 03650 0.04 54 
(0.273) (0 817) 
CL * Cash Flow -0.3255 -0.6689 
(0.029) •• (0.001) ... 
CL * Market-to-Book 0.0014 0.00 18 
(0.8 12) (0.986) 
CL * Size -0.0747 0.0051 
(0 033) •• (0.853) 
Country dummies Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es 
Adjusted R' 0.05 0.08 
N 55425 40523 
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3.5.3. Robustness checks 
ln this section, we conduct extensive robustness tests to validate our primary findings. 
First, we add lagged values of cash and investment as additional independent variables in our 
equation (2). Second, we re-estimate our regressions using fixed firm and year effects models 
instead of country and industry fixed effects models. Third, we propose an alternative 
measure of firm financial constraints. Fourth, we separate between leve! II and Ill ADRs and 
re-estimate our equation (2) where CLi,t becomes a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm has a leve! Il ADR and 0 otherwise. The results of this additional analysis should 
provide sorne confidence that the main conclusions for exchange listings are not driven by 
leve! III programs who allow firms to raise capital and ultimately alleviate their financial 
constraints. Finally, we recognize that an important concern regarding our specifications is 
endogeneity. ln fact, non US firms with lower binding financial constraints could be more 
likely to cross-list in US markets which could introduce a selection bias in our estimates of 
the relation between US cross-listings and firm's financing constraints. For instance, non US 
firms might anticipate the likelihood of cross-listing in the US by gradually increasing 
disclosure and adopting better governance pracfices long before the cross-listing date. We 
will consider two approaches to address any presence of endogeneity. 
3.5.3.1. Additional control variables 
We want to examine the robustness of the results presented to this point with respect to 
changes in mode! specification. Table (3.8) reports the effect of including separately lags of 
cash and investment expenditures. We include lagged values of cash in equation (2) to 
control for the fact that investment-cash flow sensitivity is likely to be lower if firms have a 
lot of financial slack. As suggested by Cleary and Booth (2008), lagged values of cash may 
have explanatory power for investment when firms build up financial Jack in order to fund 
future investments without resorting to costly externat capital. In fact, firms facing binding 
financing constraints will tend to accumulate and use liquidity as a buffer against these 
constraints (Cieary and Booth, 2008). In addition, prior year values of investment (11_1) may 
also have explanatory power for current investment (11) when investment spending is not 
completed within one year (multi-year project) . 
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Indeed, in ali models of table (3.8), adding lagged values of cash or investment reduces 
the current cash flow coefficient. This result is consistent with the argument that investment 
expenditures can be considered as a multiple-year spending and that firms anticipate potential 
future financial constraints by building up fi nan cial slack. Further, in models ( 1) and (2) 
(table 3.8), the coefficients of the interaction term CLi,t * (CF/K)i,t are negative and 
significant suggesting that investment spending is less sensitive to internai capital for US 
exchange cross-listings and private placements. Also, the financial benefits of the cross­
listing decision remain larger for exchange listings. On the other hand, we are unable to 
document a consistent association between US cross-listing and firm financial constraints in 
the case of OTC listings. Overall, US exchange listings and private placements allow non US 
firms to strengthen their financial status and significantly alleviate their financial constraints. 
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Table 3.8: lnvestment-Cash flow sensitivity for cross-Iisted and non cross-listed firms: 
Additional results 
This table presents the results of Ûle fo llowing regression: 
(I l K) ,,1 = fJ 0 + (J1 (CF 1 K) ,,1 + (J , (M 1 B)u _1 + {J3 (Size) 1•1_1 + (J,Controls + fJ 0 CL u + fJ 1CL ,,1 *(CF 1 K) u 
+ fJ ,CL ,,1 * (M 1 8) ,,1_1 + fJ 3CL, ,1 * (Size ) 1.1_ 1 + B,CL 1•1 *Contrais + & 1•1 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total assets (CF/K), Fi rm 's market-to­
book ratio (M/8 ), firm 's size are the independent variab les . For robustness, we include lagged values of firm investment or cash 
in our main regress ion. Cash is cash and marketable securities. ln mode! (1), CLuis a dummy variable that takes tlle value of 1 if 
the firm has an Exchange ADR and 0 otherwise. ln mode! (2) , CL11 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a 
private placement li sting (Rule 144A) and 0 otherwise. ln mo del (3) , CLu is a du mm y variable th at takes the value of 1 if the 
firm hasan Over-the-Counter li sting (OTC) and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the firm levet. P-values for two-tai led tests are in parentheses. One, two or three asteri sks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
levels, respectively. Country, industry and year dummy variables are included but not reported 
lndependent Modell Morle/ 2 Mode/34 
Variables NCL versus Exch NCL versus l44A NCL versus OTC 
listings listings list ings 
lntercept -0 0600 - 1.0712 -0.0337 -1.03 18 -0 .2 11 8 -1.3752 
(0 .843) (0.022) .. (0.9 11 ) (0.027) .. (0.484) (0.003) ... 
Cash Flow 0.2362 0.3972 0.2398 0.3973 0.2302 0.3772 
(0 .00 1) ... (0.001) ... (0 001) .. . (0 .00 1) ... (0.001) .. . (0 .001) ... 
Market-to-Book -0.0000 -0 .0000 -0 .0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0 974) (0 984) (0 .974) (0 .988) (0.97 1) (0 .993) 
Size 0.0 193 0. 11 37 0.0 186 0.111 7 0.0324 0.141 3 
(0 .027) .. (0.00 1) ... (0.033) " (0.00 1) ... (0 .00 1) ... (0.00 1) .. . 
Lagged lnvestment 0.7844 0.7804 0.7697 
(0 .001) .. . (0 001) '" (0 .00 1) ... 
Lagged Cash 0.3784 0.3808 0.3345 
(0.001 ) '" (0.00 1) ... (0.00 1) ... 
CL -0.197 1 0.009 1 -0.3569 -0.50 13 -0.1698 -0 .9639 
(0 058) . (0 .955) (0 001) ... (0 .00 1) ... (0 11 7) (0.001) .. . 
CL • Cash Flow -0.2335 -0.3555 -0.0849 -0.0398 0.0107 -0.0984 
(0.001) ... (0.001) ... (0.001) ... (0.001) ... (0.001) ... (0.001) .. . 
CL • Market-ta-Book 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0092 -0.04 18 -0.0000 -0 .0 182 
(1.000) (0.990) (0 .663) (0.205) (0.992) (0.19 1) 
CL • Size 0.0092 -0 0 173 0.0579 0.1664 -0.0236 0.036 1 
(0.449) (0 .357) (0 001) ... (0 .00 1) ... (0 .008) ... (0 .009) .. . 
CL • Lagged lnvestment 0.00\0 0.0959 0.0255 
(0.987) (0 001 ) ... (0 001) ••• 
CL • Lagged Cash -0.2646 -0.0440 0.2355 
(0 008) ... (0 00 \ ) ... (0.00 \) ... 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0 .07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0 .07 
N 103969 105605 103969 105605 103969 105605 
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3.5.3.2. Estimation with fixed firm and year effects 
We re-estimate our main equation using fixed firm and year effects. Firm fixed effects 
models account for time-invariant firm characteristics that are unobservable or at least 
difficult to measure. Therefore, introducing firm fixed effects estimation should mitigate 
concerns about correlated omitted variables and selection bias based on unobservable time­
invariant firm characteristics (Hail and Leuz, 2009). Further, fixed time effects are included 
to capture aggregate business-cycle influences. Table (3.9) reports estimates of this 
alternative methodology. The reported firm fixed effects estimates are obtained by 
demeaning the observations with respect to the firm average for each variable. Year dummies 
are included but not reported. Again, our primary findings remain unchanged when we re­
estimate our main equation using fixed firm and year effects models instead of country and 
industry fixed effects models. 
In the case of exchange listings and private placements, the results of models (1) and (2) 
(Table 3.9) confirm the negative and significant association between the cross-listing 
mechanism and the investment-cash flow sensitivity. ln addition, the positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction variable CLi,t * (CF/K)i,t in the case of OTC cross-listings further 
support the fact that these programs do not allow foreign firms to alleviate their financial 
constraints. 
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Table 3.9: US cross-listing and lnvestment-Cash flow sensitivity Fixed firm and year effects 
estimation 
This table presents the results of the fo llowing regression : 
(1 1 K ) 1 ,~ = flo + (J 1 (CF 1 K ) 1,1 + (J , (M 1 8) ,,1_1 + (J , (Size ) 1 ,~_ 1 + B0 CL 1,1 + B,CL 1 ,~ *(CF 1 K ) 1•1 
+ B2 CL ,,1 * (M 1 8) ,,1_ 1 + B,CL ,,1 * (Size ), ,,_ 1 + e 1•1 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total assets (CFIK), Firm's market-to­
book ratio (M/8), firm 's size are the independent variab les. ln mode! (1 ), CLu is a dummy variable thal takes the value of 1 if 
the firm has an Ex change ADR and 0 otherwise. ln mode! (2), CLi.t is a dummy variable thal takes the value of 1 if the firm has a 
private placement listing (Rule 144A) and 0 otherwise. ln mode! (3), CLu is a dummy variable thal takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has an Over-the-Counter li sting (OTC) and 0 otherwise. Ali regress ions include firm fixed effects and year effects. Fixed 
firm effects account for unobserved lime-invariant relations between our explanatory variables and investment spending. Year 
dummies are include but not reported. P-values for two-tailed tests are in parentheses. One, two or three asterisks denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
ln dependent Mode/! Mode/2 Mode/3 
Variables NCL versus Exch NCL versus 144A NCL versus OTC 
listings listings listings 
lntercept -2.0291 -2.2078 -2.4249 
(0 00 1) ••• (0 001) ... (0 00 1) ... 
Cash Flow 0.5483 0.5626 0.4534 
(000 1)'" (0.00 1) ... (0.001) ... 
Market-to-Book -0 0001 -0 0001 -0.0001 
(0.948) (0.945) (0.952) 
Size 0.2164 0.2098 0.2405 
(0 00 1) ... (0.001) ... (0 001) ... 
CL -0.5207 -0.5775 -1.3431 
(0. 106) (0 07 1). (0 001)'" 
CL* Cash Flow -0.8251 -0.2791 0.2530 
(0.001) ... (0.001) ... (0.001) ... 
CL* Market-to-Book -0.0000 -0.01 20 -0.0019 
(0.988) (0.697) (0.881) 
CL * Size -0.1062 3.5101 0.7321 
(0.692) (0.001) ... (0.001)'" 
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es 
Adj usted R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 
N 106 829 106 829 106 829 
3.5.3.3. Alternative measure of firm financial constraints 
There is extensive empirical evidence supporting the argument that investment spending 
ts more sensitive to internai funds for firms with high levels of financial constraints. 
However, this interpretation is not without controversy. In fact, many other contributions do 
not consistently support the existence of a positive relation between investments and cash 
flow for constrained firms. For instance, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary ( 1999, 
2006) challenge the conclusions of Fazzari et al. ( 1988) approach . 
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To substantiate our interpretation of the relation between US cross-listing and firm's 
financing constraints, we propose an altematiYe measure of firm financing constraints. Wh ile 
there are many possible methods of measuring firm ' s financing constraints, we use the Cleary 
(1999, 2006) index in our robustness checks. Following the approach advocated by Cleary 
( 1999, 2006), firms are classified according to a beginning period financial status index (Z) . 
This alternative measure of firm's financ ial constraints is determined using multiple 
discriminant analysis which considers different characteristics shared by a pa1ticular firm and 
transform them into a univariate statistic. The Cleary index relies on the following variables: 
current ratio (Current), debt ratio (Debt), interest coverage (Cover), net incarne margin 
(Margin), sales growth (SG), and Return on Equity (ROE). A full description of these 
variables is included in the Appendix 2. Extreme values of these variables are winsorized. 
The discriminant score (Z) is calculated according to the following equation: 
Z = -0.11905 Current - 1.903670 Debt + 0.00138 Co ver + 1.45618 Margin + 2.03604 SG - 0.04772 ROE (3) 
Firms with high Cleary index are supposed to be less financially constrained . Summary 
statistics ofthe Z score are presented in table (3.10). The results ofthis alternative measure of 
firm's financial constraints support our primary finding of a negative relation between cross­
listing in US exchanges and the investment-cash flow sensitivity. In fact, the Z score for 
exchange cross-listings is -0.4066 while the same score is -1.1536 for non cross-listed firms 
suggesting that US exchange cross-listed firms are less financially constrained. In addition, as 
expected, OTC listings do not offer comparable financial benefits as exchange listings . On 
the other hand, based on Cleary index, Rule l44A cross-listings do not alleviate firm's 
financing constraints. 
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Table 3.10: Alternative measure of firm 's financing constraints (Cieary index) 
This table presents the results of the following equation: 
Z = -0.11 905 Current - 1.903670 Debt +0.00 138 Co ver + 1.45618 Margin + 2.03604 SG -0.04772 ROE 
The score (Z) is calculated using discriminant analys is. A full description of the variables is included in the Appendix 2. Firms 
are cl ass ified according to their cross-listing status before calculatim of the Cleary measure. 
Non CL ftrms Exchange listings Private listings OTC listings 
Discriminant score (Z) -1.1536 -0.4066 -7.7530 -7.9380 
3.5.3.4. Estimation based on levet II ADRs 
We also explore whether our exchange listings results are driven by leve! III programs 
who allow foreign firms to raise capital and ultimately alleviate their financial constraints. To 
test this argument, we separate between level Il and III ADRs and re-estimate our main 
equation using a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a leve] Il ADR and 
0 otherwise. The results of this additional analysis (table 3.11) suggest that level II listings 
allow firms to alleviate their binding financing constraints. In fact, our coefficient of interest 
(8 1) is negative and significant for ali specifications suggesting that investment spending is 
less sensitive to cash flow for firms with level II ADRs. 
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Table 3.11: Level II ADRs a nd Investmen t-Cash fl ow sensitivity 
This table presents the results of the following regression: 
(! 1 K) ,,, = /10 + /11(CF 1 K), + /1 2 (M 1 8), ,,_1 + /l,(Si:e ), .<-~ + fJ,Controls + B0 CL ,,, + B1CL, *(CF 1 K) ,, 
+ B,CL,,, * (M 1 8), ,,_1 + B3CL ,,, * (Si:e ), ,,_, + B,CL ~,~ * Contro/s + e, ,, 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total assets (C F/K) , Firm 's market-to­
book ratio (M/8), firm 's size are the independent variables. For robustness, we include lagged values of finn investment or cash 
in our main regression. Cash is cash and mark etable securities. CL;,~ is a dummy vari able thal takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
a leve! Il ADR and 0 o1herwise. 
lndependent Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
Variables NCL versus NCL versus NCL versus 
level II leve! II leve! II 
ADRs ADRs ADRs 
lntercept -1 .2825 -0.9522 0.0022 
(0.0 10) ... (0 04 1) .. (0 994) 
Cash Flow 0.7165 03943 0.2425 
(0.00 1) ... (0 00 1) ... (0 00 1) ... 
Market-to-Book -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.928) (0 994) (0.978) 
Size 0.1534 0.1052 0.0157 
(0 001)"' (0 00 1) ... (0 07 1). 
Lagged lnvestment 0.7867 
(0 001) ... 
Lagged Cash 03960 
(0 001) ... 
CL -03468 -0.4326 -0.2547 
(0.037) .. (0 .005)'" (0.011 ) .. 
CL * Cash Flow -0.0837 -0.0223 -0.0447 
(0.001) "' (0.006) ... (0.00 1) ... 
CL * Market-to-Book -0.06 11 -0.0548 -0.0248 
(0.050)" (0 060)' (0 .186) 
CL* Size 0.189 1 0.174 1 0.0830 
(0 00 1) ... (0.00 1) ... (000 1) '" 
CL • Lagged lnvestment -0.0362 
(0 001 ) ... 
CL • Lagged Cash -0.091 1 
(0 001)'" 
Country dummies Y es Y es Y es 
lndustry dummies Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.09 
N 106 829 105 605 103 969 
3.5.3.5. E ndogeneity 
A remaining concem is endogeneity. Cross-listing in the US is not a random decision and 
whenever an independent variable in a regression is the result of such a choice, it raises the 
possibility of an endogenous relation between the dependent variable and the chosen 
independent variable (CL,). The econometrie concem here is that the residual errors in our 
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regressions turn out to be correlated with the independent variable CL1 and the interaction 
variables, thus producing inconsistent coefficients. To mitigate this potential endogeneity 
problem, we consider two different approaches. First, we apply a self-selection mode) that 
contrais for this bias using Heckman 's (1979) two-step estimator. Second, we use time-series 
data for cross-listed firms only to examine how cross- listed firms ' financing constraints 
change after the listing date. 
For the Hec km an' s (1979) two-step estimation, we need, in the first stage, to mode! the 
choice of cross-listing in the US through a probit mode!. We follow Doidge et al. 2004 and 
make the cross-listing decision depend on firm and country characteristics: 
CLi = Wi'Y + ui (listing decision equation) ( 4) 
CLi = 1 if CLi > 0 ; 0 otherwise 
Where CLi is an unobserved latent variable, and Wi is a set of variables that affect the 
decision to cross-list. We use three country-leve! variables: the legal origin (common law 
dummy variable), accounting standards and an index of anti-director rights from Djankov et 
al. (2008). The accounting standards index rates companies' annual repmis for their inclusion 
or exclusion of 90 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 as the highest standard (Doidge et 
al. 2004). The anti-director rights index measures the leve! of protection for minority 
shareholders. ln addition to the country-leve! variables, we also attempt to control for firm­
level variables that could help explain the cross-listing behaviour. Severa! studies show that 
larger firms are more likely to cross-list on US exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) because 
these markets require that firms (!) pay high fees and (2) meet minimum size requirements. 
Further, firms with high expected growth and considerable need for externat funding are 
more likely to cross-list in the US Accordingly; we include firm size, market-ta-book, and 
leverage (ratio of long term debt to total assets) as additional explanatory variables in the 
mode! of the cross-listing choice. 
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In the second stage, we estimate our main equation: 
1; = bo + X; ~ + CL; 80 + CL; * X; e + E; (5) 
Where I; represents investment; X; is a set of exogenous variables; and CL; ts a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm hasan ADR and 0 otherwise. 
Table 3. 12 : U .S cross-listin g a n d Investmen t- Cas h fl ow sen s itiv ity Self-select ion bias estimation 
This tab le reports the results of the Heckman ( 1979) two-stage procedure . ln the fi rst stage, we specify a mode! of the cross­
li sting choice (probit mode!) as a function of country and finns characteristics. ln the second stage we estimate our main 
equation. ln mode! (1) , CLuis a dummy variab le that takes the value of 1 if the firm hasan Exchange ADR and 0 otherwise. ln 
mode! (2) , CL;.1 is a dummy variable thal takes the value of 1 if the firm has a private placement listing (Rule 144A) and 0 
otherwise. Regressions include country, industry, and year fi xed effects. P-values for two-tailed tests are in paren theses. One, 
two or three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% leve ls, respectively. 
Probi t m o d e l Mod e ll Model 2 
Dependent variab le Exch listings private listings 
(CL) 
Intercept 4 .0764 -4.0156 
(0001)'" (0.001)"" 
Size 03 121 0.2122 
(0 001)'" (0 00 1)'" 
Market-to-book -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.678) (0.957) 
Leverage 0.0020 0.0003 
(0322) (0 966) 
Common law dummy 0.7398 -0.6587 
(0.001 )'" (0 00 1)'" 
Anti -director index -0.7098 0.8764 
(0 00 1)'" (0 001)'" 
Accounting standards -0.0248 -0.0226 
(0001)'" (0 .00 1 )'" 
N 103830 103830 
Dependent vari able Mode/ / Mode/ 2 
(lnvestment) NCL versus Exch NCL versus 
listings private listings 
ln terce pt -17 .944 -11.056 
(0.007) ... (0 .092). 
Cash Flow 0.700 1 0.7245 
(0.00 1) .. . (0 001) ... 
Market-to-Book -0.0 144 -0.0048 
(0.627) (0.881) 
Size 0.9958 0.5990 
(0 002) ... (0.054). 
CL 3.6326 -3.1902 
(0.319) (0.588) 
CL* Cash Flow -0.5960 -0.1893 
(0.001) ... (0.001) ... 
CL* Market-to-Book 0.0080 -0.0407 
(0.957) (0 545) 
CL* Size -0.31 70 0.4320 
(0.228) (0.302) 
À 2.6270 -3 .8938 
(0.036) .. (0 .265) 
N 103 830 103 830 
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Table 3.12 presents the results of the Hec km an ( 1979) madel. Our findings suggest that 
larger firms are more likely to cross-list in the US. We also find that legal origin, accounting 
standards and the leve! of the protection of minority shareholders are significantly related to 
the cross-listing mechanism. Firms from common law countries are more likely to cross-list 
on US exchanges (madel 1 ). Further, firms originating from countries where investors are 
poorly protected and with lenient accounting standards are more likely to cross-list on US 
exchanges. The results of the second stage estimation suggest that our primary conclusions 
are robust to endogeneity. 
In addition to the Heckman ( 1979) procedure, we propose an alternate approach that 
relies on time-series data for US cross-listed firms (we do not consider non cross-listed firms 
data). As suggested earlier, it's possible that only firms with lower binding financing 
constraints choose to cross-list in the US and our contrais have not mitigated that effect. 
Therefore, we should use only our sample of ADRs listings and construct a Post-ADR 
dummy variable set equal to one for the years after the listing date and zero otherwise. We 
include this dummy variable to control for changes in the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
around the time of the ADR listing. The--regression specifications for this additional test take 
the following form: 
(6) 
+ ()1PostADR *(CF 1 K) ;,, + ()2 PostADR * (M 1 B) i.t - l + ()3 PostADR * (Size ) ;,~ _ 1 + &;,~ 
Where PostADR is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the listing date and 0 otherwise. 
Equation (6) is estimated using firm fixed effects. If we are witnessing self-se lection, we 
should not observe significant changes in the investment-cash flow sensitivity after the cross­
listing date. On the other hand, if US cross-listing alleviates firm ' s financing constraints, the 
coefficient on the interaction between cash flow and the Post-ADR dummy should be 
negative and significant. 
The results of our ADRs time series tests (table 3. 13) suggest that the investment to cash 
flow sensitivity declines significantly after the cross-listing date indicating that our primary 
findings are robust to endogeneity. 
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Table 3.13: Investment-Cash flow sensitivity before and after the listing date 
This table presents the results of the following regress ion: 
(! 1 K );J = /l 0 + /3 1(CF 1 K )u + {J , (M 1 8) ;., _1 + {J , (Si:::e l .. 1-1 + 80 PostADR + 8 1PostADR *( CF 1 K) ,., 
+ e , PostADR * (M 1 B) u _1 + 83 PostADR * (Si:::e );.,_1 + t: ,., 
lnvestment spending divided by total assets (1/K) is the dependent variable. Cash fl ow/total assets (CF/K), Firm 's market-tc­
book ratio (MIB), firm 's size are the independent variables. PostADR is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the li sting date and 0 
otherwise. ln mode! (1 ), regression estimates are for exchange listed firms. ln mode! (2), regress ion estimates are fo r private 
placements programs. Each mode! includes firm fi xed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the finn leve!. P­
values for two-tailed tests are in parentheses. One, two or three asteri sks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respective ly. 
Independent Modell Model2 
Variables Exchange li sted ADRs Private placements 
A ORs 
lntercept -1.3 694 -64 982 
(0.093). (0.709) 
Cash Flow 0.5376 0.6758 
(0.00 1) ... (0 .00 1)"' 
Market-tc-Book 0.0002 -1.6 11 4 
(0 .817) (0 .195) 
Size 0.1298 0.9778 
(0.032) .. (04 70) 
PostA DR 0.9392 0.26 14 
(0 .294) (0 989) 
PostADR • Cash Flow -0.4299 -0.1399 
(0.001 )"' (0.001) ... 
PostADR • Market-to-Book -0.0005 1.5658 
(0 .979) (0.209) 
PostA DR * Size -0.09 13 -0327 1 
(0 .172) (0.822) 
Adj usted R2 0.27 0.64 
N 2421 765 
L_---------------------------------------------------------------·--- --
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3.6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the hypothesis that non US firrns cross-list in the US to alleviate 
their financial constraints. Our analysis is based on models of capital market imperfections 
that show that information asymmetry increases the sensitivity of investment spending to 
fluctuations in internai cash flow. ln particular, we use the relation between investment and 
cash flow to test the presence and extent of financing constraints. According to Fazzari et al. 
( 1988), wh en the wedge between internai and externat cost of capital is large, firms are 
considered as financially constrained because they are effectively rationed in their access to 
externat funding. As a result, internai capital will impact investment and we can interpret 
greater investment-cash flow sensitivity as evidence that firms are facing binding financial 
constraints. 
We document severa! findings. First, consistent with the bonding hypothesis, we find a 
significant decline in the investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms that cross-list on US 
exchanges. These effects are sustained and exist after the SOX act. Further corroborating the 
bonding argument, the financial benefits of the cross-listing decision are large for US 
exchange listings and for firms originating from countries with weak institutions and less 
stringent information disclosure rules. Second, we also find evidence that private placements 
significantly reduce firm 's financing constraints even though these programs do not require 
compliance with SEC disclosure rules and US GAAP. One potential explanation for this 
result is that private placements programs entai! giving a specifie group of investors 
(institutional investors) privileged access to firm-specific information, which in turn makes it 
easier for the firm to raise externat capital. We also look at firms with OTC listings . Our 
findings suggest that OTC programs are associated with higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity . Finally, our evidence is robust to many aspects of our methodology. ln sum, our 
empirical results suggest that relaxation of firm 's financial constraints is an important benefit 
of a US cross-listing. 
APPENDIX 1 
COUNTRY -LEVEL VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
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Country-leve! variab les description 
This table summarizes variables for legal origin, shareho lder protection and accounting standards. The common 
law variab le represents a dummy set equal to 1 for countries fa lling into the common law legal system and 0 
otherwise. The Anti-director rights variable is taken for Djankov et al. (2008). It represents an index that 
measures the leve! of protection for minority investors. The accounting standards variable is an index that rates 
companies' annual reports for their inclusion or excl usion of90 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 as the 
highest standard (Ooidge et al. 2004). 
Commonlaw Anti-director rigltts Accounting 
dummv stantlards 
Panel A : Dcveloped markets 
Australia 1 0.79 75 
Austria 0 0.21 54 
Belgi um 0 0.54 61 
Canada 1 0.65 74 
Den mark 0 0.47 62 
Fin land 0 0.46 77 
France 0 038 69 
German y 0 0.28 62 
Gree ce 0 0.23 55 
Hong Kong 1 0.96 69 
Ire land 1 0.79 -
Ital y 0 039 62 
Japan 0 0.48 65 
Netherlands 0 0.21 64 
New Zealand 1 0.95 70 
Norway 0 0.44 74 
Portugal 0 0.3 36 
Singapore 1 1 78 
Spain 0 0.37 64 
Sweden 0 0.34 83 
Switzerland 0 0.27 68 
UK 1 0.93 78 
·Panel B : Emergi ng markets 
Argentin a 0 0.44 45 
Brazi l 0 0.29 54 
Ch ile 0 0.63 52 
China 0 0.78 -
Colombia 0 0.58 50 
Czech Republic 0 0.34 -
Hungary 0 0.2 -
lndia 1 0.55 57 
lndonesia 0 0.68 -
Israel 1 0.71 64 
Korea (South) 0 0.46 62 
Malaysia 1 0.95 76 
Mexico 0 0. 18 60 
Pakistan 1 0.41 -
Peru 0 0.4 1 38 
Philippines 0 0.24 65 
Po land 0 03 -
Russia 0 0.48 -
South Africa 1 0.81 70 
Taiwan 0 0.56 65 
Th ai land 1 0.85 64 
Turkey 0 0.43 51 
APPENDIX 2 
FOR THE CLEARY INDEX (1999, 2006), THE FINANCIAL VARIABLES ARE 
CALCULA TED AS FOLLOWS: 
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For the Cleary index (1999, 2006), the financial variables are calculated as follows: 
1. Current ratio= ( current assets)/ ( current liabilities) 
2. Debt ratio =(long term debt)/(total assets) 
3. coverage ratio= (earnings before interest and taxes)/(interest expenses) 
4. Net income margin =(net income)/(net sales) 
5. Sales growth = (sales1- sales1•1) / (salest-I) 
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CONCLUSION 
Nous avons voulu éclairer le lien entre inscriptions croisées, activités des analystes et 
valeur informative des prix des titres. Plus précisément, nous avons testé si les inscriptions 
croisées à la cote américaine et un suivi plus accru des analystes financiers se traduisent par 
des prix de marché qui reflètent plus d'informations au sujet des bénéfices futurs de 
l'entreprise. La pertinence de cette étude est double puisqu'elle cherche à lier la relation 
rendement-bénéfices aux mécanismes des inscriptions croisées et aux activités des analystes, 
un exercice qui , à notre connaissance, n' a pas été entrepris jusqu'à présent dans la littérature. 
Étant donné que les prix de marché des actifs financiers sont censés représenter la valeur 
présente des flux monétaires futurs , nous avons jugé intéressant d'étudier l'impact de ses deux 
phénomènes sur la relation rendement-bénéfices. 
Notre premier article cherche à documenter comment l'inscription croisée à la cote 
américaine influe sur la relafion entreîe prix de marché actuel et les bénéfices actuels et 
futurs de l'entreprise. Si une telle inscription permet aux informations relatives aux bénéfices 
futurs d'être reflétées de manière plus prononcée au niveau des prix actuels, on peut conclure 
que le mécanisme de l'inscription croisée est associé à une meilleure accessibilité 
informationnelle. Notre approche méthodologique nous permet de faire une contribution 
importante à la littérature des inscriptions croisées puisqu'elle est appliquée pour la première 
fois au niveau de cette littérature. Une telle approche est basée sur les travaux de Collins et al. 
( 1994) qui proposent de régresser les rendements actuels d'une firme sur ses bénéfices actuels 
et futurs. Le fait de trouver des coefficients de réponse des bénéfices futurs élevés signifie 
que les prix actuels reflètent plus d'informations au sujet des bénéfices futurs de l'entreprise, 
et par conséquent, de tels prix peuvent être considérés comme étant informatifs pour les 
investisseurs. Nos résultats indiquent que l'inscription croisée à une bourse US (NASDAQ et 
NYSE) ne permet pas d' intégrer plus d'informations sur les bénéfices futurs dans les prix de 
marché actuels. Ceci signifie que de telles inscriptions n'ont aucun impact sur 
l' environnement informationnel des firmes non américaines. D'un autre côté, nous avons 
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aussi documenté que les programmes d'inscriptions croisées privés (Rule 144A) et ceux qui 
se négocient sur le marché hors cote (OTC) n'offrent aucun bénéfice en terme d'informativité 
des prix. De tels résultats sont consistants avec les exigences d'informations minimales qui 
sont imposées aux programmes privés et hors cote. 
Notre deuxième article examine le rôle informationnel des analystes financiers. En 
général, ces agents sont considérés comme des experts des marchés financiers dont les 
activités consistent, principalement, à émettre des prévisions sur les bénéfices futurs des 
entreprises et des recommandations d'achat ou de vente. Nous proposons, dans ce papier, 
d'étudier le rôle de ces intervenants en rapport avec l'hypothèse d'efficience des marchés. Il 
faut savoir qu'une telle question a fait l'objet de plusieurs études dans la littérature financière. 
Cependant, il existe très peu de recherches qui relient les activités des analystes au processus 
de formation des prix. Nous espérons, grâce à notre deuxième papier, remédier à une telle 
lacune et contribuer à une meilleure compréhension de l'impact des analystes financiers sur 
un tel processus. Notre approche méthodologique est la même que celle adoptée au niveau du 
premier papier. Par conséquent, notre but consiste à tester la relation qui peut exister entre le 
suivi des analystes et les coefficients de réponses des bénéfices futurs. Une association 
positive entre ces deux variables signifie que les activités des analystes se traduisent par des 
prix de marché plus informatifs. De plus, notre analyse est appliquée séparément aux 
entreprises des marchés émergents et celles des marchés développés. Le but de cet examen 
additionnel est de vérifier l'incidence des facteurs institutionnels (le système de protection des 
actionnaires, la réglementation de l'audit...) sur le compo1tement et l'efficacité des analystes 
financiers. Nos résultats indiquent qu'un suivi accru de la part des analystes permet aux prix 
des actions des firmes, originaires de marchés développés, d'incorporer plus d' informations 
au sujet de leurs bénéfices futurs . Dans le cas des marchés émergents, nos résultats suggèrent 
que les activités des analystes ne réduisent pas les asymétries d' information. Ces résultats 
sont robustes aux changements de différents aspects de notre méthodologie. Globalement, il 
semble que les analystes financiers jouent un rôle positif au niveau des marchés développés . 
Leurs prévisions des bénéfices futurs, au niveau de ces marchés, peuvent être considérées 
comme de bons indicateurs des bénéfices futurs réels de l'entreprise. D'un autre côté, le degré 
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de précision des prévisions faites par les analystes financiers ne permet pas aux investisseurs 
des pays émergents de mieux évaluer les perspectives d'avenir de la firme. 
Notre troisième article vise à clarifier l'impact des inscriptions croisées sur les contraintes 
financières des firmes . L'intérêt de cette question provient du fait que de telles contraintes 
peuvent limiter tout potentiel de croissance des firmes. La notion de contraintes de 
financement repose sur l'existence d'un écart de coût entre le financement interne et les 
sources de financement externes. Ainsi, l'investissement peut dépendre de facteurs financiers 
tels que la disponibilité des fonds internes. La traduction empirique de ce concept, au niveau 
de tout un pan de la littérature, consiste à mesurer la sensibilité des dépenses 
d'investissements aux cash-flows de l'entreprise. Lorsque le niveau d'investissement est très 
sensible à toute variation des cash-flows, les firmes sont considérées comme financièrement 
contraintes. L'article de Fazzari et al. (1988) est le point de départ de plusieurs études qui ont 
analysé l'impact des contraintes financières sur le comportement des investissements. Pour 
évaluer l'impact des contraintes de financement sur l'investissement des firmes, ces études 
procèdent, en premier lieu, à une classification des firmes selon leurs coûts d'information . 
Ainsi, certaines recherches regroupent les entreprises en fonction de leur politi-que de 
dividende, leur taille, leur âge, la présence ou pas d'une notation de la dette ... etc. Par la suite, 
la sensibilité des investissements aux cash-flows est mesurée pour chaque catégorie. Les 
résultats obtenus suggèrent que les entreprises contraintes sur le plan financier ont tendance à 
avoir des sensibilités plus élevées de l'investissement vis à vis des cash-flows. 
Nous nous inspirons de la méthodologie proposée par Fazzari et al. ( 1988) pour tester 
l'impact de l'inscription croisée sur les contraintes financières des entreprises non US. Nos 
résultats indiquent que les inscriptions à l'une des bourses américaines atténuent de manière 
significative les contraintes de financement des sociétés non américaines. De plus, les 
bénéfices financiers associés aux inscriptions à des bourses US sont plus prononcé par 
rapport à ceux générés par les programmes privés (Rule 144A). Par ailleurs , les programmes 
qui se négocient sur le marché hors cote n'offrent pas d 'avantages financiers similaires à 
ceux des programmes boursiers et privés. Nos résultats indiquent aussi que la réduction des 
contraintes de financement est plus prononcée pour les entreprises originaires de marchés 
émergents. Par conséquent, l'intercotation dans une bourse américaine peut aider les 
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entreprises à contourner les sources de con tl its d'intérêts entre les actionnaires et 
gestionnaires. Il semb le qu'un tel mécanisme oblige les dirigeants de l'entreprise à respecter 
des normes de gouvernance accrues et à renoncer à l' expropriation des actionnaires 
minoritaires, en contrepartie de bénéfices liés à cette opération. 
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